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Key 
**Indicates date Notice of Intent to File a Claim was filed, the first step in the NAFTA investor-state process when an investor notifies a 
government that it intends to bring a NAFTA Chapter 11 suit against that government. 
 *Indicates date Notice of Arbitration filed, the second step in the NAFTA investor-state process when investor notifies an arbitration body that it 
is ready to commence arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
The two venues for the adjudication of NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes are the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nation’s Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
 
 
Corporation 
 or Investor 
 
Venue 
 
Damages 
Sought 
(U.S.$) 
 
Status of 
Case 
 
Issue  
 
 
Cases & Claims Against the United States 
 
 
Loewen 
Oct. 30, 1998* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$725 million 
 
Dismissed 
 
Canadian funeral conglomerate challenged large Mississippi state court 
damage award granted by a jury in a contract dispute suit by a local company 
claiming Loewen engaged in anti-competitive, predatory business practices.  
June 2003 – Claim dismissed on procedural basis. Tribunal found that 
Loewen’s reorganization as a U.S. corporation under U.S. bankruptcy law 
destroyed the firm’s ability to bring the NAFTA claim as a foreign investor.  
 
Mondev 
Sep. 1, 1999* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$50 million 
 
Dismissed 
 
Canadian real estate developer challenged City of Boston’s actions in 
development contract dispute and adverse state supreme court ruling that 
denied the firm compensation on the grounds that city actions were shielded 
by principle of sovereign immunity.  
October 2002 – Claim dismissed on procedural grounds. Tribunal found that 
the majority of Mondev’s claims, including of expropriation, were time-barred 
meaning that the dispute on which the claim was based predated NAFTA and 
that court rulings were well founded in state law.  
 
Methanex 
Dec. 3, 1999* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$970 million  
 
Pending 
 
Canadian corporation which produces methanol, a component chemical of 
gasoline additive MTBE, challenges California phase-out of MTBE, which is 
contaminating drinking water throughout the state. 
August 2002 – Jurisdictional ruling indicates that because Methanex only 
produces a component ingredient of MTBE, methanol, not the actual product, 
company is to “distant” from the MTBE ban to qualify as a firm harmed by it, 
suggesting that certain MTBE producers may be qualified to bring similar 
NAFTA suits. Methanex allowed to resubmit claim to demonstrate how the 
MTBE ban was specifically directed toward methanol producers instead of 
merely affecting them. U.S. government has spent $3 million on legal 
defense to date on case, which NAFTA supporters are eager to have 
dismissed permanently on technical grounds for fear of political ramifications 
if Methanex wins.  
 
ADF Group 
Jul. 19, 2000* 
 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$90 million  
 
Dismissed 
 
Canadian steel contractor challenged U.S. Buy America provision in Virginia 
highway construction contract. 
January 2003 – Claim dismissed on procedural grounds. Tribunal found that 
the basis of the claim constituted “government procurement” and therefore 
fell under the procurement provisions of NAFTA, Chapter 10, not Chapter 11.  
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James Baird 
Mar. 15, 2002** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$13 billion 
 
 
 
Canadian investor challenged U.S. policy of disposing nuclear waste at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada site. Investor claims to have patents for alternative 
waste disposal method and location. 
 
Doman 
May 1, 2002** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$513 million 
 
 
 
Canadian company seeks damages over May 2002 application by the U.S. of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber. 
 
Canfor 
Jul. 9, 2002* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$250 million 
 
Pending 
 
Canadian company seeks damages over May 2002 application by the U.S. of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber. 
 
Kenex 
Aug. 2, 2002* 
 
UNCITRAL  
 
$20 million 
 
Pending 
 
Canadian hemp production company challenged U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency regulations criminalizing importation of hemp foods. In 2004 the firm 
won a U.S. federal court case charging that the agency overstepped its 
statutory authority when issuing the rules. Status of NAFTA case unclear. 
 
Ontario Limited 
Sep. 9, 2002** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced 
 
$38 million  
 
Canadian company seeks return of property after its bingo halls and financial 
records were seized during an investigation for RICO violations in Florida. 
 
Tembec  
Dec. 3, 2003* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$200 million 
 
Pending Canadian company seeks damages over May 2002 application by the U.S. of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber. 
 
Glamis Gold  
Dec. 9, 2003* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$50 million 
 
Pending 
 
Canadian company seeks compensation for California regulation requiring 
backfilling and restoration of open pit mines that would damage Native 
American sacred sites.  
 
Albert J. Connolly 
Feb. 19, 2004** 
 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced 
 
Value of 
expropriated 
property 
  U.S. investor claims real estate was expropriated by Canadian government to 
be used as a park. 
 
Grand River  
Mar. 10, 2004* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$340 million 
 
Pending 
 
Small Canadian tobacco company seeks damages in claim challenging U.S. 
tobacco settlements due to the requirement that tobacco companies 
contribute to state escrow funds set up by state law. 
 
Terminal Forest 
Products 
Mar. 30, 2004* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$90 million 
 
Pending 
 
Canadian company seeks damages over May 2002 application by the U.S. of 
anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Canadian softwood lumber. 
 
Canadian Cattlemen 
for Fair Trade 
Aug. 12, 2004** 
 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced 
 
$300 million   
 
Group of Canadian cattlemen and feedlot owners seeks compensation for 
losses incurred when the U.S. halted imports of live Canadian cattle after the 
discovery of a case of BSE (mad cow disease) in Canada in May 2003. 
 
Cases & Claims Against Canada 
 
 
Signa 
Mar. 4, 1996** 
 
Arbitration 
never 
commenced  
 
$40 million  
 
Mexican pharmaceutical manufacturer filed challenge of Canadian patent law 
which blocked the manufacture of a generic equivalent to CIPRO, the multi-
spectrum antibiotic. Little is known with regard to the disposition of this case. 
 
Ethyl 
Apr. 14, 1997* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$250 million 
 
Settled; 
Ethyl wins, 
$13 million 
paid 
 
U.S. chemical company challenged Canadian environmental regulation of 
gasoline additive MMT. 
July 1998 – Canada loses NAFTA jurisdictional ruling, reverses ban, pays 
$13 million in damages and legal fees to Ethyl. 
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S.D. Myers 
Oct. 30, 1998* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$20 million 
 
S.D. Myers 
wins, 
$4.8 million 
paid 
 
U.S. waste treatment company challenged Canadian ban of PCB exports. 
Ban was compliant with multilateral environmental treaty on toxic waste trade 
November 2000 – NAFTA tribunal dismisses S.D. Myers claim of 
expropriation, but upholds claims of discrimination and equates this violation 
with a violation of the minimum standard of treatment required by 
international law. Panel also states that “market share” could constitute a 
NAFTA protected investment. 
 
Pope & Talbot 
Mar. 25, 1999* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$381 million 
 
P&T wins, 
$582,000 
paid 
 
U.S. timber company challenged Canada’s implementation of 1996 U.S.-
Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement.  
April 2001 – NAFTA tribunal dismissed claims of expropriation and 
discrimination, but held that the rude behavior of the Canadian government 
officials seeking to verify firm’s compliance with Softwood Lumber Agreement 
constituted a violation of the minimum standard of treatment required by 
NAFTA for foreign investors. Tribunal also stated that “market access” could 
be considered a NAFTA-protected investment. 
 
UPS 
Apr. 19, 1999* 
 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$160 million 
 
Pending 
 
UPS claims that Canadian post office parcel delivery service, due to its status 
as a public service, enjoys NAFTA-illegal subsidies that undermine the 
market share of foreign private sector competitor UPS. 
 
Sun Belt 
Oct. 12, 1999* 
 
Arbitration has 
not yet 
commenced 
 
$10 billion 
 
Unknown 
 
U.S. water company challenged moratorium by Canadian province (British 
Columbia) on bulk water exports.  
 
Ketchum and Tysa 
Investments 
Dec. 22, 2000** 
 
Arbitration 
never 
commenced 
   U.S. softwood lumber firms challenged Canadian implementation of 1996 
Softwood Lumber Agreement. Case later withdrawn, perhaps due to limited 
success of similar Pope & Talbot case. 
 
Trammel Crow 
Sep. 7, 2001** 
 
Arbitration 
never 
commenced 
 
$32 million 
 
Settled 
 
U.S. real estate company filed complaint regarding discrimination over 
Canada Post’s competitive bidding process. Reportedly settled in 2002. 
 
Crompton 
Nov. 6, 2001** 
 
Arbitration has 
not yet 
commenced  
 
$100 million 
 
 
 
U.S. chemical company, producer of pesticide lindane, a hazardous 
persistent organic pollutant, challenges voluntary agreement established in 
Canada to restrict production of the chemical.  
 
Cases & Claims Against Mexico 
 
 
Amtrade 
International 
Apr. 21, 1995** 
 
 
Arbitration 
never 
commenced 
 
$20 million  
 
U.S. firm claimed it was discriminated against by a Mexican firm while 
seeking to bid for pieces of property, in violation of a pre-existing settlement 
agreement. Little is known with regard to the disposition of this case. 
 
Metalclad 
Jan. 13, 1997* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$90 million 
 
Metalclad 
wins, $15.6 
million paid 
 
U.S. firm challenged Mexican municipality’s refusal to grant construction 
permit for toxic waste dump and governor’s declaration of ecological 
preserve surrounding the site. 
August 2000 – NAFTA tribunal ruled that the denial of the construction permit 
and the creation of an ecological reserve are tantamount to an “indirect” 
expropriation and that Mexico violated the minimum standard of treatment 
guaranteed foreign investors because the firm was not granted a “clear and 
predictable” regulatory framework. In October 2000, the Mexican government 
challenged the NAFTA ruling in Canadian court alleging arbitral error. A 
Canadian judge ruled that the tribunal erred in part by importing transparency 
requirements of NAFTA Ch 18 into Ch 11 and reduced award by $1 million. 
In 2004, the Mexican federal government’s effort to hold state financially 
responsible failed in Mexican Supreme Court. 
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Azinian, et al. 
Mar. 10, 1997* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$19 million 
 
Dismissed 
 
U.S. investors challenged revocation of solid waste collection contract by 
City of Naucalpan and Mexican federal court decision upholding the 
revocation. 
November 1999 – Claim dismissed. NAFTA tribunal held that the firm made 
fraudulent misrepresentations with regard to its experience and capacity to 
fulfill the contract and dismissed claims of expropriation and unfair treatment.  
 
Waste Management 
Sep. 29, 1998* 
Resubmitted: 
Sep. 18, 2000* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$60 million 
 
Dismissed 
 
U.S. waste disposal giant challenged City of Acapulco revocation of waste 
disposal concession, also implicated Mexican courts and the actions of 
Mexican government banks.  
April 2004 – Claim dismissed. Tribunal found that the investor’s business 
plan was based on unsustainable assumptions and that none of the 
government bodies named in the complaint failed to accord the minimum 
standard of treatment, nor did the city’s actions amount to an expropriation. 
 
Karpa (Feldman) 
Apr. 7, 1999* 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$50 million 
 
Karpa wins, 
$1.5 million 
paid 
 
U.S. cigarette exporter challenged denial of export tax rebate by Mexican 
government.  
December 2002 – The tribunal rejected an expropriation claim but upheld a 
claim of discrimination after the Mexican government failed to provide 
evidence that the firm was being treated similarly to Mexican firms in “like 
circumstances.” Karpa attempted to bring this ruling into Canadian domestic 
court, but its case was dismissed by a Canadian judge.  
 
Scott Ashton Blair 
May 21, 1999** 
 
Arbitration 
never 
commenced  
 
Value of 
property he 
owns 
  U.S. investor purchased a residence and restaurant in Mexico and claims he 
was a harassed by Mexican government officials and improperly jailed 
because he was a U.S. citizen. 
 
Adams, et al. 
Feb. 16, 2001* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$75 million 
 
 
 
U.S. landowners challenged Mexican court ruling that developer who sold 
them property did not own land and therefore could not convey it. 
 
Lomas Santa Fe 
Aug. 28, 2001** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$210 million 
  
An American real estate development company claimed Mexican 
government discriminated against him and expropriated land intended for 
commercial development. Implicated adverse Mexican court decision as well. 
 
Fireman’s Fund 
Oct. 30, 2001* 
 
ICSID 
 
$50 million 
 
Pending 
 
U.S. insurance corporation alleges that Mexico’s handling of debentures 
issued to capitalize a bank was discriminatory. 
 
Francis Kenneth 
Haas 
Dec. 12, 2001** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$17 million 
  
American citizen claimed he was cheated out of his rights in an investment 
firm held with former Mexican business partners. Implicated state 
government officials as well. 
 
GAMI Investments 
Apr. 9, 2002* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$55 million 
 
Dismissed 
 
U.S. minority-share investors in Mexican sugar mills challenged failure of 
government to ensure profitability of mills and September 2001expropriation 
of five debt-ridden sugar mills. In Nov. 2004, NAFTA panel dismissed all 
claims after Mexican Supreme Court reversed the challenged expropriations.  
 
Thunderbird Gaming 
Aug. 1, 2002* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$100 million 
 
Pending 
 
Canadian company operating three video gambling facilities in Mexico 
challenges government’s closure of facilities. Most forms of gambling are 
illegal in Mexico. 
 
Robert J. Frank 
Aug. 5, 2002* 
 
UNCITRAL 
 
$1.5 million 
 
 
 
U.S. citizen challenges government confiscation of vacation property alleged 
to be his in Baja California, Mexico.  
 
Calmark  
date not avail.** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$400,000 
 
 
 
U.S. company challenges Mexican domestic court decisions regarding a 
development project planned for Cabo San Lucas, alleging company was 
cheated out of property and compensation by various individuals. 
 
Halchette 
1995 
 
No public 
documents 
available 
 
Unknown 
  
Halchette, a U.S. firm which operates airport concessions in Mexico, filed a 
otice of claim. Disposition of the case is unknown. n
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ADM and A.E. Staley 
Oct. 13, 2003** 
 
Unknown 
 
$100 million  
 
U.S. company is leading producer of high fructose syrup HFCS, a soft drink 
sweetener. Agribusiness giant seeking compensation against Mexican 
government for imposing an allegedly discriminatory tax against its 
subsidiary company and HFCS exports to Mexico. 
 
Corn Products  
Oct. 21, 2003** 
 
 
ICSID 
 
$325 million  
 
U.S. company is leading producer of high fructose syrup HFCS, a soft drink 
sweetener. Agribusiness giant seeking compensation against Mexican 
government for imposing an allegedly discriminatory tax against its 
subsidiary company and HFCS exports to Mexico. 
 
Bayview Irrigation 
Aug. 27, 2004** 
 
Arbitration 
has not yet 
commenced  
 
$550 million  
 
17 water rights holders in the United States challenge Mexico’s alleged 
failure to implement 1944 water-sharing treaty governing water in the Rio 
Grande. 
 
Summary 
 
 
Total Claims Filed 
Against All 3 NAFTA 
Parties: 
 
42 Cases 
 
$28 billion  NOTE: This amount excludes cases where there has been a final award, and includes the Baird and Sun Belt claims, which are disproportionately high. 
Without Baird and Sun Belt, total claims against all three NAFTA parties is $5 
billion. 
 
Total Cases 
Currently in Active 
Arbitration: 
 
11 Cases    7 against the United States, 1 against Canada, 3 against Mexico 
 
 
Dismissed Cases 
(Won by NAFTA 
governments): 
 
6 Cases 
 
  
 
Loewen, Mondev, ADF, Azinian, Waste Management, GAMI 
 
Cases Won by 
Investors: 
 
5 Cases 
 
$35 million 
awarded 
  Ethyl, S. D. Myers, Pope & Talbot, Metalclad, Karpa (Feldman)  
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NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Eleven years ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United 
States, Canada and Mexico went into effect after heated debate.1 NAFTA was called a trade agreement. 
Yet, much of it focused on investment issues – establishing rights for foreign investors to acquire, own 
and operate broad categories of NAFTA-defined “investments” within the NAFTA nations and restricting 
governments’ regulation of such investors and their investments.  
 
The NAFTA debate was characterized by more heat than light. NAFTA’s supporters were able to 
frame the fight in sweeping terms. NAFTA critics who raised concerns about specific provisions were 
broadly labeled protectionist, fearful, and backward, while proponents promised grand, if vague, benefits 
from NAFTA. As a result, few people had any idea that NAFTA contained several radical, experimental 
aspects never before included in a U.S. free trade agreement. 
 
Among the most astounding of these of these surprises was NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investment 
rules. Therein signatory governments are required to provide extensive rights and privileges to foreign 
investors, and investors are empowered to privately enforce these new rights by demanding cash payment 
from governments for actions foreign investors claim violate their NAFTA privileges. These cases are 
decided in private “investor-state” arbitral tribunals operating outside the nations’ domestic court system, 
yet millions in taxpayers dollars can be demanded and awarded. These NAFTA rules grant foreign 
investors greater rights when operating within the United States than those available to U.S. residents or 
businesses under the Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
This report, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases: Lessons for the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement, provides detailed analysis of the 42 cases and claims to date – 
many of them not previously publicly known – in which foreign investors have demanded compensation 
from NAFTA nations. The track record of cases demonstrate an array of attacks on public policies and 
normal governmental activity at all levels of government − federal, state and local. Even though these 
NAFTA cases implicate commonplace public policies, the investor-state system is a closed and 
unaccountable one. Citizens whose policies are being attacked have no avenue of meaningful 
participation and neither do the state and local officials they elected to represent them. Court decisions 
can be challenged and jury decisions undermined, yet no judge or jury has standing to participate in the 
private NAFTA tribunals.  
 
This report is the most comprehensive analysis of NAFTA cases yet published in the United 
States. To date, foreign investors have been granted monetary compensation in five cases and in six cases, 
investors’ claims have been rejected. Although the number of concluded cases is small it is notable that 
already $35 million has been awarded to foreign investors by NAFTA tribunals or governments as part of 
a settlement agreement – often over claims that would not have been allowed under domestic law or in 
domestic courts. Another $28 billion has been claimed by NAFTA investors (please see “Table of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases and Claims” at start of report for further details). In addition, the U.S. 
government has spent millions in legal fees fighting foreign investors’ claims under NAFTA. 
 
Our findings demonstrate that NAFTA’s model of extensive foreign investor privileges and their 
private enforcement outside of the domestic court system should not be replicated in future agreements. 
Over the past several years, as news of some of the more controversial cases has hit the papers, members 
of Congress, state Supreme Court chief justices, state attorneys general, mayors, other state and local 
officials and taxpayers have raised an array of serious concerns about the legitimacy of private dispute 
resolution for matters of public concern.  
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Yet, currently a NAFTA expansion to six additional countries, called the Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), is being promoted by the Bush administration.2 As described in this report, 
most of the problems Congress and others raised about NAFTA’s Chapter 11 foreign investor protection 
were not remedied in CAFTA’s investment chapter (Chapter 10), which would expose the United States 
to claims from foreign investors – including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies – from six additional 
nations and expose the Central American CAFTA signatories and the Dominican Republic to similar 
attacks. 
 
NAFTA Provides “Greater Rights” to Foreign Investors to Challenge Government 
Policies and Decisions 
 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has been called “an extraordinary legal invention”3 in large part because it 
gives significantly greater rights to foreign investors operating on U.S. soil than U.S. firms enjoy. First, 
the sovereign immunity shield – the long-standing common law principle that governments cannot be 
sued for certain types of activities – does not apply in NAFTA’s private tribunal system. This means that 
foreign investors are empowered to sue the United States for cash compensation over federal, state and 
local policies in instances when U.S. residents and companies would have no such right. Second, NAFTA 
requires signatory governments to provide to foreign investors a variety of substantive rights that go 
beyond those that the U.S. Supreme Court – in balancing the specific interests of property owners with 
the broader public interest in public health and safety – has ruled are provided by the U.S. Constitution. 
This means that under NAFTA, foreign investors operating within the United States must be provided 
with different – superior from the investor’s perspective – treatment than the Constitution requires be 
provided to U.S. residents and businesses. If such treatment is not provided, the foreign investor may 
demand cash compensation from the U.S. government for the government’s failure to deliver on the 
foreign investor’s NAFTA rights. 
 
Indeed, many of the claims lodged by foreign investors in the NAFTA investor-state tribunals 
would not be allowed under U.S. law. For instance, the “expropriations” that have been claimed using 
NAFTA’s foreign investor protections are nothing like the “nationalization” or government seizure of real 
estate that is generally conveyed by the term. Nor are they similar to the “takings” cases that have been 
adjudicated in the U.S. court system.  
 
The “Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The takings doctrine has been 
used to facilitate the construction of roads and highways, public utilities, power lines, sports stadiums and 
other public facilities. Under this doctrine, the government may take private property for public use if 
there is a public interest in doing so. The decision is made in a manner that provides due process to the 
private property owner and the private property owner is compensated. Corporations and conservative 
anti-environment groups have worked for two decades to broaden the notion of takings to encompass 
what they call “regulatory takings.” Their goal is to require that governments compensate private property 
owners whenever environmental, land use or other regulations tangentially impact property value so as to 
create pressure to roll back such public interest measures. For example, these groups have launched legal 
attacks against the Endangered Species Act (ESA) using a “regulatory takings” theory to argue that they 
should be compensated if ESA rules limit how they can use their property (e.g., they can’t pave over a 
wetland.) However, these cases have made little headway in the U.S. courts.  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has placed significant substantive and procedural barriers in the way of 
property owners who seek compensation for takings. Most importantly, U.S. regulatory takings 
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jurisprudence applies only to real property, (i.e., real estate), and does not apply to intangible personal 
property (everything that is not land) or more generalized economic interests. Plus, property owners must 
establish that a regulation has destroyed almost all of the value of the “property as a whole.” The Supreme 
Court has ruled that “mere diminution” of the value of the property by a government action does not 
qualify as a regulatory takings that must be compensated.  
 
In contrast, under NAFTA’s investor protections, foreign investors and corporations are using the 
NAFTA investment agreement to seek compensation for the very sort of public interest policies that the 
Congress and U.S. courts have determined not to constitute a takings. Under NAFTA, the sorts of 
property owned by foreign investors that are provided with such protection are defined in the text and 
expanded upon by NAFTA tribunals in a manner that extends far beyond U.S. law. Not only is the real 
estate of foreign investors eligible for a regulatory takings claim, but so is their personal property such as 
stocks, bonds, loans, as well as other generalized economic interests including potentially market access 
and market share. As described below, CAFTA’s terms and definition of investment extends even further 
to explicitly include items not listed in NAFTA, such as licenses, authorizations, permits and a large 
number of federal government contracts. 
 
NAFTA’s New Investor Rights Give Rise to a Diverse Array of Challenges to 
Federal, State and Local Policies 
 
 Thus, NAFTA Chapter 11 has been widely criticized for undermining the basic public interest 
protections provided by our federal, state and local governments and these governments’ basic abilities to 
conduct their day-to-day functions by extending a set of rights to foreign investors operating in the United 
States to attack domestic policies and demand compensation for the basic environmental, land use, health 
and safety policies under which U.S. businesses operate and upon which citizens rely. 
 
Under broadly worded provisions guaranteeing investors rights to a “minimum standard of 
treatment” under international law, rights to nondiscriminatory treatment, and rights to protest a wide 
range of government actions as indirect “expropriations,” corporate investors in all three NAFTA 
countries have used these new rights to challenge a variety of national, state and local policies as 
violations of the agreement, for instance:  
 
• A Mexican municipal government’s denial of a construction permit for the building of a toxic 
waste facility and the governor’s later declaration of an ecological preserve on the site were ruled 
to be NAFTA-illegal expropriations by a NAFTA tribunal. The Mexican government was 
ultimately ordered to pay California-based Metalclad company $15.6 million in compensation – a 
large amount relative to Mexico’s environmental protection budget; 
 
• Three times, governments’ environmental and health phase-outs of suspected toxins, such as 
Canada’s phase-out of the dangerous pesticide lindane, and California’s ban on the gasoline 
additive and water pollutant MTBE, have been challenged as a takings using the investor-state 
system. The Canadian government reversed its ban on another gasoline additive, MMT, and paid 
Ethyl Corporation, which filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 suit against the ban, $13 million. The other 
cases are still pending; 
 
• Canada’s implementation of two international agreements, the Basel Convention on the Control 
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and the U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber 
Agreement, were both successfully challenged using NAFTA investor-state system and damages 
were awarded in both cases. When Canada closed its border to trade in toxic PCBs – a practice 
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discouraged by the Basel Convention – a NAFTA panel ordered the Canadian government to pay 
the U.S. firm, S.D. Meyers, $4.8 million for their lost business opportunities. Another U.S. firm, 
Pope & Talbot, was awarded $582,000 in damages and legal fees after a NAFTA tribunal ruled 
that the rude behavior of Canadian officials verifying the firm’s compliance with softwood 
lumber quotas constituted a NAFTA violation; 
 
• Canadian cattlemen are using NAFTA’s broadly worded definition of “investor” to challenge the 
closing of the U.S. border to trade in live cattle after mad cow disease was found in Canada, 
arguing that the U.S. public health measure has undermined their investment in Canada. U.S. 
water-rights holders are using the investor-state mechanism to challenge Mexico’s alleged failure 
to implement a water-sharing agreement that has limited their access to water on their U.S. 
properties. In neither case do these investors appear to have an investment outside of their own 
country, yet NAFTA’s broadly worded definitions and prior tribunal rulings may make this type 
of claim possible; 
 
• Aspects of the state tobacco settlements, which have resulted in a dramatic drop in the rate of teen 
smoking in the United States, have been challenged as arbitrary and unfair by Canadian tobacco 
traders. Phillip Morris also has threatened to bring a NAFTA investor-state suit against a 
proposed groundbreaking Canadian law restricting the claims (such as “light”) made on cigarette 
packages. That measure has still not become law; 
 
• A number of U.S. domestic court decisions have been challenged by foreign investors using 
NAFTA’s investor-state system. A recent ruling in one such case, involving the challenge by 
Canadian funeral conglomerate Loewen of a Mississippi jury award in a private contract dispute, 
demonstrates that few domestic court decisions are immune from NAFTA review, not even 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court; 
 
• A variety of other federal, state and local public interest policies, such as Mexico’s anti-gambling 
policy, a U.S. drug enforcement rule criminalizing hemp foods, and the state of California’s 
requirements for open-pit mine reclamation have given rise to new NAFTA cases; 
 
• Parcel delivery by a government service, the Canadian postal service, is being challenged by a 
U.S. company, United Parcel Service, which argues that the monopoly that the Canadian postal 
service has on non-express letter delivery creates an unfair subsidy for government parcel 
delivery. Most nations’ postal services have such a monopoly on non-express letter delivery; 
 
• U.S. implementation of anti-dumping and countervailing duties with regard to imports of 
softwood lumber from Canada are being challenged by four Canadian timber firms using NAFTA 
Chapter 11 even though these issues have already been litigated in the state-state dispute 
resolution systems of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
These cases represent an extraordinary attack on normal government activity. In some instances, 
governments have been ordered by NAFTA tribunals to pay foreign investors over claims that could not 
have been pursued in domestic courts. In other instances, to the detriment of the public interest, 
governments have settled foreign investor claims with policy reversals and/or payments. In addition, the 
enactment of proposed laws that have been threatened with investor-state cases have been chilled. Even 
when an investor-state challenge is successfully defended by government lawyers, millions in taxpayer 
dollars are wasted trying to avoid damage to the nation’s public interest. 
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Each new NAFTA investor-state case about which the public becomes aware draws attention and 
criticism to NAFTA’s Chapter 11 foreign investor protections. The number of NAFTA cases attacking 
environmental policies has caused an uproar in the environmental community and among legal scholars. 
However, as more NAFTA cases are finally adjudicated, a growing number of interested parties are 
becoming alarmed. The fact that an increasing number of state and local policies are being challenged has 
evoked a sharp response from mainstream organizations representing elected officials such as the 
National Conference of State Legislators, the Conference of Mayors, the National Association of 
Attorneys General, the National Association of Counties, the National Association of Towns and 
Townships and the National League of Cities.4 Moreover, as more public health measures, such as those 
involving toxic chemicals or protecting consumers from mad cow disease and tobacco, are subject to 
NAFTA threats, the public health community, including the American Public Health Association, has 
become increasingly concerned. Perhaps most significantly, the increasing number of domestic court 
decisions giving rise to NAFTA claims have jurists, such as those represented by the Conference of Chief 
Justices, and legal scholars alike questioning the constitutionality of NAFTA tribunals. 
 
NAFTA “greater rights” for foreign investors problem not fixed in CAFTA 
 
For some Republican and Democratic members of Congress who voted for NAFTA, these cases 
have been an unexpected and unwelcome result of the agreement. Republicans who raised concerns about 
NAFTA’s implications for U.S. sovereignty in a general manner were promised that NAFTA would not 
undermine state sovereignty and local control. Democrats were promised NAFTA would not undermine 
domestic environmental and health laws. But the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases have made a travesty of these 
promises.  
 
As a result, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 foreign investor protections became a focus of the 2001-2002 
congressional debate about reauthorizing Fast Track trade authority. Fast Track, renamed “Trade 
Promotion Authority” during the 2001 debate, delegates Congress’ exclusive constitutional authority to 
set the terms of U.S. trade policy over to the executive branch, with Congress’ role limited to a yes or no 
vote with no amendments on completed, signed trade agreements and the changes to U.S. law required to 
implement them. In providing this extraordinary delegation of authority, Congress sets “negotiating 
objectives” in the legislation that are to guide U.S. executive branch negotiators regarding future trade 
agreements that must be brought back for congressional approval. Although these negotiating objectives 
are not formally binding – in that Congress’ only recourse under the current system is to vote down an 
entire agreement if negotiators ignore Congress’ instruction – the specifics of the negotiating objectives 
included in Fast Track legislation are often subject to intense congressional-White House negotiations 
because they express Congress’ position on the acceptable contents of future agreements.  
 
Thus, in order to narrowly pass the Fast Track legislation, the White House was pressured into 
agreeing to include a series of congressional demands that Bush administration trade officials were to 
meet when negotiating investment rules in future trade agreements. The most important element was that 
foreign investors should have “no greater substantive rights” with respect to investment protections than 
U.S. residents or businesses in the United States. In addition, other demands for changes to NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11 model were raised during the debate in the House and Senate, especially surrounding the 
discussion of the “Kerry Amendment” in the Senate, which attempted to align foreign investor rights with 
the rights provided to U.S. firms under U.S. law. 
 
Despite these clear demands by Congress, Bush administration trade negotiators failed to 
adequately address these concerns in negotiating recently-adopted and proposed free trade agreements, 
such as the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S.-Singapore FTA, the U.S.-Morocco FTA, or 
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CAFTA, nor were they addressed in the newly redrafted U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 
which is used to extend similar terms on a bilateral basis. Below is a summary of how in CAFTA 
Congress’ demands for changes to the NAFTA foreign investor protection model were given only 
superficial attention, and few substantive changes relative to NAFTA’s foreign investor protections were 
made.  
 
• CAFTA’s delineation of property eligible for a regulatory takings claim is significantly broader 
than under U.S. law: In CAFTA, the definition of a compensable investment is not limited to the 
real property (i.e. real estate) implicated in U.S. regulatory takings jurisprudence. Indeed, most 
types of investments for which the U.S. government could be sued under NAFTA by foreign 
investors demanding compensation would not be eligible for regulatory takings claims under U.S. 
law. Moreover, CAFTA expands, not narrows, the NAFTA definition adding as compensable 
investments, “the assumption of risk,” “expectation of gain or profit,” intellectual property rights, 
licenses, authorizations and permits as well as a large variety of government contracts including 
natural resource concession contracts; 
 
• CAFTA’s definition of “expropriation” is broader than takings allowed under U.S. law: The 
scope of what is considered an expropriation remains as expansive in CAFTA as the NAFTA 
provisions which have resulted in compensation for “regulatory takings” claims that would not be 
successful under U.S. law. NAFTA guarantees foreign investors compensation from the treasuries 
of NAFTA governments for any direct government expropriation or any other action that is 
“tantamount to” an expropriation or an indirect expropriation. CAFTA and the other new FTAs 
still require compensation for indirect expropriations, which is the operative term. Thus, under 
CAFTA an investor can still force a government to pay compensation for incidental effects on its 
business resulting from a regulation that would not be subject to compensation under U.S. law; 
 
• CAFTA requires less adverse impact on investment than U.S. law: U.S. negotiators ignored 
Congress’ instructions to conform to the U.S. law standard the degree of adverse impact required 
on a foreign investor or investment to demonstrate a compensable taking under CAFTA. Under 
U.S. law, close to 100 percent of the value of the property must be destroyed. NAFTA Chapter 11 
cases have suggested that only a “significant” or “substantial” impact on the investment need be 
demonstrated and despite Congress’ demands, U.S. negotiators did not remedy this serious gap 
between the rights of foreign and domestic investors in CAFTA’s text; 
 
• CAFTA’s standards for scope of review are less stringent than U.S. law: U.S. negotiators failed 
to include in CAFTA a provision that requires that an expropriation analysis examine the property 
as a whole, not allowing it to be segmented physically or temporally. Adding such a provision 
would have been necessary to meet Congress’ demands that future trade agreements not provide 
foreign investor rights that go beyond U.S. legal standards. Thus, temporary measures, such as 
temporary border closings, which have been considered NAFTA violations in past cases, could 
still be considered CAFTA violations contrary to U.S. takings jurisprudence; 
 
• CAFTA’s attempt to narrow what constitutes a violation of the “minimum standard of 
treatment” under international law falls short: NAFTA and CAFTA include provisions 
guaranteeing foreign investors a minimum standard of treatment, including “fair and equitable 
treatment,” from signatory countries with the right to demand compensation if this guarantee is 
not fulfilled. NAFTA tribunals have varied greatly about what this guarantee requires of 
governments, in one case ordering compensation for a foreign investor over the rude behavior of 
government officials. Although Congress explicitly asked for a narrowing of this definition, in 
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CAFTA what constitutes “fair and equitable treatment” under international law remains a matter 
for CAFTA panels to define. A 2001 “clarification” by the NAFTA governments attempted to 
deal with this problem in the NAFTA context by seeking to narrow the application to treatment 
that is required by “customary” international law. This is the language also used in CAFTA. Yet 
the notion of customary international law is notoriously broad, providing enormous opportunity 
for a continuation of an expansive interpretation by trade tribunals; 
 
• CAFTA allows a “substantive due process” standard of review forbidden in U.S. law: The Fast 
Track language requiring a narrowing of the guaranteed minimum standard of treatment for 
foreign investors in future trade agreements specifically mentions conformity to the “due process” 
requirements of U.S. law. Since the Roosevelt administration, U.S. domestic courts review of 
government actions regarding claims that a property owner’s due process rights have been 
violated are limited to considering the actual process – did the land owner or business have a right 
to be heard, for instance. Courts have stayed out of judging the fairness of the underlying policy 
in question. In NAFTA investor-state cases, panels have engaged in a substantive due process 
review of economic regulation. This means that like the courts trying to reverse Roosevelt’s New 
Deal policies, NAFTA tribunals are permitted to second-guess the merits of policies set by 
nations’ legislatures and executive branches. A provision was not added to CAFTA, as needed, to 
shut down this line of review that extends beyond U.S. legal standards; 
 
• Non-discriminatory domestic environmental and health regulations remain at risk in CAFTA: 
Language in an Annex to the CAFTA investment chapter purporting to limit when 
nondiscriminatory environmental and health regulations should be considering violations of 
CAFTA’s foreign investor rights does not safeguard such laws from challenge, as described 
below; 
 
• CAFTA does not require due process protections Congress demanded: For instance, U.S. trade 
negotiators failed to require exhaustion of remedies, especially judicial remedies, before starting a 
CAFTA investor-state complaint; 
 
• CAFTA does not include the appeals system Congress demanded: U.S. negotiators failed to 
create an appeals mechanism for investor-state cases in CAFTA’s investment chapter as required 
by the Fast Track legislation. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) does have a 
proposal for a super-judicial appellate mechanism, but has not said how it will implement it − as 
part of CAFTA with congressional approval or outside of the legislative process. The current 
USTR proposal would eliminate the already very limited review rights that domestic courts now 
have over some investor-state rulings under domestic arbitration law. 
 
Given the failure of the USTR to satisfy Congress’ demands to reign in the worst excesses of 
NAFTA’s foreign investor protection model in future trade agreements including CAFTA, a review of the 
track record of NAFTA investor-state cases is vital before Congress considers whether to extend these 
investor rights to new nations via CAFTA and a raft of new FTAs currently under negotiation. 
 
Lessons From NAFTA Cases 
 
Although more NAFTA cases are in the pipeline than have been decided, a detailed analysis of 
the NAFTA tribunal rulings in completed cases and the state-of-play in the pending cases allows us to 
identify a series of disturbing trends that have developed under the NAFTA foreign investor protection 
model: 
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Foreign Investors Will Use the Investor-State System to Seek Compensation for Adverse  
Domestic Court Rulings: The NAFTA Chapter 11 Loewen case is a prime example of how foreign 
investors are granted greater rights than domestic firms. The NAFTA panel in the Loewen case issued a  
remarkable jurisdictional ruling indicating that all adverse domestic court decisions are potentially 
eligible for NAFTA review as international law violations and may even qualify as “expropriations.” This 
ruling implicates court decisions at every level, even potentially those of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
contrast, U.S. firms operating in the United States do not have this second bite at the apple outside of the 
domestic court system and cannot bring regulatory takings cases based upon domestic court rulings. The 
case in question involved the Loewen Group, a giant Canadian funeral conglomerate, which had been 
aggressively acquiring small funeral homes across America. Loewen attempted to use NAFTA’s foreign 
investor protections to “reverse” a multimillion-dollar Mississippi jury’s ruling in favor of a small funeral 
home operator who sued the conglomerate for breach of contract and assorted fraudulent acts. Even 
though the NAFTA tribunal dismissed Loewen’s underlying claims on technical grounds (primarily due 
to the fact that the bankrupt Loewen corporation had reincorporated as a U.S. firm and thus no longer 
qualified as a foreign investor), a very different result may have occurred had the firm reincorporated in 
Canada. First, the NAFTA panel in this case, determined that under NAFTA’s terms a jury ruling in a 
civil contract case qualified as a “government action” against which foreign investors were granted 
special NAFTA protections. Attorneys representing the United States had argued that specific policies or 
actions of the government affecting a foreign investor – not the every day function of a domestic court – 
was what NAFTA’s reference to government “measures” covered. The panel’s decision further focused 
on the reference to international law in NAFTA’s provisions guaranteeing a minimum standard of 
treatment for foreign investors, noting that when the conduct of a domestic court does not meet such an 
international law standard, a NAFTA violation could be found. Remarkably, the panel failed to place any 
limits on the type of domestic court decision that can be challenged using the investor-state mechanism, 
except to state that plaintiffs should exhaust domestic court remedies before proceeding to a NAFTA 
tribunal. Thus, it is no surprise that the Loewen tribunal decision was greeted with great concern in U.S. 
legal circles. The Conference of Chief Justices (representing Chief Justices from state supreme courts) 
promptly passed a resolution calling upon the Bush administration to keep court rulings out of trade 
tribunals.5 The U.S. Conference of Mayors had earlier issued the same call, yet CAFTA fails to prevent 
domestic court rulings from being reheard in unaccountable investor-state tribunals. 
 
Increasing Questions Regarding the Constitutionality of Investor-State Tribunals: 
Increasingly, U.S. jurists and legal scholars are questioning the very constitutionality of NAFTA’s 
investor-state foreign investor protection system. Article III of the U.S. Constitution creates an 
independent judiciary, separate from the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has questioned the delegation of Article III authority 
to an increasing number of trade tribunals. “Article III of our Constitution reserves to federal courts the 
power to decide cases and controversies, and the U.S. Congress may not delegate to another tribunal ‘the 
essential attributes of judicial power,’ ” said Justice O’Connor.6 In 1982 the Supreme Court declared that 
establishment by Congress of federal bankruptcy courts was a delegation of the constitutionally granted 
power of the judiciary too extreme to pass constitutional muster. Many scholars and jurists believe that 
the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, which have extraordinary powers to review local, state, and federal 
policies and decisions as well as judicial decisions including those of the U.S. Supreme Court, represent 
an even more radical delegation of “the essential attributes” of the judiciary. The Conference of Chief 
Justices passed a resolution stating “The question of whether the investor-state process is consistent with 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution raises a sufficiently serious and important issue that deserves prompt, 
thorough examination as the United States considers negotiating additional trade agreements with various 
other nations.”7 Despite these serious concerns, CAFTA contains the same system of investor-state 
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tribunals and would extend this system to foreign investors from an additional six nations if CAFTA is 
implemented by Congress. 
 
Foreign Investors Can Bring “Regulatory Takings” Cases Not Allowed Under Domestic 
Law: As discussed above, NAFTA’s investment rules give foreign investors new rights that go 
significantly beyond the rights available to U.S. citizens or business under the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution. In the 1993 Concrete Pipe case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “our cases have long 
established that mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate 
a taking.”8 In contrast, NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals have defined compensable takings as “the incidental 
interference” with the use of property that need only cause a “significant” or “substantial” impairment of 
an investment.9 Thus, in the Metalclad case, a municipality’s denial of a construction permit to a U.S. 
company seeking to expand an existing toxic waste facility on land it had purchased was found to be an 
indirect expropriation requiring compensation under NAFTA. Rather than fixing the problems caused by 
NAFTA’s loose rules and troubling case history, the USTR has merely made cosmetic changes in the new 
FTA’s foreign investor protection provisions. For instance, one “fix” the USTR attempted in CAFTA was 
to eliminate the phrase government actions “tantamount to” an expropriation that appears in the NAFTA 
text as activity requiring compensation. However, that change is merely cosmetic. The new FTAs still 
require compensation for “indirect” expropriations, which is the operative term NAFTA panels have 
relied on in finding regulatory takings. Indeed at least two NAFTA panels have held that the “tantamount 
to” clause in NAFTA is redundant and does not expand upon the scope of NAFTA’s terms requiring 
compensation for direct and indirect expropriation.10 The Bush administration could have conformed the 
new FTAs to U.S. law which, among other things, requires the demonstration of a near total takings of the 
property as a whole before a regulatory takings is found, but failed to do so. The end result is that foreign 
firms are still being granted substantive and procedural legal rights that go beyond what is provided in the 
U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
NAFTA Definition of “Investment” Does Not Conform to Compensable Property Under 
U.S. Law, CAFTA Makes Bad Situation Worse: Under U.S. law, generally only real property (i.e., 
real estate) can be considered for regulatory takings claims. Personal property (anything other than land) 
and other generalized economic interests are not eligible for such claims. In NAFTA, the definition of a 
compensable investment is not limited to the narrow category of real property. Indeed, most types of 
investments for which the U.S. government could be sued under NAFTA (such as debt security, equity 
security, loans, contracts, etc.) constitute intangible personal property that would not be eligible for a 
regulatory takings claim under U.S. law. NAFTA panels have extended the textual definition of 
“investment” even further by including court decisions and generalized economic concepts such as 
“market access” and “market share” as compensable investments. CAFTA makes a bad situation worse. 
CAFTA negotiators failed to heed the calls of Congress to provide “no greater substantive rights” to 
foreign investors than U.S. firms, and CAFTA expands, rather than narrows, the definition of 
compensable investment by including: “the assumption of risk,” “expectation of gain or profit,” 
intellectual property rights as well as a new category of government contracts including natural resource 
concession contracts. CAFTA also adds “licenses, authorizations, permits” in the list of covered 
investments. As this type of  measure is often granted by state and local governments, the FTAs are likely 
to expose many more local government decisions such as those regarding zoning, building permits and 
licensing of various establishments to challenge under these investment rules. 
 
Potential Cost to the Taxpayers Could Reach the Billions: In the end, it is the taxpayers of the 
challenged country who must pay the compensation to a foreign investor if it succeeds in its NAFTA suit. 
In the first 11 years of NAFTA, only 11 cases have been decided or settled. Five times foreign investors 
have succeeded with at least some of their claims and $35 million has been paid in compensation to 
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foreign investors by governments. Another $28 billion has been claimed by NAFTA investors. While 
many NAFTA plaintiffs appear to be inflating their demands for compensation,11 and none so far have 
succeeded with billion-dollar claims, just a few large awards like the $15.6 million dollar verdict against 
Mexico in the Metalclad toxic waste case could significantly impact the treasuries of national 
governments. It could also result in federal governments attempting to hold states hostage for the funds, 
as was attempted in the Metalclad toxic waste case. In addition, the costs for countries to defend against 
these NAFTA investor-state claims – money that could be used elsewhere in these times of pinched 
budgets – is significant in itself. For instance, U.S. lawyers defending the Methenex challenge to 
California’s ban on MTBE have spent $3 million on defense costs so far. With three concluded 
arbitrations and seven pending against the United States, the NAFTA arbitration defense bill for U.S. 
taxpayers may quickly reach over $30 million.  
 
The Investor-State Mechanism Eviscerates the Sovereign Immunity Shield: NAFTA Chapter 
11 contains no sovereign immunity shield and constitutes a radical revision of U.S. sovereign immunity 
protections. As one legal scholar put it, “[b]y assenting to the terms of NAFTA, the United States, 
Canadian and Mexican governments essentially have waived whatever rights of sovereign immunity they 
may have enjoyed prior to signing.”12 Under U.S. law, Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity only 
by doing so in express terms on a case by case basis. There is no evidence that Congress intended to grant 
a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity rights in NAFTA, yet that appears to be what was achieved.  
 
State and Local Governments Are Not Safe From the Reach of Investor-State Tribunals: 
Not only have federal policies been challenged by foreign investors in NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, but 
an increasing number of measures taken by state, provincial and municipal governments have been 
challenged as well. These include state and local land use decisions, state environmental and public health 
policies, adverse state court rulings, and state and municipal contracts. In the Metalclad toxic waste case, 
the decision of a Mexican municipality to deny a construction permit before a U.S. company could begin 
expanding a toxic waste facility and a later decision by the governor of the state to create an ecological 
reserve on the site were both successfully challenged as NAFTA violations and the Mexican government 
was ordered to pay $15.6 million in damages. While it is true that under NAFTA, a panel cannot directly 
rescind a law, and it is the federal government that is technically liable for any damages, federal 
governments currently have a variety of avenues under domestic law to bend state and local governments 
to their will. For example, federal governments can hold funds for state and local projects hostage until 
the offending measure is rescinded or until the locality agrees to contribute to the damage award. This 
was already attempted in the Metalclad case when the Mexican federal government tried to withhold the 
damage award from the state of San Luis Potosi’s federal funding. While in this instance the state fought 
back in domestic court and was ultimately vindicated by the Mexican Supreme Court, this issue has not 
yet been addressed by U.S. courts. The federal government can also preempt state policies with a federal 
law − an effort sure to generate further controversy and constitutional questions. National associations 
representing state and local governments have begun to express alarm over these investor-state cases. 
They correctly fear that the international expropriation rules could establish a new regulatory takings 
norm that not only will apply pressure to states to conform policies in advance, but could eventually be 
used to justify federal action against states. 
 
Public Disputes, Private Tribunals: When foreign investors demand compensation under NAFTA 
or the new FTAs with investor-state systems, the cases are heard either at the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), operating under the auspices of the World Bank or at the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). These two arbitration bodies 
were designed to arbitrate private cases between contractual parties in narrow commercial disputes. Thus, 
in the past, the fact that these proceedings were strictly confidential with no access for the press or public 
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and no process for public input was of less concern. Now, however, these arbitral bodies are dealing with 
significant issues of public policy. Under NAFTA these tribunals are empowered to weigh the 
appropriateness of public policy matters such as California’s rules regarding the reclamation of open-pit 
mines or the California law phasing out the gasoline additive MTBE, which was found to be 
contaminating drinking water systems throughout that state. Yet, under the investor-state system, citizens 
of each state must rely on federal government agencies, such as the State Department and the USTR. to 
defend their laws, which the latter may not support (as in the case of the California mining regulation). 
The residents of California cannot be party to the cases involving the health and safety of their 
communities and their elected guardian of state law, the California Attorney General, has no formal role. 
Yet, it is the public’s tax dollars that may one day be awarded to the foreign investor that is demanding 
millions in compensation. Recent fixes contained in CAFTA and the new FTAs will open tribunal 
proceedings to public observation, if interested parties can afford to fly to distant venues. However, 
citizens still cannot be party to a suit and may have limited amicus opportunities as the acceptance of 
amicus briefs is at the discretion of the panel. Under NAFTA, these proceedings can still be closed to the 
public upon the demand of the plaintiff corporation. Questions regarding the appropriateness and the 
legitimacy of these private arbitration bodies for public interest disputes are made more urgent by the fact 
that the number of investment cases under NAFTA and various bilateral investment treaties appears to be 
rapidly accelerating. 
 
Threat of Investor-State Challenge Chills Public Interest Policies: In one of the first NAFTA 
claims ever filed, the U.S. Ethyl Corporation filed a suit against a Canadian environmental and public 
health measure restricting the gasoline additive MMT as the ban was being debated in parliament. 
NAFTA rules require corporations to wait six months after the events that give rise to the claim and then 
require an attempt to resolve the situation through negotiations before pursuing a NAFTA investor-state 
case. That a NAFTA tribunal accepted this case, which was a blatant attempt to intimidate a legislative 
body from taking action, sends an alarming signal. In the end, the government of Canada settled the case 
by revoking the ban on the gasoline additive and paid the company $13 million before the NAFTA 
tribunal had issued a final ruling. More recently, in 2004, an all-party committee of the provincial 
government of New Brunswick, Canada, recommended that the province develop its own public auto 
insurance program. The committee was responding to a public outcry over skyrocketing auto insurance 
premiums. The committee recommended a plan that would achieve average premium reductions of 
approximately 20 percent over existing plans due to the not-for-profit mandate and other cost savings. 
The proposal was scuttled, however, after critics pointed out that the proposal could trigger legal action 
on the part of foreign firms that might consider a public auto insurance plan an “expropriation” of the 
their market share under NAFTA Chapter 11. Lessons from this auto insurance debacle can just as easily 
be applied to many state programs to expand health care coverage to more Americans. An untold number 
of NAFTA Chapter 11 threats may be chilling public interest policies at all levels of government. 
 
Number of Investor-State Cases Against Public Services Could Increase: One firm that has 
used NAFTA rules, not to claim an “expropriation” but to utilize other NAFTA rules for strategic rather 
than defensive purposes, is United Parcel Service (UPS). UPS is arguing that because Canada Post 
provides public mail services, it should not also be providing integrated parcel and courier services. UPS 
claims that Canada Post’s vast infrastructure − including its pensions, vehicles, mailboxes and even mail 
carriers − constitutes a NAFTA-illegal subsidization of its parcel and courier services and gives Canada 
Post an unfair advantage in the marketplace. In an era when public and commercial service delivery is 
often commingled, few public services including health care and education would be immune to similar 
corporate challenges. The UPS case encapsulates one of the most disturbing trends in the NAFTA foreign 
investor protection cases taken as a whole, which is that many corporations seem to be moving from the 
defensive (protecting themselves against alleged expropriations) to the offensive − using NAFTA’s 
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investor-state tribunals in an attempt to carve out move favorable market conditions for their firms. 
CAFTA contains no language to safeguard nations from this type of case. 
 
Environmental Text Has Not Protected Investor-State Environmental Measures: The 
preamble of NAFTA states that countries will undertake their obligations in a manner “consistent with 
environmental protection and conservation.” Further language in Article 1114 of the investment chapter 
purports to protect the environment and prevent a race to the bottom in environmental standards. These 
provisions of NAFTA have been given such short shrift by NAFTA tribunals as to render them 
meaningless. In the Metalclad toxic waste case, there was no evidence that the tribunal weighed 
NAFTA’s environmental provisions at all before reaching their final decision. The ruling does make clear 
that no weight was given to the environmental concerns of the community, which was the reason that 
local officials tried to block the dump. Further, the panel set a number of disturbing precedents. It not 
only equated the denial of a municipal construction permit and the creation of an ecological reserve with 
an “expropriation” under NAFTA, but it broadened the definition of “expropriations” to include 
“incidental” interference with the value of a property, thus opening the door for all sorts of legitimate 
zoning actions by a sub-national government to be challenged under NAFTA. In the S.D. Myers PCB 
case, Canada’s obligations under an environmental treaty that regulates trade in hazardous waste called 
the Basel Convention was considered by the NAFTA tribunal, but in the end was completely discounted. 
 
No Appeals in NAFTA, Appellate Proposal for CAFTA Deeply Flawed: Unlike in the WTO, 
there is no standing appellate body or mechanism in NAFTA. Thus, NAFTA parties are subject to ad hoc 
rulings by an ever-changing cast of ad hoc panelists who may or may not have had any experience with 
NAFTA rules or prior NAFTA cases. As a result, there have been contradictory rulings on a variety of 
issues. In the Fast Track legislation, Congress specifically demanded an appellate procedure be developed 
for future trade agreements to bring consistency to investor-state tribunal rulings. The CAFTA text 
includes a provision for establishing such a mechanism one year after the formation of a negotiating 
group, but the signed CAFTA text does not create the mechanism called for by Congress. The U.S. State 
Department recently proposed a framework for an appellate mechanism that falls short of the Fast Track 
requirements. While Fast Track requires “coherence,” the State Department proposal calls for an ad hoc 
appellate mechanism that draws panelists from a roster, not a standing appellate body. The lack of 
permanent professional staff will ensure that panels will continue to strike out on their own in interpreting 
the complex investment rules, a recipe for further arbitrary, contradictory rulings. Moreover, given that 
the proposal is that the decisions of the appellate panels would have no precedent within the appellate 
mechanism itself or any future arbitration proceedings − conformity will not be attainable. The appellate 
proposal also appears to eliminate any slim chance of domestic court review of the tribunal award in the 
nation where the tribunal was seated, under narrow grounds contained in the federal arbitration laws of 
that nation or under various conventions governing arbitrations. This has been attempted in only three 
NAFTA cases,13 only one resulting in a slight modification of the final award, but the narrow avenue into 
domestic court was considered enough of a wild card to prompt supporters of the NAFTA investment 
model to try to eliminate the option entirely. Finally, it is unclear how the appellate mechanism will be 
attached to the agreement. CAFTA has already been approved by the CAFTA nations, and was formally 
ratified by El Salvador in December 2004. It is hard to believe that after having explicitly required an 
appellate mechanism, Congress would now be willing to simply hand this vast project over to the 
executive branch, empowering the USTR to create a super-judicial mechanism that, among other powers, 
will have the authority to rule that U.S. Supreme Court decisions are violations of international law. 
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Conclusion 
 
Supporters of NAFTA claimed that these extensive investor protections and their private 
enforcement mechanism were necessary to protect investors from state seizure of private property (i.e., 
nationalization). Mexico, which nationalized foreign oil refineries in 1938, was the prime target of these 
concerns.14 However, investor-state cases filed to date have had little to do with government seizure of 
property. Instead, the cases challenge laws, regulations, court decisions and other government actions at 
the national, state and local level. 
 
The expansive rights granted to corporations under NAFTA were just one of the factors that went 
largely unnoticed by Congress and the media during the debate surrounding NAFTA in the early 1990s. 
This occurred for several reasons. First, in the United States, NAFTA was approved under the Fast Track 
procedure. The use of Fast Track for NAFTA demonstrates how the exclusionary, closed process can 
obscure meaningful analysis of a proposed agreement’s actual, binding terms. But also, given that no past 
U.S. “trade” agreement had ever contained such provisions, many in Congress dismissed those who raised 
concerns about NAFTA’s investment and other terms as uninformed or “protectionist.” In this context, 
many of NAFTA’s potential implications for the basic functioning of all levels of government and the 
basic public health, safety, land use and environmental responsibilities upon which citizens rely were 
overlooked.  
 
Now, eleven years after its implementation, NAFTA’s actual track record provides a cautionary 
tale. Yet, the tweaks included in CAFTA and recent bilateral trade agreements to the NAFTA investment 
model fail to fix the model’s core problems and may have created a raft of new problems. For instance, as 
Georgetown University Law School Professor Mathew Porterfield points out, under CAFTA Article 
10.12 regarding “Denial of Benefits,” the convoluted language appears to establish the right of a company 
to use its subsidiary in another nation, a nation that is a party to the agreement, to attack its home-state 
laws. The only requirement is that the subsidiary must have “substantial business activities” outside of the 
home state. In other words, the language change in CAFTA could allow Phillip Morris, for instance, to 
use its Costa Rican subsidiary to attack U.S. tobacco laws as long as that subsidiary had substantial 
business interests in Costa Rica or any other Central American nation (i.e., was not a post-office box).  
 
What constitutes “substantial business interests” is not defined, and given past NAFTA Chapter 
11 decisions this is a cause for grave concern. In the S.D. Myers PCB investor-state case, the NAFTA 
tribunal ordered Canada to pay $4.8 million even though it was very unclear what S.D. Myers’ business 
interest was in Canada. The company did not even have a long, established track record of importing 
PCBs into the United States. This did not concern the NAFTA tribunal, which, as noted above, creatively 
designated S.D. Myers’ potential “market share” in Canadian toxics treatment a sufficient investment to 
generate a NAFTA claim. 
 
This granting of new “standing” rights to U.S. subsidiaries to attack U.S. laws in CAFTA 
tribunals is an astonishing usurpation of congressional powers to set the laws of the land. On numerous 
occasions, Congress has rejected bills that would allow regulatory takings cases to be brought more easily 
in U.S. courts. Now, if the CAFTA signed by the Bush administration is passed, it would grant large 
multinational firms such rights via an international “trade” agreement approved under Fast Track rules 
that prevent Congress from striking such a provision. Moreover, these rights would extend only to U.S. 
firms large enough to have foreign subsidiaries. Most U.S. businesses are not multinational, but operate in 
their local communities or on a state-wide basis. These small and medium-sized firms, the backbone of 
the U.S. economy, are thus doubly disadvantaged under CAFTA. Both foreign investors and giant U.S. 
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multinationals are granted greater rights and powers vis-à-vis operations within the United States than 
U.S. firms have in U.S. domestic courts under the Constitution.  
 
If the implications of this NAFTA provision were not alarming enough, a recent jurisdictional 
ruling in a case decided in one of the same venues CAFTA would use (ICSID) gave even more 
encouragement to firms seeking to pursue investor-state cases against their home countries. The case 
involved a group of Ukrainian investors that incorporated a legal entity in Lithuania and then used that 
entity to invest back into Ukraine. They later availed themselves of  investor protections under the terms 
of a Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.15 Two panelists in the case, Dan Price (a former U.S. trade official who 
negotiated NAFTA Chapter 11) and Italian Professor Piero Bernardini, ruled that the claim should move 
forward, arguing that the origin of the capital was not relevant.16 However, the chairman of the tribunal, 
respected French law Professor Prosper Weil, issued a sharp dissenting opinion. He argued that the ICSID 
investment system was established to arbitrate international claims and encourage foreign investment. He 
stated that the majority opinion cast doubt upon the “integrity” of the ICSID system and was “at odds 
with the purpose of the ICSID Convention and could jeopardize the future of the institution.”17 Shortly 
thereafter he resigned from the case, marking the first time any ICSID tribunal chairman had done so.18 
Under CAFTA, it is only a matter of time before a creative American investor will utilize a subsidiary to 
bring a constitutionally prohibited regulatory takings attack on U.S. law, thus bypassing U.S. legislative 
and judicial processes. 
 
Even without the extraordinary provision found only in CAFTA granting standing to U.S. 
subsidiaries to bring an investor-state case against the United States, NAFTA Chapter 11 contains broad 
rules and expansive definitions that allow firms to bring as many creative investor-state cases as their 
pocketbooks can support. Whenever these cases are filed, U.S. taxpayer money is wasted because U.S. 
government attorneys must launch defenses on an array of cases and claims, the majority of which would 
not be allowed under U.S. law. Millions in taxpayer dollars have already been eaten by these investor- 
state cases. Meanwhile, some of the NAFTA panels have served to make a bad situation worse by 
rewarding investors making outrageous claims. Investors are not only bringing regulatory takings and 
other cases that are contrary to U.S. law, but have launched investor-state cases covering services (i.e., the 
UPS case challenging aspects of the Canadian postal service) and trade in goods (i.e. Canadian softwood 
lumber companies challenging the United State’s imposition of countervailing duties) that were never 
intended for private investor-state arbitration.  
 
Despite this track record, the Bush administration has rejected demands from Congress and a 
large number of interested parties, such as associations representing states, attorneys general, mayors, 
counties, townships, jurists and citizens to “fix” the deep flaws in the NAFTA investor-state model in 
new agreements. The modest tweaks to the NAFTA investment model contained in CAFTA and other 
FTAs fail to remedy the fundamental problems and thus will result in more challenges to public interest 
policies at the federal state and local level. Moreover, the Bush administration has failed to answer key 
questions posed by scholars and policymakers alike about the NAFTA investment mechanism. Is it 
constitutional? Are such extra-judicial tribunals necessary, much less appropriate, in a nation with a fully 
developed judicial system? 
 
Public Citizen recommends: 
 
• The investor-state mechanism should be kept out of future agreements. Commercial disputes 
arising under the terms of international agreements between nations should be dealt with by the 
governments themselves on a state-state basis. There is precedent for this approach, as an 
investor-state enforcement mechanism was not included in 2004 U.S.-Australia FTA. 
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• NAFTA is overdue for a thorough review with an overarching question of whether it should be 
continued. In the interim, however, the radical regulatory takings provisions that give foreign 
investors greater rights than U.S. investors under U.S. law should be excised from NAFTA and 
kept out of future agreements. Other aspects of the NAFTA model of investor protection model 
require significant change to ensure that foreign investors are not granted greater substantive or 
procedural rights than U.S. firms operating under U.S. law. 
 
• Trade agreements should focus on traditional trade matters − the terms of exchange between 
countries − not countries domestic regulatory system, investment regime or other internal 
policies. All non-discriminatory environmental, health, safety and other public interest policies, 
as well as state and local matters and domestic court decisions must explicitly be kept from the 
coverage of investor protection rules. 
 
• If pressured to accept such investor-state enforcement as part of a free trade agreement or a 
bilateral investment treaty, developing countries should work to ensure that such enforcement is a 
temporary measure only. 
 
• When Fast Track expires in 2007, this outdated procedure for trade policymaking must be 
replaced by a more open, accountable procedure giving all potentially interested parties a voice in 
the process. 
 
The NAFTA investor-state track record that this report exposes offers lessons that careful analysis 
of a pact’s specific requirements and potential consequences must surround the debate about the future 
course of U.S. trade policy and be examined in the context of what values the United States wishes to 
export around the world. 
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NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases 
I. BACKGROUND
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) is an international commercial agreement between 
the United States, Mexico, and Canada that took effect in 
1994. Unlike the trade agreements that preceded it, NAFTA’s 
scope extended far beyond traditional trade matters, such as 
tariffs and quotas for trade in goods, and instead included 
entire chapters on foreign investor rights, the ownership and 
domestic regulation of services, and even how tax dollars can 
be spent on procurement. NAFTA’s Chapter 11 contains 
NAFTA’s rules regarding investment. Chapter 11 was designed to grant special legal protections and new 
rights to corporations from one NAFTA country that do business in another NAFTA country. NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11 is unusual because it provides for the private enforcement of these investor rights by the 
investors themselves outside of a nation’s domestic court system and in private trade tribunals. This 
private enforcement mechanism is called an “investor-state” dispute resolution system. It contrasts with 
the state-state dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other multilateral 
agreements, in which only the nations signing the agreements can take action to enforce the terms of the 
agreements. 
 “If Congress had known that there 
was anything like [Chapter 11] in 
NAFTA they would never have voted 
for it.”  
 
Abner Mikva, former U.S. federal 
judge and NAFTA panelist in the 
Loewen case19
 
 Corporate investors have used NAFTA’s investor-state enforcement system to challenge domestic 
court rulings, local and state environmental policies, municipal contracts, tax policy, federal controlled 
substances regulations, federal and state anti-gambling policies, emergency efforts to prevent the spread 
of mad cow disease, a federal government’s alleged failure to provide water rights, and even the provision 
of public postal services. In most instances, challengers have sought millions of dollars in damages, 
claiming that regulatory measures and government actions that negatively affected their profitability. At 
least one NAFTA corporation has succeeded in winning $15.6 million in a “regulatory takings” case that 
would not have been possible under the U.S. Constitution. If a NAFTA investor prevails in its NAFTA 
claim, the losing nation is obliged to compensate the firm from the national treasury. 
 
The investor-state system was designed to operate behind closed doors. NAFTA investor-state 
cases are litigated in special international commercial arbitration bodies that have generally been closed to 
public participation, observation and input. The decisions made in these bodies, which provide no appeals 
process, are binding upon national governments. Two arbitral bodies, which are described below, are 
listed in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 as venues for private enforcement of NAFTA’s terms: the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank’s International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). These two venues do not provide the basic due process or 
openness guarantees afforded in national courts. During the proceedings, documents can be restricted, 
local officials whose policies are challenged have no standing to participate, and the public and press have 
no right to observe proceedings. Rather, three-person panels composed of professional arbitrators meet to 
hear arguments in cases, most often in venues far distant from the location where the case arose. Instead 
of acting as conciliators, the tribunal members become judge and jury and can rule that a NAFTA 
member nation must pay an unlimited amount of taxpayer dollars in compensation to the corporation 
whose NAFTA rights the three arbitrators conclude have been impaired. No sovereign immunity shields 
apply in this system, and thus foreign investors are allowed to bring suits against governments not 
allowed in U.S. law. 
 
Moreover, as more corporations have used NAFTA’s Chapter 11 to attack federal, state and local 
policies, NAFTA’s investor protections and its private enforcement mechanism are drawing increased 
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scrutiny to the NAFTA investment model. This model, with only modest changes, was incorporated into 
recent bilateral agreements, including the 2003 U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) as well as the 2004 FTA with Morocco. The Bush administration has been eager to extend it to 
additional FTAs, including the pending Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which would 
expand NAFTA to five Central American nations and the Dominican Republic, as well as the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), a proposed NAFTA expansion to 31 countries in the hemisphere. In 
addition, NAFTA-style investment rules form the basis of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) and proposed BITs.  
 
Given that the NAFTA investment model now has a 11-year track record, it is essential to take a 
close look at the NAFTA cases that have been adjudicated to date before extending the investment model 
to more nations. This report focuses on the details of the 42 known NAFTA cases and claims, because the 
track record of investors utilizing the investor-state enforcement system provides the best evidence of the 
threat the NAFTA model of investor rights poses to democratically achieved policies, democratic 
governance and the rule of law. 
 
Rather than including such expansive investor rights in new trade agreements, a wide range of 
interested parties are calling upon the Bush administration to simply leave them out. This approach has 
precedent. Facing pressure from the Australian Congress, (which was itself under enormous domestic 
political pressure), the Bush administration did not include an investor-state mechanism in the 2004 U.S.-
Australia FTA. The U.S.-Australia FTA does contain many of the same substantive rights and privileges 
for foreign investors and allows the two governments to revisit the use of investor-state enforcement in 
the future. Still, the exclusion of the mechanism was a significant development, no doubt related to the 
fact that Australian firms have significant investments in the United States and visa versa, opening up the 
possibility of wide-ranging attacks on domestic laws and regulations.  
 
The next fight over the appropriateness of the NAFTA model is likely to be in the U.S. Congress 
over CAFTA. The Central American agreement is slated for a vote in 2005. Thus, a careful review of the 
NAFTA investment rules 11-year record may provide the most prudent means to evaluate the model’s 
usefulness for CAFTA and future FTAs. 
 
In this “Background” section of the report, we begin our analysis by describing: NAFTA’s 
extraordinary investor rights; the private enforcement mechanism developed to enforce these rights and 
secure cash compensation; a failed effort by NAFTA trade ministers to “fix” NAFTA’s worst excesses; 
the failure of the USTR to respond to congressional dictates to prevent foreign investors from enjoying 
greater rights than U.S. investors under U.S. law; the increased questions that have been raised by jurists 
and scholars regarding the constitutionality of the NAFTA Chapter 11 mechanism. In the sections that 
follow, we review major NAFTA cases of public interest, new NAFTA claims of public interest, and 
other NAFTA cases and claims that have been filed. 
 
Investors and Their New NAFTA Rights and Privileges 
 
Under NAFTA rules, an “investor” who is empowered to use the NAFTA Chapter 11 
enforcement system is one who makes an “investment” as defined by NAFTA. A long list of business 
activities constitutes an “investment” under NAFTA’s definition, including: 
 
• an enterprise (defined as a private or publicly held legal entity, including any corporation, trust, 
partnership, sole proprietorship, joint venture or other association), 
• equity security of an enterprise, 
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• debt security of an enterprise, 
• a loan to an enterprise, 
• interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to income or profits, 
• real estate or other property used for business purposes, and 
• certain interest arising from the commitment of capital.20 
 
Under NAFTA’s investor-state dispute resolution system, only the “parties” to NAFTA can be 
sued. This means that the responsibility to defend the cases brought by NAFTA investors lies with the 
federal governments of Mexico, Canada and the United States. However, an array of state and local laws 
and policies are exposed to challenge by investors under NAFTA Chapter 11’s new investor guarantees. 
A government “measure” that can be challenged under NAFTA as infringing on investor rights includes 
“any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice” at any level of government.21 State and local 
governments whose policies are challenged as violating NAFTA must rely on federal governments to 
defend their interests, whether the federal government agrees with the state policy or not. 
  
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 contains a number of special protections for investors. There are five 
primary NAFTA investor rights and privileges that investors have claimed have been violated in the 
investor-state cases reviewed in this report: 
 
• NAFTA Article 1110 guarantees foreign investors compensation from the treasuries (i.e., from 
the taxpayers) of NAFTA governments for any direct government expropriation (i.e., 
nationalization) or any other action that is “tantamount to” an expropriation or an “indirect” 
expropriation.22 This article is the basis of “regulatory takings” claims that have occurred under 
NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 
• NAFTA Article 1102 includes a “national treatment” provision that requires governments to treat 
foreign investors from a NAFTA signatory country no less favorably than domestic investors 
with respect to all phases and aspects of investment, from the initial establishment of an 
investment to the sale of the investment.23 
 
• NAFTA Article 1103 provides for “most favored nation” (MFN) treatment, a provision that 
requires governments to give foreign investors from signatory nations no less favorable treatment 
than the best treatment given to investors of another signatory nation or even nonsignatory 
nations, even if that treatment is better than that given to domestic investors.24 This rule can and 
has been interpreted to mean that any investment right that the host nation grants to any country 
under any treaty must be granted to all nations to whom the host country has MFN obligations.25 
 
• NAFTA Article 1105 contains a “minimum standard of treatment” provision, which requires that 
investors must be given treatment “in accordance with international law” including “fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security.”26 This vague catch-all clause has been used 
in several investor-state cases to dramatically expand NAFTA’s corporate investor protections. 
 
• NAFTA Article 1106 forbids the use of “performance requirements,” which is a term describing 
conditions on investment, such as rules requiring goods to be manufactured containing a certain 
level of domestic content, or the employment of locals or the development of local infrastructure. 
These measures are geared toward shaping the terms of foreign investment to ensure local 
economies, and not just foreign investors, benefit from the foreign direct investment.27 
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While NAFTA provides an array of legally binding constraints on government regulatory action, 
rights and privileges for foreign investors and strong private enforcement of these rules, NAFTA’s terms 
concerning the environment or other public interest concerns are meager. Notably, the non-binding 
preamble of NAFTA states that the parties resolve to strengthen the development and enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations as well as promote sustainable development. In addition, Article 1114 
of NAFTA’s investment chapter contains language purporting to protect the environment. Article 1114.1 
states that nothing in Chapter 11 shall prevent a party from maintaining measures to ensure that 
investment is undertaken in an environmentally sensitive manner. Article 1114.2 states that parties 
“should” not encourage investment by relaxing or waiving or derogating their domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures in order to encourage investment. Of course, unlike NAFTA’s investor rights 
rules, this clause is permissive, not mandatory. The term “shall” is used to establish investor rights, while 
environment terms “should” be met. Both clauses are worth noting because they have been almost 
entirely disregarded by the investor-state NAFTA tribunals when weighing environmental protection 
against investor rights under NAFTA. 
 
If a company or investor believes that a government has violated these NAFTA rights and 
protections, the investor can use the investor-state system to initiate a binding dispute resolution process 
and seek monetary damages outside the country’s court system. In a departure from many previous 
investment agreements, both parties need not consent to the arbitration, but an investor can initiate a case, 
thereby forcing the respondent country to decide whether or not to participate in the arbitration (it would 
be foolish for a nation not to).28  
 
Although a NAFTA panel in an investor-state dispute cannot directly order a NAFTA country to 
rescind the law or policy in question, nations are under tremendous pressure to do just that to shield 
themselves from being ordered to pay further awards of cash damages to investors because of the policy. 
Indeed, in the very first NAFTA investor-state case ever initiated, which involved the U.S. Ethyl 
Corporation, Canada moved to rescind its environmental measure regulating a gasoline additive 
developed by Ethyl even before the final NAFTA tribunal ruling in an effort to avoid a large damage 
award. In addition, when a state or local measure is challenged successfully under NAFTA, the federal 
government bears the liability − creating enormous incentive to pressure state and local governments into 
rescinding such policies. The federal government could attempt to use lawsuits, promulgate a new federal 
law to preempt the challenged state policy or withhold federal funds otherwise available to the state to 
force compliance. If a federal government refused to abide by the final award, a panel could be convened 
under the traditional state-state dispute resolution mechanism called for in Chapter 20 of NAFTA, but this 
has not happened in a NAFTA Chapter 11 case to date.29
 
NAFTA Corporate Dispute Resolution: Private Enforcement of a Public Treaty 
 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 lists two international arbitration bodies in which NAFTA investor-state 
disputes can be heard. These two bodies operate with similar rules and procedures which exclude the 
public while providing investors with a sympathetic ear. The International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) operates under the auspices of the World Bank. It first began operation in 
1966 as the implementation arm for an international treaty called the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. The Convention assigned ICSID the role of administering a new arbitration system 
established for handling disputes between countries that signed the convention and private foreign 
investors from signatory nations. For the most part, the new system was intended to handle cases 
involving specific contractual disputes between governments and corporate contractors. It was not created 
to adjudicate broad questions of public policy and the appropriate use of governmental regulatory 
authority.30
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The institutional scope of ICSID increased with the adoption of the ICSID “Additional Facility 
Rules” in 1978. These rules allowed proceedings when either the investor’s home country or the country 
against which a case was brought did not belong to the ICSID Convention. In 1994, ICSID took on a new 
role when it was chosen by NAFTA negotiators as one of two arbitral bodies that could hear investor 
disputes under NAFTA’s Chapter 11. Since neither Mexico nor Canada is an ICSID member country, any 
NAFTA cases involving parties from the United States and one of those two countries would have to be 
brought to ICSID under the Additional Facility Rules. Meanwhile, any NAFTA investor-state cases 
involving both Canada and Mexico must be brought under the UNCITRAL rules. 
 
Despite the rapid growth in bilateral investment agreements in recent years, the number of cases 
brought to ICSID was limited until recently. In the past eight years, however, in the words of the ICSID 
Deputy Secretary-General, “the floodgates then seemed to open.”31 More than three-fourths of ICSID's 
case load has been instigated since the beginning of 1997; 127 cases have been registered since then – 
over three times more than in ICSID’s entire previous history.32
 
Arbitral tribunals for ICSID cases are appointed on a case-by-case basis, and there is no 
requirement for the arbitrators to have served in any similar capacity before. Most strikingly, the parties to 
the case generally appoint the members of the tribunal. This system may have been suited for private 
contractual disputes, but is not appropriate for matters of public policy.  
 
Most often, including under NAFTA, the investor and the country involved each appoint one 
arbitrator, and the two initial arbitrators then choose a third who serves as the presiding arbitrator. If the 
parties can’t agree on a third arbitrator, the ICSID Secretary-General can choose the third from an ICSID 
“panel” of arbitrators appointed by member countries. 33 In addition, there is no provision for amicus 
participation by outside interested parties, and there is no standard appeals process such as that found in 
domestic courts.34 ICSID does provide for the annulment of final awards on narrow grounds, but this is 
not an appeals process.35
 
UNCITRAL is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. It adopted a set of 
Arbitration Rules in 1976 that parties from any country can use.36 Since neither Mexico nor Canada are 
members of the ICSID Convention, any NAFTA investor rights cases in which both parties are from these 
two countries must be brought under the UNCITRAL rules. Any other Chapter 11 dispute can also be 
brought under UNCITRAL. 
 
The UNCITRAL rules for the arbitration proceedings themselves are very much like those of 
ICSID, and the rules for the selection of arbitrators are similar as well. However, unlike ICSID, 
UNCITRAL only provides a set of rules. UNCITRAL has no professional staff to provide any 
administrative oversight for arbitration proceedings. It does not collect or compile final decisions in 
arbitration cases and therefore cannot make them available to the public. In fact, UNCITRAL does not 
collect and therefore does not make public even basic information about pending and concluded cases, 
although they are sometimes made public by the plaintiffs. Therefore, a case can proceed under 
UNCITRAL rules for years without the public being aware of it, and the history of cases brought under 
UNCITRAL rules is not known. Since UNCITRAL has no staff to oversee cases, there is no provision to 
annul arbitral decisions as there is in ICSID. Thus, the process under UNCITRAL provides even less 
transparency and public participation than under the ICSID rules, which themselves fall far short of 
domestic court due process and access to information standards. 
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Because these rules were created to arbitrate private contract disputes between investors and host 
states, the arbitration process in ICSID and UNCITRAL is a closed and unaccountable one. For instance, 
ICSID Additional Facility rules state that “[t]he deliberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private 
and remain secret,”37 thus traditionally only minimal information is available to the public about cases. 
ICSID does post on its Web site basic information such as names of the parties, date of complaint and 
names of arbitrators, but UNCITRAL does not provide even this basic information. Neither institution is 
permitted to release information about final awards without the consent of both parties. ICSID often posts 
information about final awards on its Web site, but UNCITRAL does not.38  
 
Moreover, potential for conflict of interest in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes is serious. Having 
parties to the suits appoint arbitrators raises potential problems as illustrated in the NAFTA Chapter 11 
Methanex case regarding California’s ban of the gasoline additive MTBE. Panelist Warren Christopher 
resigned from the case when the Methanex firm protested the close relationship between the former 
Secretary of State and then-Governor Gray Davis of California, whose actions were at issue in the case. 
Also, major law firms advertise their attorneys as both counsel for the plaintiff and as NAFTA panelists − 
suggesting that this joint expertise − as advocate and judge − is especially valuable to clients in need of 
Chapter 11 counsel.39  
 
The lack of transparency and public participation in ICSID and UNCITRAL, combined with the 
vast powers of tribunals to grant an infinite number of taxpayer dollars to corporations that successfully 
bring NAFTA suits, have raised significant questions about the appropriateness and the legitimacy of 
these private venues for the adjudication of significant issues of public concern. In response to mounting 
criticism, ICSID itself has proposed a variety of reforms in the areas of providing a mechanism for 
injunctive relief, greater public access to awards, amici participation, disclosure rules for panelists and an 
appeals procedure.40 The ICSID convention can be amended only if all 140 contracting states ratify the 
amendment, but there is an easier process for amending Additional Facility Rules. At this point it is not 
clear how much opposition the reforms may face, what avenue for adoption they may take, or how long 
such a process may take. As the cases described in detail in this report demonstrate, this closed-door 
process has already benefited foreign investors to the detriment of the public interest. 
 
As Criticism of Chapter 11 Builds, NAFTA Trade Ministers Issue a “Clarification” 
 
Responding to a rash of press and mounting criticism of NAFTA’s closed-door, investor-state 
process, on July 31, 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, composed of three NAFTA country trade 
ministers, issued a “clarification” related to NAFTA Chapter 11:41 NAFTA Article 1131 (2) allows for the 
Free Trade Commission to issue “interpretations” of NAFTA rules if agreed to by consensus. The 
clarification was issued as criticisms of the NAFTA investment process by environmental and consumer 
groups mounted and NAFTA tribunals continued to issue contradictory and controversial rulings. It is 
important to discuss this clarification and analyze its intended “fixes” of NAFTA because similar 
language has now been included in newly negotiated FTAs, such as CAFTA. 
 
The NAFTA Commission’s 2001 Chapter 11 clarification dealt with two issues. First, in response 
to a firestorm of criticism with regard to NAFTA’s closed-door process, the trade ministers turned their 
attention to the transparency issues. The clarification states that the NAFTA parties (i.e., the NAFTA 
nations) “agree to make available to the public in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued 
by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal,” except for confidential business information, information that is privileged 
or otherwise protected from disclosure under the party’s domestic law, and “information which the Party 
must withhold pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules as applied.”42 This last clause is the pertinent one. 
The problem with the clarification is that it does not change the underlying arbitration rules, such as those 
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at both ICSID and UNCITRAL which grants plaintiff investors the right to closed-door proceedings. At 
best, the NAFTA clarification is the signatory government’s assertion that if it is allowed to do so by the 
plaintiff, it will attempt to have open oral arguments. However, under the clarification it remains possible 
that serious matters regarding the public interest will be adjudicated behind closed doors under NAFTA. 
 
Also in the clarification, the NAFTA signatory governments declare that “Nothing in the NAFTA 
imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, 
subject to the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing 
public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal.”43 This represents a 
declaration by the NAFTA signatory governments that they will make NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration 
documents publicly available, and it appears that they generally have. All three NAFTA governments 
have set up Chapter 11 Web sites for posting arbitral material,44 and they appear to be posting key 
documents such as “Notice of Arbitration” (the legal brief by the plaintiff that initiates an arbitral 
proceeding), the statement of defense by the governments, and transcripts of hearings. However, the U.S. 
government does not post “Notices of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration,” which is the first step in 
bringing a complaint and would provide the public and the press timely notice of new cases. In addition, 
even though future proceedings may still be closed, at least two tribunal hearings (in the Methanex and 
UPS cases) have been open to the public, and in the Methanex case, the NAFTA panel agreed to receive 
two amici briefs by public interest groups. However, the public’s right to participate in a limited way 
through amici briefs is not assured. NAFTA panels get to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not 
they will allow amici briefs.  
 
It is important to note that as a practical matter, the clarification does little to remedy the access 
problems. Citizens and other interested parties, such as state and local elected officials, have no standing 
and no right to participate substantively as parties to the proceedings. For the citizens of California 
concerned about MTBE contamination of their wells and the potential impact of a NAFTA case, the fact a 
NAFTA tribunal in a far away Washington D.C. location had opened oral arguments to the public gives 
them little comfort. The fate of their property values − greatly affected by whether a home has access to 
affordable drinking water protected by California’s ban on MTBE − and a significant state policy will be 
determined in an obtuse, exclusive arbitration system which operates outside of the basic due process 
protections and other substantive and procedural rights provided by the U.S. Constitution. 
 
In addition, the NAFTA Commission’s 2001 Chapter 11 clarification also attempted to clear up 
what was meant by the guarantee of a “minimum standard of treatment” under international law provided 
for in Article 1105 of NAFTA, which had been given vastly different interpretations by NAFTA panels. 
The clarification simply states that Article 1105 provides those rights and protections afforded by 
“customary” international law. Unfortunately, the language that the trade ministers issued conflicts with 
the plain language of NAFTA and does not define what is encompassed in the rubric of “customary” 
international law. As a result, although we are instructed that a traditional interpretation is intended, we 
do not know what body of law is included, leaving in place what amounts to an extremely vague and 
open-ended standard that can be used to challenge efforts to protect the environment and other public 
interest policies. 
 
In addition, the interpretation attempted to put a stop to NAFTA claims that a NAFTA panel’s 
finding of a breach of another treaty, such as a WTO agreement, constitutes a breach of 1105 minimum 
standard of treatment under international law. The text states that “a determination that there has been a 
breach of another provision of NAFTA or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that 
there has been a breach of Article 1105 (1).” This language may pare down the number of claimants 
attempting to import other treaty obligations via Article 1105, but it does not shut down the possibility of 
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firms using NAFTA Chapter 11’s “most favored nation” rule to import more favorable obligations from 
other treaties. This has been attempted successfully in bilateral investment treaty cases heard at ICSID 
and it may be only a matter of time before a firm is successful in this endeavor in the NAFTA context. 45
 
One reason for the political shift that precipitated the Trade Minister’s clarification was the 
looming threat of rulings against governments on a number of cases due to a broad interpretation of 
NAFTA Article 1105’s minimum standard of treatment. Most notably, the United States was worried that 
it could loose the pending billion dollar California MTBE case if the 1105 standard was not tightened. 
One concern, however, is that it will be up to each individual NAFTA tribunal to decide whether the 
clarification is a legitimate interpretation or an inappropriate effort to amend NAFTA after the fact. Some 
legal scholars have pointed out that had the NAFTA authors intended to add the word “customary” to the 
NAFTA text − they would have, and the action of the Ministers is better described as an inappropriate 
attempt to insert a contradictory view. This view is supported by an affidavit sworn out by the former 
Principal Legal Counsel for International Trade Negotiations in Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Guillermo Aguilar Alvare. Alvare, who negotiated the Chapter 11 text on behalf of Mexico, stated that 
Mexico explicitly rejected the construct of “customary” international law, largely due to the fact that this 
term encompassed mostly United States and European jurisprudence.46 With only a small number of post-
clarification rulings, so far it appears that  NAFTA tribunals are being guided by the clarification. 
 
Meanwhile, in issuing this limited clarification, the trade ministers from the three NAFTA nations 
refused to deal with the core problems of Chapter 11 that have been raised by legislators and policy 
analysts in all three nations. The regulatory takings provisions of Article 1110 have drawn the most fire. 
However, the trade ministers refused to provide an interpretation of the provision or in any way limit its 
use. As well, the ministers refused to deal with the ever-expanding definition of both government 
“measure” and “investment,” which have generated numerous new cases based on expectations of future 
profitability and market share. 
 
New Investment Rules in CAFTA/ FTAs Fail to Meet Congressionally Required 
“No Greater Rights” Standard 
 
While the NAFTA trade ministers were tinkering with the various aspects of NAFTA’s 
investment rules, Congress decided to take matters into its own hands. In the U.S. Senate, where 
procedural rules make it easier for members of the minority party to obtain floor votes on their proposed 
amendments, senators fought to prevent some of the most damaging elements of the NAFTA investment 
model from being included in future trade agreements during the debate surrounding the “Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002,” better known as “Fast Track.”47 The Fast Track procedure 
delegates away Congress’ exclusive constitutional control over trade policy, authorizing the president to 
negotiate the terms of trade agreements, write the implementing legislation and give Congress only a 
yes/no vote on the completed package. While the Fast Track mechanism itself is controversial and passed 
only by a narrow margin, a key issue in the 2002 Fast Track debate was NAFTA Chapter 11’s investment 
rules. 
 
Both the House and the Senate debated the track record of Chapter 11 in undermining public 
interest policies and granting foreign investors regulatory takings rights that were not enjoyed by U.S. 
businesses. As amendments on the issue gained support, the Bush administration added some language to 
the bill aimed at addressing congressional dissatisfaction with the performance of Chapter 11. Between 
the meager language in the final Fast Track statue and the clearly articulated demands for deeper change 
found in amendments that did not pass, a series of demands were proposed for the Bush administration to 
meet before including investment rules in future trade agreements. The key requirement that made it into 
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the final Fast Track statue was that foreign investors should have “no greater substantive rights with 
respect to investment protections than U.S. investors in the United States.”48  
 
Congressional concern was justified because NAFTA Chapter 11, the enforceable investor-state 
terms of CAFTA and many of the post-Fast Track FTAs appear to dispense completely with the 
sovereign immunity shield enjoyed by the federal government vis-á-vis claimants in U.S. courts. As one 
legal scholar put it, “[b]y assenting to the terms of NAFTA, the United States, Canadian and Mexican 
governments essentially have waived whatever rights of sovereign immunity they may have enjoyed prior 
to signing.”49 While some foreign investors may argue that Congress waived federal sovereign immunity 
when it passed NAFTA, this is a hard argument to make since most members of Congress were not even 
aware of the existence of NAFTA Chapter 11 due to its approval under the Fast Track procedure, which 
circumvents the normal deliberative process. Moreover, the NAFTA implementing legislation states in 
part that when there is a conflict between U.S. law and NAFTA, U.S. law will prevail.50 This buttresses 
the argument that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity. The point may be an academic 
one; however, as NAFTA investors are proceeding to bring suits that are accepted and adjudicated by 
NAFTA tribunals that would not be allowed under U.S. law. Under U.S. law, both foreign and domestic 
firms can sue under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution for injunctive relief, 
but they are not allowed to sue for monetary relief.51 Under NAFTA Chapter 11 and the investment rules 
of post-Fast Track FTAs; however, foreign investors can sue for monetary relief on similar grounds 
regarding national treatment (anti-discrimination) and fair and equitable treatment and thus enjoy greater 
rights than U.S. citizens and firms. 
 
Additionally, in the final Fast Track statute, Congress identified several specific attributes that 
future agreements should contain, including: 
 
• establishing “standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation, consistent with 
United States legal principles and practice,” 
• establishing “fair and equitable treatment consistent with United States legal principles and 
practice, including the principle of due process,” 
• establishing “mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims and to deter the filing of frivolous 
claims,” 
• “providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations 
of investment provisions in trade agreements,” 
• “ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public…all proceedings, 
submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made public; and…all hearings are open to the 
public,” 
• “establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, 
and nongovernmental organizations.”52 
 
The USTR has systematically failed to meet these clear demands by Congress. In the recently 
completed Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, a proposed BIT with Uruguay, and in recently completed 
and proposed FTAs, including CAFTA, these issues have been given only superficial attention, and few, 
if any, real changes have been made. 
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Regulatory Takings Cases Allowed Under CAFTA and Recent FTAs That Would 
Not Be Allowed Under U.S. Law 
 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution requires the government 
pay compensation if it takes property for public use. Takings typically involve the physical seizure of 
property by the government for the construction of 
power lines, parks, public facilities and other public 
purposes. In the past decade, various conservative 
“property rights” groups have tried unsuccessfully to 
expand on the limited doctrine of “regulatory 
takings.” In theory, there are limited circumstances 
under which “regulatory takings” may occur – 
situations where government regulations so 
completely destroy a property’s value that a court 
will determine that a taking has occurred. If such a 
determination is made, the government will be 
required to pay for the property. However, in 
practice, U.S. courts almost never find that regulatory 
takings have occurred, making the doctrine more or 
less moot in contemporary takings jurisprudence. The 
situation is different under NAFTA Chapter 11, 
however, where a number of aspects of the agreement facilitate, rather than discourage regulatory takings 
claims. 
“In particular, we are troubled that a claim 
by a foreign company that a local 
government’s regulation or zoning law 
constitutes a taking against the company 
will make it impossible for the locality to 
enforce that specific regulation or law 
against the company. Equally troubling, 
such an action would appear to favor 
foreign companies over domestic 
companies, which would in all likelihood 
have to comply with the local regulation or 
law.” 
 
National Association of Towns and     
Townships, Apr. 4, 2002 letter to 
Congress 
 
Categories of Property Eligible for a Takings Claim Far Broader than Under U.S. Law: Under 
U.S. law, generally only real property (i.e., real estate) can be considered for regulatory takings claims. 
Personal property (anything other than land), other generalized economic interests, and concepts such as 
“market access” are not eligible for such claims. Rather than comply with Congress’ “no greater rights” 
requirements and narrow the range of property that can be the appropriate subject of a takings claim, 
shortly after the Fast Track bill passed, the USTR moved in the opposite direction. The USTR outlined its 
position in a paper submitted to the WTO that “investment agreements must have a broad, open-ended 
definition that includes all types of investment.” The USTR wrote that in the context of that institution’s 
debate about whether or not to conduct multilateral negotiations on an investment treaty.53
 
Thus, it is not surprising that the USTR broadened rather than narrowed the definition of 
investment in recent FTAs and CAFTA. The USTR characterizes investments in these agreements in 
terms that would not be sufficient to establish the existence of a protected property right under the 
Takings Clause, including “the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectations of gain or 
profit, or the assumption of risk.”54 Moreover, the USTR has now made clear that even more types of 
investments qualify for NAFTA’s investor protections. CAFTA, for instance, now includes “licenses, 
authorizations, permits” in the list of covered investments. As these are measures often granted by state 
and local governments, the FTAs are likely to expose more local government decisions such as those 
regarding zoning, building permits and licensing of various establishments to challenge under these 
investment rules. 
 
Plus, the powerful pharmaceutical lobby succeeded in making sure that “intellectual property 
rights” are now listed as a protected investment in the FTAs. This means that a pharmaceutical company 
that believes its intellectual property rights are affected by a public health policy that may negatively 
impact its profitability could use the investment rules to bring a regulatory takings claim. Such a suit 
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already has been threatened by Phillip Morris against proposed Canadian regulations that would forbid 
the use of such descriptors as “light” and “mild” on cigarette packaging. Phillip Morris noted at the time 
that this was a violation of its intellectual property rights under the WTO and NAFTA. The broadened 
definition of investment means that the firm does not have to convince the U.S. government to press its 
claim using the state-state enforcement mechanism; rather, it has been granted explicit permission to 
attempt an investor-state suit under the FTAs if another country covered by the broader investment 
definition passed such a law. 
 
Other examples of investor protections providing greater rights than U.S. businesses are allowed 
under the constitution involve NAFTA cases in which claimants have challenged regulations governing 
toxic substances, as in the Methanex case, 
where a Canadian chemical company is 
challenging California’s law banning MTBE 
which has been found to be polluting scarce 
water resources across the state. Under the 
U.S. Supreme Court holding in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, pollution that 
harms public or other properties is a nuisance 
that can be regulated by states without 
compensation.55 Thus, chemical pollutants are 
unlikely to qualify as “property” eligible for a 
regulatory takings claim. The investment rules 
in the recent FTAs fail to ensure that a 
government action to prevent a public 
nuisance is not treated as an expropriation − a 
failure sure to generate further investor-state 
claims by chemical companies attempting to 
combat environmental regulation.  
“The vague nature of international agreements 
such as NAFTA that define "expropriation of 
property" to include "indirect expropriation" or 
"tantamount to expropriation" can give rise to 
interpretations that are inconsistent with the 
United States Constitution. It is our view that the 
"no greater rights" language must specifically 
reference the United States Constitution as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in order to 
ensure that international businesses do not 
receive preferential treatment when compared to 
domestic businesses.”  
 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Council of State 
Governments, U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, National League of Cities, Sept. 
23, 2003 letter to USTR 
 
In addition to failing to limit the definition of investment, the USTR also failed to prevent future 
trade panels from extending the textual definition of investment even further to even more intangible 
economic interests. For instance, in the S.D. Myers PCB case, the tribunal found “market share” to be a 
legitimate investment, and the Pope & Talbot softwood lumber tribunal declared that “market access” 
constituted an investment.56 The USTR could have, but failed to clarify that these generalized economic 
interests were not encompassed under the definition of investment in the new FTAs. Instead, new 
language in the definitions section regarding “the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk” 
extends the categories of generalized economic interests that are investor-state enforceable. 
 
Finally, it is important to highlight new language in the “definitions” section of certain of the 
FTAs. For instance, CAFTA contains a Section C under definitions that extends the investor-state dispute 
resolution system to corporations that have a “written agreement” with a federal government with regard 
to “natural resources or other assets that a national authority controls.” This means the new FTAs 
explicitly allow foreign investors to avoid the domestic court system and bring disputes over government 
contracts straight into binding international arbitration. The language of the text implicates an 
incalculably broad array of assets controlled by the federal government. For instance, investors could 
bring arbitral challenges over oil and gas, mining and water contracts without first having to resort to 
domestic legal remedies. In the United States, firms with concession contracts or other contracts with the 
federal government regarding the management of public lands or other public assets would not be allowed 
to avoid U.S. courts if involved in a contract dispute. 
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Definition of Expropriation Broader: In CAFTA and the post-Fast Track FTAs, the USTR also 
failed to limit the expansive definition of expropriation, which under NAFTA has led to the compensation 
of foreign investors for “regulatory takings” that would not be eligible for such a claim under U.S. law. 
Congress wanted to ensure that of foreign investors could not seek compensation for measures that were 
less than true expropriations.  
 
NAFTA Article 1110 guarantees foreign investors compensation from the treasuries (i.e., from 
the taxpayers) of NAFTA governments for any direct government expropriation (i.e., nationalization) or 
any other action that is “tantamount to” an expropriation or an “indirect” expropriation.  
 
One change the USTR made in the FTAs was to replace the words “tantamount to” a 
nationalization or expropriation with “equivalent to” an expropriation or nationalization in the section 
delimiting when expropriations would be eligible for compensation.57 However, this change is merely 
cosmetic. The new FTAs still require compensation for “indirect” expropriations, which is the operative 
term.58 Indeed some NAFTA panels have held that “tantamount to” is redundant and does not expand 
upon the scope of direct and indirect expropriation.59 This means that an investor can still force a 
government to pay compensation for incidental effects on its business resulting from an environmental, 
labor, or other public interest regulation. 
 
Another mechanism Congress sought to include in future FTAs to ensure “no greater rights” for 
foreign investors was to require trade tribunals to follow U.S. law in determining if an expropriation had 
occurred. The post-Fast Track FTAs give further guidance regarding what constitutes an expropriation, 
and this language includes a list of factors to be considered in determining if a takings has occurred that 
were generated by the U.S. Supreme Court case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.60 
However, the Penn Central factors are relevant only when considered in the context of over 25 years of 
judicial interpretation – interpretation that has made it extremely difficult to find a taking. Outside of the 
U.S. jurisprudence defining them, terms such as the “character of the government action” are 
meaningless. Unless the FTAs require that U.S. jurisprudence be adhered to, the dispute tribunals will be 
able to interpret the list of Penn Central factors in any number of ways, without being bound by decades 
of U.S. court precedence about what these terms mean. 
  
Lesser Degree of Adverse Impact Required: The protections accorded foreign investors under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 greatly surpass those provided by the Takings Clause in another important way. The 
degree of adverse economic impact required for an expropriation to be found under the trade agreements’ 
investment rules is apparently much lower than the near total destruction of the value of the property 
required by Supreme Court interpretations of the Takings Clause. In the 1978 Penn Central case, the 
Supreme Court rejected the notion of “conceptual severance” − the idea that harming one part of the 
property or one use of the property eliminated the value of the property or parcel as a whole. In addition, 
Congress has repeatedly rejected property rights bills that would have permitted conceptual severance. 
 
Yet in the NAFTA Chapter 11 Metalclad toxic waste case, an investor-state tribunal ruled that 
even though the investor may have been left with economically beneficial use of the land, potentially 
including “the exploration, extraction or utilization of natural resources,” a municipality’s denial of a 
construction permit constituted a compensable takings.61 Moreover, the panel failed to conduct an 
analysis of whether the property in question had other economically beneficial uses than the one denied to 
the investor.62 Such a consideration would be routine under U.S. law, and a finding of other beneficial 
uses would defeat a takings claim. Yet, such claims are clearly permitted under NAFTA, and the USTR 
has failed to rule out such claims in CAFTA and recent FTAs. 
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In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion of “temporal severance,” the idea that 
a temporary restriction on the use of property constitutes a takings. In the 2002 case Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. vs. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court held that a three-year 
moratorium on development was not a categorical taking because it deprived property owners of the use 
of their property for only a portion of the property’s entire useful life. The court upheld a complete ban on 
new development in the Tahoe basin. Yet, in the S.D. Myers NAFTA Chapter 11 case, the NAFTA panel 
ruled that Canada’s temporary ban on trade in PCBs was a NAFTA violation worthy of compensation and 
indicated that temporal 
severance may be 
appropriate in certain 
instances.65
 
In the 1993 case 
Concrete Pipe and 
Products vs. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust, 
the U.S. Supreme Court 
characterized its position 
on regulatory takings cases 
by stating that “our cases 
have long established that 
mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”66 In 
contrast, NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals have declared that a measure need only cause “significant” or 
“substantial” impairment of an investment’s value to qualify as a takings. For instance, the Metalclad 
tribunal stated that “expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged 
takings of property… but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owners in whole or significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected 
economic benefit of property.”67
“Our cases have long established that mere diminution in the value 
of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a 
taking.”63   
                        -U.S. Supreme Court 
 
 “[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate 
and acknowledged takings of property… but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect 
of depriving the owners in whole or significant part, of the use or 
reasonably to be expected economic benefit of property.”64  
 
  NAFTA Metalclad tribunal 
 
The USTR could have ensured that the trade pacts did not provide greater rights than the basic 
tenant of U.S. property rights law by including specific language in CAFTA and the recent FTAs to 
require that a total takings must be deemed to occur before an expropriation is found to ensure that, but it 
failed to do so. 
 
Language in CAFTA Investment Annex Fails to Protect Against Regulatory Takings: In 
response to criticism that investment rules in new FTAs allow for broad regulatory takings claims, the 
USTR will likely point to one new provision included as an Annex to the new FTAs that reads: “Except 
in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.”68 While this language attempts to calm concerns that legitimate public 
health and safety regulations will be the basis for expropriation claims, it has precisely the opposite effect. 
 
Under U.S. law, public interest regulations governing personal property are considered a 
legitimate exercise of police powers and are exempt from regulatory takings claims.69 Thus, the language 
in the Annex does precisely opposite of what is purportedly intended: it enshrines the right of foreign 
investors to bring cases involving a wide array of public health and safety regulations. Furthermore, the 
USTR will have absolutely no ability to ensure that such cases are brought only in “rare” circumstances. 
Given the numerous NAFTA cases involving toxic substances, the Phillip Morris threat with regard to 
proposed Canadian tobacco control law, and the Canadian cattlemen’s initiation of a NAFTA case over 
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the U.S. actions to prevent mad cow disease from entering the United States, the “rare circumstances” 
language is of little effect, as deciding whether to award damages for normal environmental and health 
policies remains with investor-state tribunals on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, when deciding such 
cases, tribunals will reference other specific provisions of the agreements expanding foreign investor 
rights that directly conflict with this general language. Had the USTR truly wanted to protect public 
health and bring consistency with U.S. takings law, it would have created a binding article within the core 
text of the agreement simply and explicitly prohibiting such cases. 
 
Investors Enjoy “Substantive Due Process Review” Under CAFTA and Recent 
FTAs Not Allowed Under U.S. Law 
 
NAFTA Article 1105 contains a “minimum standard of treatment” provision, which requires that 
investors must be given treatment “in accordance with international law” including “fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.” This vague catch-all has been used in several investor-state 
cases to dramatically expand NAFTA’s corporate investor protections. CAFTA and the recent FTAs also 
continue to guarantee foreign investors protection through a vague standard of “fair and equitable 
treatment” under international law. This provision clearly goes beyond the due process standard under 
U.S. law.  
 
Prior to 1937, the U.S. Supreme Court regularly subjected economic regulations to a “substantive 
due process review” and invalidated many New Deal statutes, such as a New York minimum wage law. 
This so-called “Lochner era” (named for a New York baker whose conviction for breaking wage and hour 
laws was reversed) has been widely repudiated by legal scholars and later courts for overstepping 
separation of powers and unconstitutionally tying the hands of the legislative branch of government. 
 
Today, U.S. courts do not apply a substantive due process test, but rather use a “minimum 
rationality standard,” which means that the economic regulation will be upheld as long as it bears some 
rational relation to the legislative objective. U.S. courts are very deferential to the decisions of legislatures 
and are prohibited from second-guessing them under modern jurisprudence.70 Instead of second-guessing 
whether a policy is “fair,” U.S. courts limit their due process review to whether parties obtained the 
procedural safeguards to which they were entitled, such as whether or not they were granted a hearing. 
 
However, the notion of substantive due process review and second-guessing are alive and well in 
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. The USTR failed to prohibit such behavior in CAFTA and the new FTAs. 
Under the vague and open-ended standard of fair and equitable treatment, investor-state trade tribunals 
have been given tremendous leeway to take apart government decisions and define for themselves what 
constitutes “fairness.” In the NAFTA Metalclad toxic waste case, the S.D. Myers PCB case and the Pope 
& Talbot softwood lumber case, governments were found to have violated the fair and equitable treatment 
standard after NAFTA panels engaged in excessive second-guessing of government actions. For instance, 
the Pope & Talbot tribunal found that the rude and overly zealous behavior by Canadian officials 
attempting to verify the company’s softwood lumber quotas was a violation of NAFTA’s fair and 
equitable guarantees. It is notable that the panel did not find a violation of international law, customary 
law or even domestic law in the government’s conduct and carved out its own definition of “fair and 
equitable.”  
 
The USTR added new language in CAFTA and the FTAs linking “fair and equitable” to the 
obligation not to deny justice “in accordance with the due process embodied in the principal legal systems 
of the world.”71 However, this language will fail to address the problem of trade panels extending their 
purview beyond due process considerations and into substantive economic review. First, this language 
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leaves unclear what legal systems are being referred to. Moreover, by defining due process in terms of 
unnamed nation’ legal systems rather than linking it to U.S. law and jurisprudence, the USTR “fix” flies 
in the face of the congressional requests to provide “no greater rights.”72
 
No Exhaustion of Remedies Required by CAFTA and Recent FTAs 
 
There is no finality requirement or exhaustion of local remedies requirement in the CAFTA or 
new FTAs as there is under U.S. law.74 The Supreme Court has long held the reasonable standard that “a 
court cannot determine whether a regulation 
has gone ‘too far’ unless it knows how far the 
regulation goes.”75 This means there must be a 
final determination of the permissible property 
uses by the relevant authority before a claim 
for expropriation can be brought. The fact that 
there is no similar requirement in NAFTA led 
to the Metalclad ruling, where the denial of a 
municipal construction permit was found by a 
NAFTA tribunal to be a takings even though 
the plaintiff had not exhausted its remedies 
with the municipality or the domestic courts. 
The USTR failed to ensure that such a 
requirement was included in CAFTA and the new FTAs, nor did it heed calls of groups representing 
jurists and local officials to keep domestic court decisions out of investor-state dispute resolution 
altogether. 
“The United States Conference of Mayors urges 
conferees on the Trade Promotion Act of 2001 to 
include language providing that decisions and 
other orders of the courts of the United States 
including the U.S. Supreme Court and the highest 
courts of states cannot be challenged before 
international arbitration panels as violations of 
investment provisions in trade agreements.”73   
 
U.S. Conference of Mayors Resolution on 
Fast Track trade bill 
 
The USTR failed to require exhaustion of remedies even after the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal in 
the Loewen case ruled that an investor bringing a investment challenge over a court ruling should be 
required to exhaust all available judicial remedies before seeking NAFTA arbitration − a ruling that saved 
the United States from potentially millions of dollars in damages. However, the Loewen decision has no 
precedential effect and thus, is not binding on future tribunals. Rather than making the Loewen ruling a 
permanent fixture and enshrining it in new trade rules to narrow the range of court decisions that can be 
considered NAFTA violations, the USTR simply failed to address the issue in CAFTA or the new FTAs. 
 
Proposal for Super-Judicial Appellate Mechanism Falls Short In CAFTA  
 
Besides demanding “no greater rights” for foreign investors, Congress included various other 
expectations in the 2002 Fast Track bill, which the USTR has largely failed to address adequately. For 
instance, Congress specifically demanded an appellate procedure for investor-state cases to bring 
consistency to tribunal rulings. The new FTAs do not fulfill this congressional charge. The U.S.-Chile 
FTA calls for the creation of an appellate mechanism within three years, and CAFTA calls for the 
creation of one a year after the formation of a negotiating group.76 Neither agreement actually creates the 
mechanism called for by Congress. 
 
 In a letter to the USTR, Senator Max Baucus expressed his discontent with the appellate issue, 
stating, “The current CAFTA text, however, does not include an appellate mechanism. Rather, it merely 
states the parties’ intentions to discuss the creation of such a mechanism at an indefinite future time.”77
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The U.S. State Department recently proposed a framework for an appellate mechanism that falls 
short of the Fast Track requirements. While this plan is not yet available in writing, it was presented to a 
group of investment and takings experts, some of whom noted the following problems. 
 
• Design Does Not Promise Coherence: While Fast Track calls for a mechanism to bring 
“coherence” to investor-state rulings, the State Department proposal calls for an ad hoc appellate 
procedure that draws panelists from a roster, not a standing appellate body. The lack of 
permanent professional staff will ensure that panels will continue to strike out on their own in 
interpreting the complex investment rules, a recipe for further arbitrary, contradictory rulings. 
Moreover, given that under the proposal, decisions of the appellate panels would have no 
precedent within the appellate mechanism itself or any future arbitration proceedings, the 
proposed system is simply not designed to improve coherence. 
 
• Current Limited Domestic Court Review Would Be Eliminated: Unbelievably, the current 
proposal also eliminates the existing last resort − domestic court review of panel rulings. Under 
NAFTA, in extremely limited circumstances, arbitration panel decisions can be brought to 
domestic courts and be reviewed by domestic judges under federal law governing arbitration or 
under the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York Convention). The narrow grounds for review 
under domestic law focus on issues such as corruption or fraud on the part of plaintiff, 
misconduct by panelists, procedural irregularity, or panelists who exceed their authority in the 
final award. The New York Convention also allows for an analysis of whether or not the result of 
the arbitration is in contravention to public policy. The State Department’s proposal for an 
appellate system seems geared to eliminate even this slim chance for domestic court review. The 
proposal is either to amend the Federal Arbitration Act or the New York Convention or to require 
that parties utilizing investor-state arbitration proceedings waive any rights they have under these 
measures as a condition of obtaining access to the investor-state process. This limited backstop on 
arbitral decisions is in place to ensure that domestic courts retain their designated role as the 
ultimate arbiters of public policy issues, including constitutional issues. 
 
• Very Narrow Grounds for Bringing Appeal: The proposal would only allow cases to be 
reviewed utilizing a very high standard of review such as “manifest errors of law” or a “clearly 
erroneous” standard. Currently, NAFTA tribunal decisions are subject to review on narrow 
grounds, but these grounds include a review for consistency with “public policy” of the NAFTA 
nation under the New York Convention. Instead of removing this backstop for misguided arbitral 
decisions, USTR should maintain or expand the scope of domestic court review of arbitral 
decisions as another means to encourage conformity to U.S. law and practice.  
 
• Would Appellate Body be Subject to Congressional Approval?: Finally it is not clear how the 
State Department’s plan would be implemented, i.e., whether or not the Bush administration 
would seek to get an agreement to add it to CAFTA before congressional approval or if it will 
somehow implement the system after CAFTA has been passed by Congress. After having 
explicitly required an appellate body in CAFTA, it is unlikely that Congress will be willing to 
hand over this vast project to the executive branch and grant the State Department and USTR the 
power to create a super-judicial procedure which, among other powers, will have the authority to 
rule that U.S. Supreme Court decisions are violations of international law. 
 
In sum, the proposed appellate mechanism is what one scholar called a “costly and redundant 
second bite at the apple” that will not achieve what Congress set out to achieve and will not be subject to 
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domestic court review, yet will have direct impacts on U.S. domestic law as well as potentially enormous 
impacts on the U.S. treasury.78
 
Transparency Improvements in CAFTA and Recent FTAs 
 
Traditionally, NAFTA tribunals have operated in secret, even though the decisions have 
enormous effects on public policy and the U.S. treasury. The rules of ICSID and UNCITRAL, where the 
NAFTA cases are arbitrated, do not provide for public hearings, amicus briefs or even the publication of 
the final award without the consent of the parties. In the past ten years, significant criticism was leveled 
by the public, the press, state and local officials and other interested parties on the closed-door nature of 
NAFTA tribunals. Many members of Congress were also astonished and offended to learn about the 
absolute secrecy which shrouded most NAFTA proceedings. Thus, it is not surprising that a key 
congressional demand was that any future trade agreements which include and investor-state mechanism 
require greater transparency.  
 
In a victory for all those who raised these issues with Congress, CAFTA and the new FTAs do 
offer improvements with regard to transparency. For citizens who can afford to travel to sometimes 
distant locations, tribunal hearings will now be open to the public. Furthermore documents are to be made 
available to the public in a timely fashion during the course of the proceedings. In additions, tribunals 
have the explicit authority to consider whether or not to accept amicus curie briefs, though it is not 
required that they do so. However, the new transparency rules do have exceptions for “protected 
information” and “confidential business information” that allow an investor to designate material as 
“protected,” at which point it would be kept from the public eye.79 There is no mechanism by which the 
public could challenge such a designation, and there appears to be no requirement that the confidential 
business information definition conforms to the definition under U.S. law. It remains to be seen whether 
this loophole will be exploited by investors in order to keep tribunal proceedings secret. 
 
Frivolous Lawsuits Addressed in CAFTA and FTAs 
 
One issue of concern raised in Fast Track that was dealt with in a forthright manner was the 
establishment of a mechanism to deal with challenges that do not fall within the tribunals’ competence. 
CAFTA and the new FTAs outline a procedure for an expedited review of issues of jurisdiction and 
competence and require plaintiffs who are judged to have filed a frivolous claim to pay reasonable costs 
and attorneys’ fees.80 The complication with this provisions is that to date, NAFTA Chapter 11 panels 
have found it extremely difficult to separate issues of jurisdiction from issues of merit. NAFTA panelists 
have seemed loathe to dismiss claims, perhaps because the NAFTA investor-state mechanism is still 
fairly new, lacking an appellate system and is not guided by a large body of cases. It is quite likely that 
this state of affairs will continue with cases under the recent FTAs and panelists will be reluctant to reject 
any case without a thorough review of the merits, leading to costly reviews of cases on grounds of both 
jurisdiction and merit. 
 
Greater Procedural Rights Still Allowed in CAFTA and FTAs 
 
While Fast Track did not explicitly address the issue, it should be noted that foreign investors 
continue to receive greater procedural rights in the new FTAs than under U.S. law. 
 
First, foreign investors are allowed a second chance to litigate the same claim if they choose to 
pursue a claim in the U.S. court system and are unsuccessful. In contrast, U.S. businesses must abide by 
the rulings of U.S. courts. NAFTA Chapter 11 has generated a large number of claims that challenge 
 17
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, February 2005 
domestic court decisions as expropriations or discriminatory acts. NAFTA tribunals are being asked to 
rehear extremely complicated cases where the investor failed to prevail in the domestic court system. 
While most of these cases are still pending, NAFTA Article 1121 explicitly allows this second bite at the 
apple in a more investor-friendly setting. In addition, the recent Loewen decision made clear that no court 
is exempt from this second-guessing, 
potentially not even the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 
The new FTAs also allow 
investors to avoid U.S. state courts, 
which have traditionally been 
skeptical of takings claims. In the 
United States, federal courts defer to 
state courts on takings cases as 
property rights are generally defined 
by state law.81 Congress has 
repeatedly refused to grant the 
property rights movement the right to 
avoid state courts. However, foreign 
investors pursuing investor-state takings claims have been granted the right to bypass U.S. state courts 
and proceed directly to a trade tribunal under NAFTA and the FTAs. 
“Our objection to the investor state provision stems from 
our concern that investors from nations with well 
developed legal systems have abused such FTA 
provisions to challenge the authority of U.S. state and 
local governments. The Methanex and Loewen cases in 
particular have reinforced our concern that the provision 
will be abused by investors who simply hope to 
circumvent established legislative and judicial 
procedures.”  
 
                       National Conference of State Legislators  
                       Feb. 12, 2004 letter to USTR 
 
CAFTA and the new FTAs provide for more of the same. Instead of respecting the will of 
Congress as indicated by the Fast Track negotiating objectives, the USTR has failed to make systematic 
and substantive changes to the serious problems that have been identified in NAFTA’s investment 
chapter. The USTR has negotiated additional agreements granting extensive rights to foreign investors 
while paying only superficial attention to the demands of Congress or the critical feedback by a growing 
list of groups representing attorneys general, other state and local officials, judicial groups and the public 
at large. 
 
Increasing Questions Regarding the Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 11 
Tribunals 
 
While USTR negotiators tinker with cosmetic changes to NAFTA’s investment model to satisfy 
congressional critics and others, the steady drumbeat of controversial NAFTA decisions has generated an 
increased level of scrutiny from the media, policymakers, scholars and the public at large. An increasing 
number of jurists, state and local officials and academic experts have cut to the heart of the issue and have 
begun to question the very constitutionality of the NAFTA tribunals. Legal scholars have cited a number 
of concerns. 
 
 The primary issue raised by scholars is that the executive branch-negotiated and congressionally 
authorized investor-state tribunals conflict with the separation of powers doctrine, the core premise of 
which is an independent judiciary.82 Article III of the U.S. Constitution creates this independent judiciary, 
separate from the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in 1997: “Article III of our Constitution reserves to federal courts the  
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power to decide cases and controversies, and the U.S. 
Congress may not delegate to another tribunal ‘the 
essential attributes of judicial power.’ ”84 Whether a 
delegation of judicial authority includes such 
“essential attributes” determines if this delegation is 
unconstitutional. Three factors are considered: the 
scope of the delegation, the importance of the claims, 
and the purpose of the delegation. In the case of 
investor-state tribunals contained in NAFTA, 
CAFTA and other trade agreements, Chapter 11 
tribunals, each of these factors weighs against constitutionality. The scope of issues dealt with by 
tribunals is very broad, potentially implicating countless federal, state or local government policies. The 
claims are certainly important, involving issues at the core of U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence. In a 
filing in support of allowing amicus briefs in the Methanex MTBE case, the U.S. government argued 
“NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven plays an important role in settling investment disputes in the NAFTA 
territories, and in developing generally applicable principles of state responsibility under international 
law.” 85 Finally, the purpose of the delegation is relatively weak, in that there are other available means to 
secure the same ends. In fact, in 1982 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the federal bankruptcy 
courts as then established by Congress, arguing that the system violated Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution.86 Surely, the Chapter 11 tribunals, and the vast array of public policy matters adjudicated 
under them, constitute as great or greater a delegation of power than the unconstitutional bankruptcy 
courts. 
“Our recent experience under NAFTA 
demonstrates how drastically such 
provisions in international trade agreements 
can depart from American constitutional 
standards.”  
 
California Attorney General Bill 
Lockyer83
 
 In the summer of 2004, the Conference of Chief Justices passed a resolution stating in part: “The 
question of whether the investor-state process is consistent with Article III of the U.S. Constitution raises 
a sufficiently serious and important issue that deserves prompt, thorough examination as the United States 
considers negotiating additional trade agreements with various other nations.”87 These jurists also called 
upon the Bush administration to ensure that judgments and other rulings of U.S. state and federal courts 
are not subject to challenge in investor-state arbitration proceedings under U.S. trade agreements. The 
U.S. Conference of Mayors made similar requests in 2001 when it urged the House and Senate conferees 
on the Trade Promotion Authority Act “to include language providing that decisions and other orders of 
the courts of the United States, including the U.S. Supreme Court and the highest courts of states, cannot 
be challenged before international arbitration panels as violations of investment provisions in trade 
agreements.”88  
  
There is also a growing concern among legal scholars that an action by the federal government to 
force state compliance with a NAFTA investor-state tribunal ruling would be unconstitutional. A Chapter 
11 tribunal award against the United States would be binding on the federal government as the signatory 
to the agreement and not on the state or local government involved in the alleged violation. The federal 
government is required to ensure conformity of all levels of government to the terms of the agreement. 
Thus, the federal government could pre-empt the state or local law on the grounds that it violates a trade 
agreement’s investment rules as interpreted by an investor-state tribunal.89 Yet, a growing number of legal 
scholars believe such pre-emption by the federal government would be unconstitutional, first because it 
would pose a separation of powers issue.90 If the federal government attempted to enforce a tribunal’s 
award with regard to a regulatory takings case, by preempting state law with a new federal policy, 
Congress would be exercising power allocated to the judicial branch. It is the duty and responsibility of 
the judiciary, not the Congress, to define the substance of the U.S. Constitution regarding takings of 
property.  
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Second, such a preemption would violate Article V of the Constitution, which dictates the 
procedures for amending the Constitution.91 Essentially, such preemption would serve the purpose of 
changing the substance of the Takings Clause without going through the proper procedures to do so. In 
fact, Congress previously had tried to pass legislation that would similarly affect the Takings Clause. 
However, that legislation was attacked as being unconstitutional by many, including the Attorneys 
General of thirty-seven states who argued in a letter that: “Congress lacks the power to substantively re-
define constitutional limitations on the states.”92 The same argument would apply to federal efforts to 
enforce Chapter 11 rulings upon states. 
 
 The constitutionality question has also been raised even more actively on the other side of the 
border.93 In Canada, a lawsuit is under way challenging the constitutionality of NAFTA investor-state 
tribunals and the Canadian laws that implement them.94 The Council of Canadians and the Canadian 
Union of Postal Workers together filed suit in the Superior Court of Ontario, and oral arguments will be 
heard in January of 2005. They argue that investor-state tribunals undermine the independence of 
Canadian courts by improperly delegating authority to adjudicate matters reserved to them by the 
Constitution Act, infringe on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights, and exceed the treaty making powers of government under 
Canadian and international law. If successful, the suit will nullify the Canadian laws that implement the 
Chapter 11 investor-state tribunals and raise enormous questions about the constitutionality of such 
mechanisms under the constitutions of other nations. 
 
 Another Canadian lawsuit was filed by Democracy Watch (a Canadian citizen group) and the 
Canadian Union of Public Employees against the Attorney General of Canada.95 The plaintiffs in this case 
argue that the Chapter 11 investor-state tribunals are inconsistent with freedom of the press and freedom 
of expression guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, because the tribunals are 
conducted in private without public input or knowledge. The suit seeks a declaration that the 
administrative order bringing NAFTA Chapter 11 into existence is of no force or effect. 
 
The fact that USTR has failed to fix the expansive investment rules in CAFTA and in recently 
negotiated FTAs ensures that new cases will generate new controversy. Greater scrutiny will be brought 
to bear by policymakers and jurists with regard to the appropriateness of this mechanism and the 
constitutionality of what is in effect a parallel judicial system for large multinational businesses.  
 
Below we detail the track record of NAFTA investment cases. In NAFTA’s first eleven years, 42 
cases and claims have come to light. This number is sure to increase exponentially in coming decades, as 
investor rules are included in an ever-increasing number of FTAs and BITs with implications for public 
interest policies, democratic governance and the rule of law, unless radical rights and privileges contained 
in the NAFTA investment model and their private enforcement mechanism are eliminated or altered.  
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II. MAJOR NAFTA CHAPTER 11 CASES 
 
 What follows is a detailed discussion of seven important NAFTA Chapter 11 cases of significant 
public interest that have been completed or are currently under way. 
 
ETHYL v. CANADA – MMT GASOLINE ADDITIVE 
 
Ethyl Corporation is a Virginia-based chemical company with a long and controversial history. In 
1922, Ethyl started to produce tetraethyl lead, the additive used to make leaded gasoline, to enhance auto 
engine performance.96 Shortly after production started, many of the workers at its New Jersey plant began 
hallucinating and experiencing acute convulsions.97 Eventually, five of the workers died.98 It wasn’t until 
50 years later that the U.S. federal government took action to eliminate lead from gasoline. By then, 
numerous studies had demonstrated that lead from gasoline exhaust and spills was contaminating soils 
and surface water and creeping into the food chain.99 Lead from automobile exhaust was even getting into 
the brains of American children, causing neurodevelopmental impairment.100
 
In the 1950s, Ethyl Corporation developed a new gasoline additive called methylcyclopentadienyl 
manganese tricarbonyl (MMT).101 MMT, an anti-knocking agent used to improve engine performance, 
contains manganese − a known human neurotoxin.102 A concentrated form of MMT is produced in the 
United States, then imported into Canada by the Ethyl subsidiary there, Ethyl Canada, where it is diluted 
at a plant in Ontario and sold to Canadian gasoline refiners.103
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
In 1977, MMT was banned from use in unleaded gasoline by California, which has its own state-
level clean air law, and then by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) due to environmental 
and public health concerns until an adverse domestic court ruling in 1995.104 Although little was known 
about the specific dangers posed to the public from manganese particles coming out of the tail pipes of 
cars burning fuel containing MMT, the dangers of inhaling manganese have been known since the 
1800s.105 Airborne manganese has been found to cause disabling neurological impairments and symptoms 
similar to Parkinson’s disease in manganese miners.106 A series of occupational studies of battery plant 
workers, steelworkers and other workers conducted in the 1990s was characterized in a public health 
journal as “compelling evidence of neurotoxicity associated with low-level occupational exposure” to 
manganese in the air.107
 
Against this background of health studies and U.S. government action, the Canadian Parliament 
imposed a ban in April 1997 on the import and inter-provincial transport of MMT.108 Because the United 
States was the only NAFTA partner country that produced MMT, and given that environmental regulation 
was a role shared by the national and provincial governments, the transport ban was an effective 
mechanism for removing MMT from all Canadian gasoline. Canada took this action for a number of 
reasons. First, while Canada was working to tighten vehicle emissions standards, auto manufacturers were 
recommending against the use of MMT because of concerns that the product damaged the proper 
functioning of catalytic converters and other devices in automobiles that help control auto emissions.109 
Canadian officials were concerned that MMT could undermine the Canadian government’s efforts to 
control air pollution, and could contribute to the build-up of greenhouse gases that contribute to global 
warning.110 Second, Canadian officials were concerned about the potential health effects of exposing 
workers and drivers to airborne manganese particles via MMT.111 Although the potential hazards to 
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human health were not fully-known, Canada acted in a precautionary manner until more information was 
available, as had the state of California and the U.S. EPA. 
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On September 10, 1996, while the prospective ban was being debated in the Canadian Parliament, 
Ethyl Corporation notified the government of Canada that it would instigate an investor-state suit for 
compensation under NAFTA’s investment chapter if restrictions were placed on MMT. The Parliament 
disregarded these threats and passed the ban a year later in April 1997.112 That same month, Ethyl filed a 
NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state claim against the Canadian government for $250 million in damages at 
the UNCITRAL.113 Ethyl argued that NAFTA granted it new rights and privileges vis-à-vis the Canadian 
government and that the Canadian MMT ban amounted to a NAFTA-forbidden indirect expropriation of 
its assets as defined in NAFTA Article 1110. Further, Ethyl argued that the ban was a violation of 
NAFTA’s Article 1102 rules requiring national treatment for foreign investors, because the legislation in 
question banned imports, but not local production of MMT.114 Finally, the corporation argued that the ban 
was a “performance requirement” seeking to regulate how a foreign investor operated, which is forbidden 
under NAFTA Article 1106. The company’s logic underlying the performance requirement claim was that 
the law would effectively require Ethyl to build a factory in every Canadian province to comply with the 
transport ban if it sought to make an MMT investment in Canada.115
 
OUTCOME 
 
A NAFTA panel was constituted at UNCITRAL to hear the Ethyl case. Initially, Canada objected 
to the NAFTA suit, claiming that the MMT ban was not a “measure” covered by NAFTA Chapter 11 and 
that Ethyl had failed to wait the requisite six months after the ban was passed and implemented before 
filing a claim.116 On June 24, 1998, however, the NAFTA panel rejected Canada’s jurisdictional claims, 
clearing the way for the case to move forward on the merits.117 Shortly after this initial ruling, the 
government of Canada decided to settle with Ethyl. On July 20, 1998, Canada reversed its ban on MMT, 
paid $13 million in legal fees and damages to the Ethyl Corporation, and issued a statement for Ethyl’s 
use in advertising, declaring that “current scientific information” did not demonstrate MMT’s toxicity nor 
that MMT impairs functioning of automotive diagnostic systems.118
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Pay the Polluter: Ethyl Corporation’s claim that Canadian regulations on MMT “expropriated” the 
company’s investment. The Canadian government argued that NAFTA Article 1110 “deals with the 
taking of property and not with regulation.”119 The NAFTA tribunal’s decision to accept the claim and 
allow it to proceed on the merits constitutes a significant and potentially dangerous new limit on the 
exercise of basic government functions. Governments must maintain the ability to regulate a product 
because of environmental or public health concerns without having to pay a corporation that imports the 
substance for the right to exercise this normal government function. The Ethyl case foreshadowed the new 
“regulatory takings” rights for NAFTA investors that exceed the rights investors have under domestic law 
and that would continue to be at the heart of the NAFTA Chapter 11 controversy. 
 
Intimidation Chills Innovation: By threatening to initiate a NAFTA suit before the law was even 
passed and by circumventing domestic avenues for challenging a law or regulation, Ethyl hung the threat 
of future monetary damages over the heads of lawmakers and public health officials. While the Canadian 
Parliament did not give in to the early pressure in this instance, the number of threats of corporate “trade 
challenges” is increasing. The record of similar threats at the WTO shows that they have had a chilling 
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effect on prospective public interest policies and innovations in public policy being considered by 
governments and often result in governments preemptively conceding and changing a policy to avoid a 
trade challenge − as Canada did in this instance.120
 
Undermining the Government’s Ability to Exercise Precaution: In this case, NAFTA was used 
to undercut a strong, domestic public interest protection. Cognizant of the parallels between the two 
organometallic compounds − tetraethyl lead and MMT − and not wanting to repeat the devastating health 
and environmental problems caused by leaded gasoline, the Canadian Parliament acted in accordance 
with the Precautionary Principle. The Precautionary Principle is generally understood to mean that in 
cases where there is a risk to public health or the environment, but the current data is insufficient to fully 
quantify or assess that risk, government has a right and a responsibility to err on the side of safety. The 
principle is based on the fact that science does not always provide the information necessary for 
authorities to avert public health or environmental threats in a timely manner. As the leaded gas example 
illustrates, sometimes it takes years and numerous long-term studies to fully understand the dangers of a 
new product. NAFTA and WTO rules turn the Precautionary Principle on its head and in effect require 
the governments to compile proof of harm before regulatory action can be taken, rather than requiring 
companies seeking to market a product to prove that the product is safe. Both Canada and the United 
States are now undertaking the long-term studies needed to better understand the dangers posed by MMT. 
In the meantime, consumers in both nations are being exposed to the potentially dangerous compound. 
 
LOEWEN v. UNITED STATES – FUNERAL HOME CONGLOMERATE 
 
The Loewen Group was a Canadian-based funeral 
conglomerate that had aggressively acquired more than 1,100 
funeral homes across Canada and the United States.122 The 
Loewen NAFTA case arose in the context of increasing 
consolidation in the U.S. funeral home market as a handful of 
large conglomerates have acquired or pushed out of business 
small, independent firms. This phenomenon has drawn public 
attention because of subsequent consumer abuses and several 
high-profile investigations of anti-competitive business 
practices. A 1996 Time Magazine investigation into the 
funeral industry charged that “Loewen and a handful of other 
large death-care companies are racing to buy up as many 
independent funeral homes as possible ─ not out of any desire to share the resulting economies of scale 
and cut the cost of funerals ─ but rather to boost prices still higher.”123
 “Article III of our Constitution 
reserves to federal courts the power 
to decide cases and controversies 
and the U.S. Congress may not 
delegate to another tribunal ‘the 
‘essential attributes’ of judicial 
power.”121  
 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
U.S. Supreme Court 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
In 1994, Loewen was sued in Mississippi state court by a Biloxi businessman named Jeremiah 
O’Keefe. O’Keefe alleged that Loewen, as part of a strategy to dominate the local funeral market, had 
committed various unlawful, anti-competitive and predatory acts designed to drive O’Keefe’s local 
funeral and insurance companies out of business in violation of state law.124 This was neither the first nor 
the last time Loewen would land in U.S. court. In 1996, Loewen settled a case concerning a similar 
breach of contract claims for $30 million.125 The Massachusetts attorney general became so concerned 
about Loewen’s near monopoly status in the Cape Cod area that it ordered the company to divest itself of 
a number of funeral homes.126
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After a trial reviewing O’Keefe’s claims, a Mississippi jury agreed with O’Keefe. Angered by the 
examples of Loewen’s behavior that had been presented as evidence in the trial, the jury came back with a 
verdict of $260 million.127 According to one juror, “The Loewen Group ... clearly violated every contract 
it ever had with O’Keefe. ... If there was ever an indefensible case, I believe this was it.”128 Because the 
jury decided on an amount during the judgment phase of the trial and not during the penalty phase, 
Loewen had the choice of accepting the jury’s verdict or going back to the same jury for the penalty phase 
of the trial. Loewen chose to go back to court, but this time the jury upped the damages to $500 million.129 
Ironically, O’Keefe’s attorneys had attempted to settle the case even before the trial began. Five million 
dollars was the number they had in mind, but they were authorized to go even lower.130
 
Loewen decided to appeal the jury verdict to a higher court. Before proceeding with the appeal, 
the company sought to be exempted from a long-standing rule of civil court procedure.131 The state rule, 
which is identical to a national rule of civil procedure, requires that losing defendants who wish to pursue 
an appeal without beginning to pay damages to the plaintiff must buy a bond worth 125% of the damages 
owed. The purpose of the rule is to prevent defendants from using the lengthy appeals process to hide 
assets or otherwise evade liability. Loewen’s request to be exempt from the rule was rejected, and 
Loewen appealed this specific issue to the Mississippi Supreme Court. In 1996 the Mississippi Supreme 
Court rejected Loewen’s demand to be exempted from posting bond. Rather than post the large bond or 
pursue other legal avenues, Loewen decided to settle the case with O’Keefe, and on January 29, 1996, the 
company settled for approximately $150 million, 30 percent of the jury verdict and more than 30 times 
what the company could have settled for when the case began.132
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
The settlement was not the end of the story in this breach of contract case between two private 
businesses, however. On October 30, 1998, Loewen filed an investor-state suit against the United States 
in ICSID under NAFTA’s investment chapter.133 Although Loewen paid only a fraction of the original 
jury award, the company demanded $725 million in compensation from U.S. taxpayers, arguing that the 
jury verdict, the punitive damages and trial court’s refusal to reduce the bond violated its new investor 
rights guaranteed under NAFTA.134 Specifically, the company claimed that the judge allowed the 
plaintiff’s attorney to appeal to the “anti-Canadian, racial and class biases” of a Mississippi jury in 
violation of national treatment rules in NAFTA Article 1102.135 (In response to these allegations, the U.S. 
government has argued that comments by a private attorney in a private contract dispute did not constitute 
a government “measure” covered by NAFTA rules, noting that Loewen never objected to these comments 
at trial.)136 The company also claims that the bond requirement and the trial courts failure to reduce the 
bond effectively forced Loewen to settle and thus denied Loewen its right to appeal, in violation of 
Article 1105 requiring fair and equitable treatment.137 Finally, Loewen argued that “the excessive verdict, 
denial of appeal, and coerced settlement were tantamount to an uncompensated expropriation in violation 
of Article 1110 of NAFTA.”138
 
OUTCOME 
 
 Loewen is the first instance in which a jury ruling has been challenged under NAFTA. In March 
1999, ICSID formed a NAFTA panel to hear the case. The panel included former Congressman and 
former Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit Abner J. Mikva. The U.S. 
Department of Justice responded to the initiation of proceedings with a brief challenging the basic 
jurisdictional premise of the case: NAFTA’s Chapter 11 provides rights to foreign investors vis-à-vis 
“government actions” while in this case the controversy in question was a civil law dispute between two 
private companies. The U.S. government called for the case to be dismissed. On January 9, 2001, the 
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panel issued an interim decision rejecting a variety of U.S. arguments that the case should be dismissed 
and instead found that NAFTA’s foreign investor rights extended to the civil court context, surprising 
many observers. Further, the tribunal appeared to place no limits on what types of court action or decision 
it considers covered by NAFTA rules. This initial decision opened up the possibility that all court 
decisions, even those of the U.S. Supreme Court, are now open to review by unaccountable NAFTA 
tribunals. 
 
 The case proceeded to the merits. Meanwhile, in 1999, Loewen Group, Inc. and more than 850 of 
its U.S. subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy under the U.S. bankruptcy code. Loewen’s Canadian 
subsidiaries did the same under Canadian bankruptcy law. In January 2002, as part of its reorganization, 
the massive Loewen empire was reincorporated in the United States (not Canada) under the name of a 
U.S. subsidiary, Alderwoods Group, Inc. In March 2002, the U.S. government submitted documents to 
the NAFTA tribunal arguing that this reorganization destroyed the company’s NAFTA claims, as it is no 
longer a Canadian company.139 To the contrary, Alderwood’s attorneys argued that the critical date for 
determining nationality and jurisdiction is on the day the case is submitted, not many years down the 
road. Just in case, Alderwoods set up a shell corporation in Canada called “Nafanco” to pursue its 
NAFTA claim. 
 
The NAFTA tribunal rendered a decision against Loewen on June 26, 2003. However, in 
reference to Loewen’s claims of anti-Canadian bias under Articles 1102 and 1105, the tribunal found 
Loewen’s claims of discrimination were valid.140 Citing the class-based, race-based and nationality-based 
appeals to the jury by O’Keefe attorneys, the NAFTA tribunal characterized the trial as a “disgrace” and a 
violation of due process.141 However, the tribunal dismissed Loewen’s Article 1102 claims because it 
found no evidence in the record to enable it to compare how Loewen was treated versus other parties “in 
like circumstances.”142 Therefore, the tribunal could not determine whether the United States had treated 
Loewen “no less favorably than it accords in like circumstances to its own investors.”143
 
On a related issue, the United States had argued that Loewen was barred from bringing such 
claims of discrimination, since it had not objected to any discriminatory statements during trial. The 
United States tried to persuade the NAFTA panel that they should then not hear these claims of 
discrimination. Under most U.S. state court rules, a party is prohibited from raising issues on appeal that 
it did not object to during trial – therefore, in order to preserve the right to appeal an issue, a party must 
object during the trial first. Contrary to the U.S. request and longstanding domestic court practice, the 
NAFTA tribunal deliberated at length on the claims of discrimination and the statements by O’Keefe’s 
attorneys, which had not been objected to at trial. Even more surprisingly, the panel in its ruling took 
upon itself the job of speculating about the reasons why Loewen attorneys did not object during trial.144
 
On the bond issue, Loewen had argued that the Mississippi trial court’s failure to reduce the $625 
million bond was a violation of Articles of 1105 − minimum standard of treatment and Article 1110 − 
uncompensated expropriation. However, the tribunal found that the trial court’s denial was within its 
discretion and could not be considered an error.145 Nonetheless, the tribunal did imply that had Loewen 
challenged a Mississippi court rule that allows judges to set bonds of up to 125 percent of the original 
judgment, instead of challenging the trial court’s refusal to reduce the bond, then the tribunal may have 
found some merit to Loewen’s claim that its rights under NAFTA Article 1105 and 1110 had been 
violated.146
 
Further, the tribunal ruled that in judging whether or not there was an 1105 violation, the panel 
needed to consider the entire judicial process available to Loewen, not merely the trial.147 Citing the 
international law principle of “exhaustion of local remedies,” the NAFTA panel argued that all state 
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judicial action should be considered as a single action from beginning to end. The tribunal found that 
Loewen failed to pursue all judicial avenues available to the firm because it did not appeal the trial court’s 
decision and instead settled the claim.148 Absent a final judgment on Loewen’s various claims from the 
court of last resort, including the U.S. Supreme Court, the tribunal ruled that Loewen’s NAFTA claim 
was brought prematurely.149 For this reason, Loewen’s other 1105 claims were dismissed, and since its 
claim of expropriation arose from its 1105 claim, that was dismissed as well. 
 
After this long discussion on the merits of the specific claims, the tribunal also concluded that 
because Loewen had been reorganized as a U.S. corporation after its bankruptcy, the NAFTA tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction in the case.150 In order to commence and maintain a NAFTA lawsuit, the claimant and 
respondent must be citizens of two different NAFTA parties. Even the fact that Loewen had set up a shell 
corporation in Canada for the sole purpose of pursuing its NAFTA claim did not mitigate the reality that 
the present real beneficiary of the claim was an American corporation. The Loewen tribunal decided that 
applicable rules of international law suggest that “there must be continuous national identity from the date 
of the events giving rise to the claim through the date of the resolution of the claim.”151 (Because the stare 
decisis precedent system does not apply to these tribunals, a different NAFTA tribunal could rule 
differently on this question) Similarly, the panel dismissed a NAFTA Article 1117 claim (a claim by an 
investor on behalf of an enterprise) that named Loewen’s founder, Ray Loewen. The panel found that Mr. 
Loewen did not own or control the newly reorganized corporation when the claims were submitted to 
arbitration.152  
 
In August, 2003, U.S. lawyers submitted a letter to the tribunal, raising the fact that it had failed 
to specifically dismiss Mr. Loewen Article 1116 claim (his claims as an individual investor on behalf of 
himself) from the case.153 Following the U.S. submission, Mr. Loewen quickly made a submission, stating 
that the tribunal had overlooked his individual claim and that he is entitled to return to the tribunal for a 
supplementary decision on the merits.154 On August 17, 2004, the NAFTA tribunal ruled that it in fact had 
dealt with the Article 1116 claims in the final award, and Ray Loewen’s request for a supplementary 
decision was denied, thus ending the NAFTA case against the United States. It has yet to be seen if the 
unpredictable and aggressive Mr. Loewen will somehow attempt to bring this case back to U.S. domestic 
court alleging arbitral error.  
  
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Loewen Case Attacks Independence and Integrity of U.S. Judicial System: The Loewen 
NAFTA Chapter 11 case definitively established that U.S. court cases, even cases heard by state supreme 
courts or the U.S. Supreme Court, are open to challenge in NAFTA’s closed-door investor-state system. 
Even though the tribunal found against Loewen because the company failed to reincorporate as a 
Canadian firm, exhaust his domestic legal remedies, and provide evidence of the sort of discrimination 
protected against under NAFTA, the Loewen decision was greeted with great concern in U.S. legal 
circles. As Chief Justice Ronald M. George of the California Supreme Court stated: “There are grave 
implications here. It is rather shocking that the highest courts of the state and federal governments could 
have their judgments circumvented by these tribunals.”155 In 2004, his colleagues at the Conference of 
Chief Justices concurred. The judicial body passed a resolution that flatly stated: “Judgments and other 
rulings of U.S. state and federal courts should not be the basis for claims against the United States in 
investor-state arbitration proceedings under U.S. trade agreements.”156 The state justices argued that 
subjecting judicial decisions to NAFTA Chapter 11 review “undermines the finality of U.S. court rulings, 
threatens the independence of U.S. courts, and detracts from the judiciary’s coequal status within our 
system of separated powers.”157 Further, the state justices reminded us that the United States originally 
argued in Loewen that the NAFTA panel had no jurisdiction because judicial actions in cases between 
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private parties are not actionable “measures” within the meaning of Chapter 11. Absent a major rewrite or 
the elimination of NAFTA’s Chapter 11, it is just a matter of time before a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
will be reviewed in a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal and U.S. citizens will learn to their shock that the 
Supreme Court is no longer the highest court in the land. 
 
Common Trial Tactics Considered International Law Violation: The Loewen NAFTA tribunal 
spent a great deal of time discussing the tactics of the O’Keefe attorneys at trial, noting that “the O’Keefe 
case was presented by counsel against an appeal to home-town sentiment, favoring the local party against 
an outsider. To that appeal was added the element of the powerful foreign multinational corporation 
seeking to crush the small independent competitor who had fought for his country in World War II.”158 
The NAFTA tribunal held that the class-based and nationality-based appeals of the O’Keefe attorneys 
were discriminatory. The tribunal only narrowly escaped determining that a NAFTA violation had not 
occurred because Loewen had failed to demonstrate in the course of the NAFTA proceeding that it was 
treated differently than other plaintiffs in Mississippi court system. Had the Loewen lawyers done this, a 
very different verdict may have emerged from this case. Even as it stands, the Loewen NAFTA tribunal’s 
final ruling is an alarming one for trial judges and attorneys everywhere. Whether the defendant is from 
the next town, the next state or a neighboring country, lawyers frequently resort to presenting them as 
“outsiders.” Now this common court tactic could constitute a NAFTA violation if the plaintiff happens to 
be Canadian or Mexican. 
 
NAFTA Tribunal Heard Claims That Were Not Objected to During Trial: The NAFTA tribunal 
also held that the trial court judge’s failure to reign in the behavior of the O’Keefe lawyers at trial was an 
error “so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that 
expression is understood in international law.”159 They came to this conclusion even though Loewen’s 
lawyers themselves did not object to class-based and nationality-based statements during the trial. This is 
an extremely important principle of state and federal trials − if a party does not object during trial, that 
party cannot then raise an objection during an appeal because the appellate body has no ability to read the 
mind of the trial judge to guess how he or she might have ruled. Thus, the right to object is considered 
waived. By allowing Loewen lawyers to raise issues they did not object to at trial and by going so far as 
to offer excuses as to why they failed to object, the Loewen NAFTA tribunal demonstrated blatant 
disregard for a bedrock principle of domestic court procedure. Worse, this aspect of the ruling encourages 
lawyers representing foreign investors in judicial proceedings to do the same in preparation for a second 
bite at the apple in a NAFTA tribunal. 
 
METALCLAD v. MEXICO − TOXIC WASTE FACILITY 
 
In 1990, the Mexican federal government authorized a Mexican company called Coterin to 
operate a hazardous waste transfer station in the state of San Luis Potosi.160 Coterin wanted to expand the 
site to be a hazardous waste landfill but was denied a municipal construction permit in 1991 and again in 
1992 by the local municipality 
of Guadalcazar.161 In 1993, 
Metalclad Insulation 
Corporation (‘Metalclad’), a 
California-based corporation, 
bought Coterin and the transfer 
station. For 30 years, 
Metalclad’s primary work 
involved installing insulation and removing asbestos for industrial, commercial and public agency clients 
on the West Coast of the United States.162 In Mexico, Metalclad soon took up Coterin’s efforts to expand 
“There is no judicial, political, or moral reason for the federal 
government to demand the government of San Luis Potosi to 
pay restitution for the $16 million indemnification paid to 
Metalclad…San Luis Potosi did not sign NAFTA.” 
 
Fernando Silva Nieto, the Governor of the 
Mexican state of San Luis Potosi 
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the transfer station into a toxic waste processing plant and landfill. Metalclad secured the requisite 
Mexican state and federal permits but, as had occurred during Coterin’s attempts, failed to secure a local 
municipal construction permit.163
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Under Coterin’s management, the site was contaminated with 55,000 drums, or 20,000 tons of 
toxic and potentially explosive waste.164 The geology of the region involves a complex hydrology with 
active sinkholes and subterranean streams.165 Studies indicate that the site’s soils are very unstable, which 
could permit toxic waste to infiltrate the subsoil and carry contamination via deeper water sources as well 
as the intermittent surface streams that form only in the rainy season.166 In 1991, the local community, 
motivated by environmental and public health concerns mobilized to stop the dumping.167 They blocked 
trucks, called the federal authorities and succeeded in getting the facility shut down.168 Several years after 
this successful effort, the local community was still concerned about the environmental and health 
hazards posed by the site and strongly opposed reopening it.169
 
In 1994, the local municipality of Guadalcazar ordered Metalclad to cease construction on the 
new toxic waste facility due to the absence of a municipal construction permit.170 Metalclad applied for 
the permit but continued construction while the permitting process was pending.171 In 1995, the company 
paid for an environmental assessment supervised by federal environmental authorities.172 The assessment 
found the site suitable for the project, but the report was quickly contested by Greenpeace Mexico and a 
local environmental group.173 The construction project was completed in March of 1995, still without the 
proper municipal permit, but the company was prevented from opening and operating the site due to 
continued local opposition and public demonstrations.174 In December 1995, the municipal government 
denied Metalclad’s request for a permit, reprimanding the company for moving forward without proper 
authorization.175 In October 1996, Metalclad notified Mexico that it intended to sue under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11.176 On September 23, 1997, the governor of San Luis Potosi declared the site part of a special 
ecological zone for the preservation of the area’s unique biological diversity and several species of rare 
cacti. 
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On January 2, 1997, Metalclad sued the government of Mexico under NAFTA’s investment 
provisions, demanding $90 million in compensation.177 Metalclad claimed that the actions of the 
municipal government in denying the permit amounted to expropriation without compensation that was  
forbidden under NAFTA Article 1110.178 In addition, the company claimed that the government of 
Mexico had failed to provide fair and equitable treatment in accordance with international law as required 
by NAFTA Article 1105.179
 
OUTCOME 
 
On August 30, 2000, a special NAFTA tribunal, operating under ICSID’s Additional Facility 
Rules, awarded Metalclad $16,685,000.180 The tribunal held that the denial of the construction permit, as 
well as the creation of an ecological reserve, constituted “indirect” expropriations in violation of NAFTA 
Chapter 11.181 In addition, the tribunal held that Mexico violated the minimum standard of treatment 
provision of NAFTA because the company was led to believe that the federal and state permits it secured 
allowed for the construction and operation of the landfill.182 The tribunal decided that by tolerating the 
actions of the municipality and by tolerating the actions of state and federal officials who failed to 
sufficiently clarify the situation for Metalclad, Mexico failed in its duty to provide “a transparent, clear 
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and predictable framework for foreign investors.”183 (As one observer has noted, the NAFTA tribunal in 
effect created a duty for the federal government of Mexico to take the company by the hand and walk it 
through the complexities of Mexican municipal, state and federal law. Plus, the Mexican federal 
government was required to ensure that officials at the various levels of federal, state and local 
government never gave contradictory advice − an extraordinary task for any government.)184
 
In reaching its conclusions regarding transparency, the panel imported into Chapter 11 the 
transparency obligations appearing in NAFTA’s preamble (Art. 102) and in NAFTA’s Chapter 18.185 
Remarkably, the panel also presumed an expansive competency and ruled that under Mexican domestic 
law, the municipality’s insistence on and denial of a construction permit was improper.186 Using circular 
reasoning, the panel not only argued that a domestic law violation had taken place, but it equated this 
perceived violation of domestic law with an international law violation under NAFTA Article 1105, an 
interpretation that would significantly broaden what has already been criticized as Article 1105’s open-
ended catch-all nature. In addition, the panel ruled that the same facts that created a violation of Article 
1105 also constituted an expropriation under Article 1110, thereby equating a process violation with an 
expropriation. 
 
In an unprecedented move in October 2000, the government of Mexico challenged the NAFTA 
tribunal decision in a Canadian Court, alleging arbitral error.187 Under NAFTA, in extremely limited 
circumstances, arbitration panel decisions can be brought to domestic courts and reviewed by domestic 
judges under federal law governing arbitration or under the 1958 United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York Convention). 
The narrow grounds for review under domestic law focus on issues such as corruption or fraud on the part 
of plaintiff, misconduct by panelists, procedural irregularity, or panelists who exceed their authority in the 
final award. This recourse to domestic courts should not be confused with an appellate system. In this 
instance, the Mexican government’s petition was initiated in British Columbia because under Vancouver 
was chosen as the tribunal’s ‘place of arbitration’ under ICSID rules. Thus, the applicable arbitration 
statutes were the British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act and the British Columbia International 
Commercial Arbitration Act.188  
 
In a narrow ruling that did not question the basic legitimacy of utilizing a NAFTA commercial 
arbitration process for determining the broad policy issues in question in this case, Justice David Tysoe of 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued a split decision. On May 2, 2001, Judge Tysoe held that 
the NAFTA panel erred when it imported the transparency provisions of NAFTA’s Chapter 18 into 
Chapter 11.189 As a consequence, Judge Tysoe struck down most of the panel’s arguments with regard to 
Article 1105, relating to the actions of the municipality and Mexico’s obligations to create a clear and 
predictable environment for investors. But the judge did so solely because the panel made a technical 
error basing these arguments on the wrong sections of NAFTA. Consequently, he struck down the panel’s 
finding that a violation of Article 1105 constituted a violation of Article 1110.190 However, the judge 
agreed with the NAFTA panel on the merits that the actions of the governor in declaring the area to be an 
ecological zone constituted expropriation. As a consequence, the judge reduced the award due to 
Metalclad by post-dating the calculation of the award to the date the governor issued the decree that made 
the area an ecological zone.191 Mexico initially announced that it would appeal the decision to a higher 
Canadian court,192 but on June 13, 2001, Metalclad announced that Mexico agreed to pay the $15.6 
million ordered by Judge Tysoe.193  
 
Confirming the fears of concerned state and local officials in all three NAFTA nations, the 
Mexican federal government attempted to withhold federal funds from the state of San Luis Potosi in an 
effort to force the state to pay for the Metalclad damage award. The state fought back. Declaring that, 
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“[t]here is no judicial, political, or moral reason for the federal government to demand the government of 
San Luis Potosi to pay restitution for the $16 million indemnification paid to Metalclad,” the governor of 
San Luis Potosi challenged the federal action in Mexico’s domestic court system.194  On March 3, 2004, 
the Mexican Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of the state, ruling that the federal government 
did not have the right to withhold federal funds from San Luis Potosi and is exclusively responsible for 
the multi-million dollar award.195 This incident should provide a cautionary tale to state and local 
governments in the United States as this issue has never been ruled upon by U.S. courts.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Metalclad Would Not be a Takings Under U.S. Law: The NAFTA tribunal in the Metalclad case 
defined expropriation as not only “open, deliberate and acknowledged takings” of property such as 
outright seizure, but also “covert or incidental interference” with the use of property.”196 This definition of 
a takings is much broader than what is allowed by U.S. courts. U.S. property rights jurisprudence requires 
that to find a regulatory taking, close to 100 percent of the value of property must be destroyed by a 
regulation and no other viable economic use of the property remains. In other words, if Metalclad had 
been able to operate a non-toxic waste treatment facility or even open a McDonalds on the property, the 
firm would not succeed in a takings claim in U.S. courts. In stark contrast, the Metalclad NAFTA tribunal 
ruled even though Metalclad may have been left with an array of economically beneficial uses of the land, 
potentially including “the exploration, extraction or utilization of natural resources,” a takings requiring 
compensation still took place.197 Indeed, the panel failed even to conduct an analysis of whether the 
property in question had economically beneficial uses other than the one denied to the investor.198 The 
fact that the firm succeeded in a regulatory takings claim that would have failed in a U.S. court sent alarm 
bells through national associations representing state and local officials and Congress. As a result, in the 
2002 bill establishing Fast Track trade authority, the Congress instructed the USTR to ensure that future 
trade agreements would not permit this type of regulatory takings claim. To date, USTR has failed to 
meet this congressional objective that foreign firms do not obtain greater regulatory takings rights under 
new trade agreements than they have under U.S. law. 
  
Undermining Local Control Over Zoning, Land Use and More: In reviewing the NAFTA 
tribunal decision, Canadian Judge Tysoe noted that the tribunal’s definition of “expropriation” was 
“sufficiently broad to include a legitimate re-zoning by a municipality or other zoning authority.” 
However, he concluded that “the definition of expropriation is a question of law with which this court is 
not entitled to interfere.”199 Yet permit requirements, zoning decisions and environmental land use 
controls at the local level are common in all three NAFTA countries. This case prompted the National 
Association of Counties to write to the USTR: “NACO is concerned that broad interpretations of Chapter 
11 by international arbitration panels may have a chilling effect on local decision making, subrogate legal 
protections of U.S. citizens to foreign investors, and result in the ultimate preemption and nullification of 
local government laws and regulations.”200  
 
Deciding Issues of Domestic Law: The NAFTA panel felt competent to decide complicated issues 
of Mexican domestic law; i.e., whether a municipal permit was required. Not only did the panel find that 
the municipal government’s actions amounted to expropriation, but the panel went further to say the 
municipality “acted outside its authority” in denying the construction permit based on environmental 
concerns. The NAFTA tribunal made a ruling on the substance of Mexican domestic law, declaring that 
the “exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the Mexican 
federal government.”201 Worse, when faced with the choice between Metalclad’s interpretation of 
Mexico’s domestic law or the Mexican government’s interpretation of its own law, the NAFTA panel 
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chose the corporation’s interpretation. The proper place for such a substantive dispute over the meaning 
of a domestic law is a domestic court.202
 
Disregard for Environmental Provisions of NAFTA: While the NAFTA tribunal imported 
language from NAFTA’s preamble to support its convoluted reasoning in the case, it is striking that the 
tribunal completely ignored other language in the preamble supporting sustainable development and 
environmental protection. The panel also ignored environmental provisions within Article 1114 of 
Chapter 11, which purports to protect NAFTA nations from a race to the bottom in environmental 
standards. On the contrary, the Metalclad panel stated that even though it found that the governor’s 
Ecological Decree constituted further grounds for a finding of expropriation, the panel decided it “need 
not consider the motivation or intent for the adoption of the Ecological Decree.”203
 
METHANEX v. UNITED STATES – MTBE GASOLINE ADDITIVE 
 
Methanex Corporation, a Canadian-based firm, is the world’s largest “producer and marketer” of 
Methanol.205 Methanol is used to produce formaldehyde, acetic acid and other chemicals and is used in 
the manufacture of resins, adhesives, paints, inks, 
foams and plastic bottles.206 Methanol is also the 
key ingredient in methyl tertiary-butyl ether 
(MTBE), a gasoline oxygenate designed to 
reduce harmful auto emissions. Notably, 
Methanex does not produce or manufacture 
MTBE, which is the substance at issue in the 
California drinking water regulation that is the 
target of this NAFTA challenge. Methanex 
claims to “indirectly” own 100 percent of the 
shares of two U.S.-based companies, Methanex 
Methanol Company in Texas, which appears to 
be a marketing operation, and Methanex Fortier 
in Louisiana, which once produced Methanol.207
"This case will act to discourage environmental 
and health regulations whether the United 
States wins or loses. If, as expected, the United 
States wins, it will have spent nearly $3 million 
of US taxpayers' money just to have an 
obviously frivolous claim dismissed; the 
decision will do nothing to prevent foreign 
manufacturers of harmful substances from 
insisting on compensation before their products 
can be banned. If the United States loses, such 
extortion will be codified as the law throughout 
North America."204
  
Martin Wagner, Earthjustice  
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
On March 25, 1999, the governor of California issued an Executive Order providing that MTBE 
use be phased out by 2002 from gasoline sold in the state. The decision came after the gasoline additive 
had been found to have contaminated drinking water wells and systems throughout the state.208 
California’s decision to phase out MTBE was based on a 1998 University of California-Davis report that 
found “significant risks and costs associated with water contamination due to the use of MTBE.”209 The 
report found that MTBE posed unique threats because it is highly soluble in water and will transfer 
readily to groundwater from gasoline leaking from underground storage tanks, pipelines and other 
components of the gasoline distribution system.210 In addition to the significant environmental problems 
of water contamination, MTBE has been associated with human neurotoxicological effects, such as 
dizziness, nausea and headaches.211 It has been found to be an animal carcinogen with the potential to 
cause human cancer.212 Because water contaminated with MTBE has a strong odor and taste, Santa 
Monica, California, had to shut down its municipal wells when MTBE leeched into its drinking water. 
Dozens of other California municipal water supplies have been affected,213 and at least 17 states have 
banned or in the process of restricting MTBE. 
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NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On December 3, 1999, Methanex filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state case challenging the 
California Executive Order that implemented the environmental policy.214 In effect, Methanex demanded 
that MTBE be allowed in gasoline sold in California or that the company be paid $970 million if MTBE 
was banned. In its NAFTA submissions, the corporation cited WTO principles to argue that the California 
phase-out was not the “least trade restrictive” method of solving the water contamination problem 
(suggesting that the state should fix leaking tanks instead) and therefore violated NAFTA’s guarantee of 
fair treatment for foreign investors under international law (Article 1105).215 Further, Methanex alleged 
that the U.S. company Archer Daniels Midlands (ADM), a principal producer of a competing gasoline 
oxygenate called ethanol, had “secret meetings” with California Governor Gray Davis’ and contributed 
$155,000 to his campaign fund seven months prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.216 Methanex 
does not say the campaign contributions were illegal per se, but that the process by which the decision to 
phase out MTBE was reached was a violation of NAFTA’s “fair and equitable” treatment guarantees.217 
Finally, Methanex claims that the ban improperly discriminates against MTBE in favor of the U.S.-
produced gasoline additive ethanol and therefore gives preferential treatment to a domestic firm in 
violation of the national treatment provisions of NAFTA Article 1102.218 Finally, the company claims that 
the California measure constituted an expropriation under Article 1110 because it prevented Methanex 
from maintaining its market share and, in effect, transferred that market share to U.S. ethanol 
producers.219
 
OUTCOME 
 
Methanex is pressing its case under UNCITRAL rules. The U.S. government argued in its 
defense that Methanex’s claims are not within the jurisdiction of a NAFTA tribunal. In its Statement of 
Defense filed August 20, 2000, the United States argued: 1) that no final regulation banning MTBE has   
taken effect so the California actions were not “measures” under NAFTA;220 2) that Methanex lacks 
standing to bring the case because the California actions are directed at MTBE and not methanol, the 
Methanex product;221 3) that Methanex has not demonstrated that it has an investment in the United States 
(versus that it seeks to import a product to the United States) because its plant in Louisiana had ceased 
production and its office in Dallas has no significant assets and earns no significant income;222 and 4) that 
the company’s claims of violation of “fair and equitable treatment” are without merit because California’s 
actions were taken in a democratic fashion after days of public comment and testimony and were based 
on ample scientific findings.223 Methanex based its large $970 million damage claim on the decline in its 
market value.224 In response, the U.S. government argued that the decline in Methanex’s share price 
began in 1995 and was due to market forces, not California’s regulatory actions.225
 
 On August 6, 2002, the NAFTA tribunal in this case issued an interim ruling on jurisdiction.226 
Many NAFTA critics had predicted that the tribunal would find some way to rule against the company, 
because a ruling in favor of the company and against a democratically achieved state law with a strong 
public purpose would have explosive political implications at a time when the Fast Track trade 
legislation, a controversial mechanism that delegates Congress’ constitutional power to set terms of trade 
policy to the president, was still being debated in the U.S. Congress. In its interim decision, the NAFTA 
tribunal indicated that it was considering just such a ruling to make this case go away. 
 
 The panel did not rule on any of Methanex’s substantive claims of NAFTA Article 1102, 1105 or 
1110 violations. It dealt only with the more narrow issue of whether it had the jurisdiction to even hear 
the case, and it dismissed most of the company’s claims. The panel upheld the U.S. government’s 
argument that the MTBE law was too distant from a company that produced only methanol, not MTBE 
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itself, to justify a NAFTA case. The United States had argued that NAFTA Article 1101 (1), which states 
that NAFTA Chapter 11 applies to measures adopted by one NAFTA government “relating to” the 
investors of another NAFTA government, required a legally significant connection between the measure 
and the investor. It would not be sufficient (as Methanex had argued) for the measures merely to “affect” 
the investor of another NAFTA government because an endless number of parties could be potentially 
affected by any government measure.  
 
 However, in its ruling, the panel left a window open for the revival of Methanex’s claims on the 
merits by giving the firm 90 days to prove that the ban was somehow directed specifically at Canadian 
methanol producers, a significantly high hurdle for the company to meet. 
 
 The positive part of this jurisdictional decision is that it could narrow the number of investors 
who can bring a claim to those directly impacted by a measure, as opposed to those incidentally affected 
by a measure. However since NAFTA tribunal decisions have no legally binding impact on future panels, 
this positive aspect could be reversed by future NAFTA panels. But, this aspect of the ruling is 
overshadowed by a significant concern. The ruling implies that if Methanex had produced MTBE itself 
and not one of the major component parts, the case would have proceeded notwithstanding the other 
important arguments raised by the U.S. government in the jurisdictional phase. The panel ignored U.S. 
arguments that the ban was achieved in a nondiscriminatory manner via a democratically sound process 
with a clear public purpose. These arguments should have been sufficient to put an end to this 
controversial case. Methanex decided to accept the panel’s 90-day offer to re-submit and did so in 
November 2002. A hearing was held on the re-submission in March of 2003, and a decision on its new 
claim is still pending. 
 
  In a further indication that the Methanex panel is very aware of the controversial nature of this 
case and the political sensitivity of dealing with this type of popular state law, the NAFTA tribunal has 
made a number of moves to open the hearing process and thereby calm critics. Back in 2001, the 
Methanex tribunal had signaled that it might be willing to allow the submission of amici briefs by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that had been petitioning the panel for this right, including the 
Canadian NGO International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the California-based 
Earthjustice public interest law firm.227 However, in its August 2002 decision, the tribunal held that it had 
no power to accept the petitioners’ request for access to materials generated during the arbitration or to 
allow them to attend the hearings.228
 
In January 2003, the petitioners kept seeking to define the parameters of their amicus curiae 
status. They continued to request access to the arbitration proceedings, noting that in the UPS NAFTA 
case, a NAFTA tribunal had agreed to open proceedings to the public.229 In response to the NGOs, 
Methanex argued that since the Methanex tribunal had not received the consent of the disputing parties, it 
could not accept the submissions. Methanex also sought in the alternative to limit the scope of 
information supplied in the amici briefs by the petitioners. Specifically, it aimed to limit the submissions 
only to the legal issues and urged the tribunal to reject submissions that raise issues of fact.230 
Presumably, the submission of factual issues would allow the petitioners to introduce into the record 
information pertaining to the environmental and health consequences of MTBE, whereas a submission 
limited to legal issues would preclude this discussion. Methanex argued that the submission of amici 
briefs containing factual issues is prohibited by NAFTA Article 1133, which permits the tribunal to 
appoint experts at the consent of the disputing parties or on its own initiative. Methanex further argued 
that allowing such a submission would be inequitable because it would have to respond to all of the 
allegations, and that would be too burdensome and costly. In February 2004, in a win for the NGO 
petitioners, the Methanex tribunal ruled that it would accept amici briefs, make public all documents 
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related to the case and allow proceedings to be open to the public. The amicus brief submitted by the IISD 
is available at www.iisd.org/publications/publication.asp?pno=608 and the amicus brief submitted by 
Earthjustice is available at www.iisd.org/publications/publication.asp?pno=608. In June 2004, these 
groups won another concession from the panel when a panel hearing on the Methanex case was open to 
the public at the ICSID offices in Washington, D.C. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Ruling Invites a New Case by MTBE Manufacturers: The Methanex NAFTA tribunal’s 
jurisdictional ruling that a methanol producer was “too distant” from an MTBE ban to qualify as a firm 
harmed by the ban has both positive and negative implications. Clearly, it is a positive ruling for the state 
of California, because it may result in a United States win in this specific case. However, the implication 
is that if a Canadian MTBE producer and not a methanol producer had brought the suit, the NAFTA 
tribunal would have allowed the case to proceed on the merits. Traditionally in trade disputes there are 
two questions of utmost importance: 1) is the measure non-discriminatory (i.e., does it apply to domestic 
and foreign firms alike); and 2) was it developed in a transparent and democratic fashion. Clearly the 
MTBE ban, which applies to foreign producers and domestic producers alike, and was fully debated by 
the legislature, which commissioned a study and held public hearings, would pass these tests. Yet 
NAFTA Chapter 11 allows foreign firms to pursue other grounds for complaint that bypass these tenets of 
trade law and allow outlandish claims of expropriation and unfair treatment even when there is no 
discrimination between domestic and foreign firms. 
 
Tribunal Rulings, Standards Inconsistent − Methanex Tribunal Requires Proof of “Intent”: 
In its interim ruling on jurisdiction, the NAFTA tribunal dismissed most of the company’s claims. 
However, the panel gave the company the opportunity to prove that the ban was somehow a direct effort 
to harm Canadian methanol producers. In other words, the tribunal is asking Methanex to prove 
intentional discrimination against their product. This not only sets a high bar, it is extremely rare in a 
trade dispute. Both under NAFTA and the WTO, evidence of a discriminatory impact upon the plaintiff is 
usually sufficient to win a national treatment claim or minimally to flip the burden of proof to the 
defendant, who must prove the negative. For instance, in the NAFTA Chapter 11 Karpa (Feldman) case 
described below, the mere showing of differential treatment regarding a cigarette tax rebate shifted the 
burden to the government to prove otherwise. Because Mexico failed to do so, the plaintiff prevailed 
under Article 1102’s antidiscrimination rule. The motivated Methanex lawyers have taken up the 
challenge and announced plans to seek discovery, including deposing Governor Gray Davis and ADM, in 
an attempt to garner evidence to prove that the two conspired to advantage domestically produced ethanol 
and disadvantage methanol.231 (The firm is allowed to do this in the U.S. domestic courts system because 
of a federal law that allows federal district courts to issue subpoenas on behalf of tribunals.) However, it 
seems unlikely that future NAFTA panels will follow the Methanex tribunal’s lead and narrow cases by 
beginning to require proof of discriminatory intent. Some observers view this aspect of the ruling as more 
evidence that the panel is trying to make this case “go away.” 
 
Methanex Would Not Have a Takings Case Under U.S. Law: The U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that a regulation could constitute a compensable taking if it “denies all economically beneficial or 
productive use” of the property in question.232 It has also ruled that “mere diminution in the value of 
property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”233 In the Methanex case, only a part of 
Methanex’s market was impacted by the California regulation. The firm is free to sell its product in many 
other states and nations. Because the firm would be “laughed out of federal or state court,”234 in the words 
of the California Attorney General, it bypassed the U.S. courts and headed straight to a NAFTA Chapter 
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11 tribunal. However, U.S. firms are not allowed to avoid skeptical U.S. courts when pursuing a takings 
claim. 
 
GAMI, CORN PRODUCTS, ADF & STALEY v. MEXICO – 
SWEETENERS CASES 
 
GAMI Investments, Inc: GAMI Investments, based in Las Vegas, Nevada, is an affiliate of Equity 
Group Investments, a privately held investment firm in Chicago. GAMI is also a minority shareholder 
with 14.18 percent ownership interest in Grupo Azucarero México, S.A. de C.V. (GAM), a Mexico City-
based sugar producer and owner of a number of Mexican sugar mills.235 The similarity in names is 
coincidental. 
 
Corn Products International: Corn Products International, Inc., based in Westchester, Illinois, is a 
leading worldwide producer of sweeteners and starches from the corn-refining process, including high-
fructose corn syrup. Corn Products had net sales of $2.1 billion in 2003, has 36 plants in 19 countries, and 
“is the only North American corn refiner with full-scale sweetener and starch facilities in all three 
NAFTA countries.”236 Arancia Corn Products, S.A. de C.V., a Mexican HFCS company, is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Corn Products with a number of locations in Mexico.237  
 
Archer Daniels Midland Company & A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company: Archer Daniels 
Midland Company (ADM), based in Decatur, Illinois is one of the largest agricultural processors in the 
world with net sales of $36.2 billion in 2004.238 In addition to processing corn, soybeans, wheat and 
cocoa, it is a leading producer of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). ADM has been mired in controversy 
for the past decade. In 2004, it settled a federal price-fixing claim concerning HFCS for $400 million.239 
A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company is a U.S. firm based in Illinois, that is also an indirect wholly owned 
subsidiary of a British corporation, Tate and Lyle PLC. Both firms make HFCS in the United States and 
ship it to Mexico. Plus, ADM and Staley each have a 50 percent investment in Alimidones Mexicanos, 
S.A. de C.V (ALMEX), a wet corn milling facility located in Jalisco, Mexico, that produces HFCS as well 
as starch, syrup, oil, sugar and byproducts including gluten feed and meal.240
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
The constantly fluctuating price of sugar on the world market has generated a great deal of 
political controversy and direct state intervention in sugar producing nations, including Mexico and the 
United States. Mexico’s sugar industry is among the country’s most important sectors in terms of 
employment, directly providing more than 300,000 jobs − and indirectly supporting another 1.9 million 
jobs.241 As a result, sugar is the subject of a wide range of public interest laws and regulation.  
 
Mexico’s sugar industry is governed by several tripartite committees, which include sugarcane 
workers, mill owners and the government, that administer the law and resolve conflicts within the 
industry. These committees take measures to maintain high prices for domestic sugar, including 
establishing agreements to penalize overproduction and failure to meet export quotas, and creating a 
system to give incentives to sugarcane workers to grow a certain amount of sugar when world prices are 
low and weather is bad.242  
 
The Mexican sugar program was confronted with a number of changes under NAFTA. The trade 
agreement included a tariff rate quota for Canadian and Mexican sugar imports that was supposed to be 
phased out over 15 years (a tariff rate quota is an agreement to allow certain amounts of a good to be 
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imported under preferential terms while amounts over that quota would face higher tariffs). Under the 
original NAFTA agreement, Mexico was permitted to export 27,557 tons of sugar annually to the United 
States for the first six years, increasing to 165,000 tons on October 1, 2000 and rising by 10 percent 
annually thereafter until the elimination of restrictions in 2008. In addition, the original agreement 
stipulated that these limits were to be waived after 2000 if Mexico achieved “net surplus producer” status 
– calculated by subtracting domestic consumption of sugar from production. 243 By this definition, Mexico 
was a “net surplus producer” as of 1995-96.244
 
The United States, however, had attached a “side letter” on sugar to the NAFTA agreement just 
hours before President Clinton submitted implementing legislation to Congress in November 1993.245 
This “side letter,” signed by the trade representatives of both countries on Nov. 3, 1993, changed the 
definition of Mexican sugar “consumption” to include both sugar and high fructose corn syrup (HFCS). 
The “side letter” effectively reduces the amount of sugar that Mexico can export to the United States, 
since Mexico imported and consumed a great deal of HFCS from the United States in the late 1990s. The 
altered formula in the side letter clearly favors U.S. sugar producers to the detriment of their Mexican 
counterparts. One study shows that Mexico might have been eligible to export as much as 550,000 tons of 
sugar in FY2002 under the original NAFTA agreement, while this amount is reduced to nearly one-third 
that amount under the side letter’s provisions. 246  
 
The side letter has provoked a fairly significant controversy, since the English and Spanish 
language versions of the letter differ. In the English version, the side letter refers narrowly to Mexican 
consumption of HFCS, while the Spanish version leaves open the possibility that Mexico’s domestic 
production of HFCS would be included in calculating the “net surplus producer.” Additionally, the 
Mexican Senate never approved the side letter, leading Mexico to contest its validity.247  
 
In 1996, when Mexico sought to export its surplus sugar to the United States, as it was entitled to 
under the Mexican government’s understanding of NAFTA’s sugar provisions, the duty-free imports were 
blocked by the United States. When Mexico filed a NAFTA complaint, the United States refused to 
nominate judges to a NAFTA dispute resolution panel and proceeded to export huge volumes of highly 
subsidized HFCS into the Mexican market.248 In 1997, the Mexican government imposed duties on HFCS 
imports from the United States, after finding that these were selling for below the cost of production, a 
practice illegal under the WTO and known as dumping.249 The United States retaliated by filing a dispute 
with the WTO, which in 2000 ruled in favor of the United States and against Mexico’s attempts at 
safeguarding their flagging industry.250
 
Meanwhile, the post-NAFTA influx of U.S. HFCS significantly displaced Mexican sugar sales, 
causing a loss of jobs in the sector.251 Sugar mills, feeling the squeeze between forced pay-outs to farmers 
and an inability to control market prices, have fluctuated between barely surviving and deep, 
unsustainable debt.252  
 
Having failed to find a remedy at the WTO, the Mexican government instituted a variety of other 
policy measures. First, in September 2001, Mexico expropriated 27 debt-ridden mills – including five 
owned by the Mexican company GAM – to get the industry’s massive debt under control and ensure that 
the workers were paid.253  
 
Second, Mexico’s Congress attached a luxury tax to the 2001 federal budget, including a 20 
percent tax on beverages and syrups that use sweeteners other than cane sugar.254 The tax effectively 
halted both imports of U.S. HFCS and production at HFCS plants in Mexico. In March 2004, the United 
States filed another WTO case against Mexico for the tax and later threatened retaliatory taxes on 
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Mexican tequila and other imports.255 In the meantime, Mexico’s interventions in the sugar industry have 
worked, and the industry has finally begun to rebound.256
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
The U.S. company GAMI filed its NAFTA investor-state case against Mexico at UNCITRAL on 
April 9, 2002.257 GAMI claims it paid $30 million for its minority investment in the Mexican company 
GAM and its five sugar mills in the late 1990s. GAMI alleges that shortly thereafter, Mexican regulatory 
decisions, actions and inactions resulted in three years of losses for the mills, which resulted in the 
expropriations of the sugar mills in 2001. Specifically, GAMI contends that the government failed to 
properly implement this legal regime and took other actions that harmed GAMI’s investment including: 
1) increasing the price that sugar mills were required to pay to farmers for sugarcane without regard for 
the market price; 2) failing to enforce export requirements for surplus production on all mills equitably; 3) 
failing to determine each mill’s base production level in a timely and transparent fashion that would 
enable enforcement of the export provisions; and 4) discriminating against GAM in the restructuring of 
GAM’s debt. The investor is charging that these actions violated NAFTA Article 1102 (national 
treatment), Article 1105 (fair and equitable treatment) and Article 1110 (expropriation). GAMI is asking 
for $55 million in damages.258
 
Corn Products International filed its NAFTA investor-state Chapter 11 claim at ICSID in October 
2003.259 Corn Products asserts that Mexico’s HFCS tax violates foreign investors’ national treatment 
guarantee under NAFTA Article 1102, the prohibition on performance requirements in NAFTA Article 
1106, and the prohibition on indirect expropriation in NAFTA Article 1110. Corn Products seeks 
damages in excess of $325 million.260
 
ADM and Staley filed a notice of their intent to bring a NAFTA investor-state claim on October 
13, 2003.261 The firms’ HFCS production at their plant in Mexico dropped significantly and exports of the 
sweetener from their U.S. plants into Mexico ended in 2003.262 Like Corn Products, they argue that the 
HFCS tax violates Mexico’s national treatment obligations under NAFTA Article 1102, the prohibition 
on performance requirements in NAFTA Article 1106, and the prohibition on indirect expropriation in 
NAFTA Article 1110. They seek damages of approximately $100 million.263
 
These three NAFTA sweeteners cases represent an extraordinary two-pronged attack on the 
Mexican government’s sugar program by foreign investors. On the one hand, Mexico is being attacked by 
the U.S. investor GAMI for doing too little to regulate the industry to insure the profitability of the sugar 
mills. On the other hand, Mexico is being attacked by Corn Products, ADM and Staley for doing too 
much and for implementing the HFCS tax, even though that tax has had a major impact on restoring the 
profitability of the Mexican sugar market. The Mexican government is caught between a rock and a hard 
place in trying to please two foreign investors with completely divergent interests in its sugar industry.  
 
OUTCOME 
 
On Nov. 15, 2004, an UNCITRAL tribunal dismissed the claims brought by GAMI against 
Mexico in their entirety. In the text of its Final Award, the UNCITRAL tribunal first dealt with two 
important jurisdictional issues. The panel established that GAMI had the right to invoke Chapter 11 and 
bring a claim under NAFTA Article 1117 (on behalf of the enterprise) even though the U.S. investment 
firm was a minority, non-controlling shareholder of GAM. The panel ruled that the fact that Mexico did 
not explicitly seize or interfere with the actual shares of ownership was not the issue; rather, the issue was 
whether a breach of NAFTA sufficiently damaged GAMI’s investment to be deserving of 
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compensation.264 The panel also ruled that the U.S. investor GAMI had the right to proceed under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 even though the Mexican firm GAM had sought and obtained a reversal of the 2001 
expropriation. In February 2004, in the middle of the NAFTA suit, the Mexican courts ruled in a domestic 
court case brought by GAM that the expropriation of three of GAM’s plants were improper (the other two 
expropriations were not challenged). While generally NAFTA does not allow a claim to proceed in 
domestic court and a NAFTA tribunal at the same time, this NAFTA panel decided that GAMI’s NAFTA 
claim should not be impaired because the controlling shareholder sought relief in domestic courts.265 This 
first-of-its kind jurisdictional ruling opens up the possibility of a diversity of shareholders making a 
diversity of claims simultaneously in international arbitral bodies and in domestic courts, a situation 
NAFTA Article 1121 was intended to prevent by generally requiring investors to waive their rights to 
proceed in domestic court at the same time as in a NAFTA tribunal.  
 
On the minimum standard of treatment claim, the panel ruled that Mexico may have indeed failed 
to implement key elements of its sugar program. However, quoting from the Waste Management 
decision, the panel ruled that GAMI failed to make the case that the specific failures of the sugar program 
were “an outright and unjustified repudiation” of the relevant regulations or that these failures were the 
government’s responsibility alone.266 Macroeconomic factors as well as actions by the tripartite 
commissions, unions and the private sector likely played a role as well. 
 
As for the claims under Article 1102, the tribunal found that GAMI’s claim that its investments in 
GAM had not been accorded national treatment did not hold in this case, because GAMI did not prove 
that the expropriation of GAM’s mills was related to the fact that its minority shareholder was an 
American company. Finally, GAMI’s claims under Article 1110 were rejected on the basis that it was 
GAM, not GAMI, which had its assets expropriated. Because those assets were later returned, and 
because GAMI failed to take this into account and continued to stake its claim on the assertion that the 
wrong done to it constituted the total destruction of the value of its investment when that was patently not 
true, the panel rejected GAMIs claim of expropriation.267 (Notably, the panel left undecided whether only 
“partial destruction of shareholding interests may be tantamount to expropriation” if such measures are 
financially demonstrated, a loophole that may have to be closed if similar cases are brought in the 
future.)268  
 
The Corn Products case and the ADM/Staley case are still in arbitration. The claims by both firms 
amount to a staggering $425 million. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Countering Economic Social Instability: Mexican agriculture has felt the bite of key NAFTA trade 
provisions in the past. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico imported corn only when production by its small farms 
fell short of domestic needs. Within two years of NAFTA’s coming into effect on January 1, 1994, the 
Mexican government decided to no longer collect tariffs owed to it on imported corn under the NAFTA 
tariff schedule.269 Subsequently, U.S. corn exports to Mexico have more than doubled, causing a 70 
percent drop in the real prices paid to Mexican farmers for their corn270 and displacing an estimated 1.5 
million small farmers and farm workers who have been pushed into city slums or into immigrating over 
the border to the United States.271 The surge in NAFTA corn imports led to massive rural dislocation and 
growing social unrest. A campesino protest movement, called “El Campo No Aguanta Más” or “the 
Countryside Will Take No More,” closed down major highways and other transportation arteries in 
February 2003, when it marched on Mexico City with tens of thousands of farmers and the support of 
dozens of rural organizations. The Mexican Congress was invaded by campesino protesters, including one 
on horseback. Riot police were called in to beat back workers and their children. The coverage of the 
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crisis on television began to mobilize Mexican urban residents to join the protest.272 Now the entire 
scenario of economic dislocation and social turmoil is set to repeat itself if Mexico is required to lift its 
tax on HFCS and U.S. corn sweeteners continue to flood the Mexican market. The Mexican government 
created its sugar regulatory framework and the HFSC tax to foster rural employment and avoid further 
NAFTA-related poverty and mass dislocation. While controversial, the Mexican actions have kept 
unemployment from rising to a rate it otherwise would have reached, and the sugar sector is beginning to 
rebound. 
 
U.S. Agribusiness Giants Exploit Farmers’ Situation on Both Sides of the Border: Corn, 
used to make HFCS, is one of the most subsidized agricultural crops in the United States. The elimination 
of tools to manage crop inventory in the 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills have resulted in vast structural 
overproduction that, barring bad weather or crop diseases, has depressed U.S. grain prices by as much as 
40 percent since 1996.273 Market prices for corn in 2001 were 23 percent below the cost of production.274 
These artificially low prices helped put over 38,000 small U.S. farmers out of business between 1993 and 
2000, despite taxpayer subsidies. The subsidies come in the form of income support for farmers. Some 
call the payments “serf subsidies” because they provide farmers with enough cash to live on to allow 
them to survive through another growing season so they can produce another crop. Basically, these 
taxpayer funds compensate for the agribusiness companies’ refusal to pay farmers a price above the cost 
of production. Low commodity prices benefit giant agribusiness corporations that purchase huge amounts 
of corn for their animal factories and the production of HFCS in both the United States and Mexico. 
These firms undercut both smaller U.S. sweetener producers and any competing manufacturers in foreign 
markets where they operate. Prior to Mexico’s imposition of the HFCS import tax in 2001, cheap HFCS 
imports flowed into Mexico from the United States and were produced in plants located in Mexico, 
displacing the Mexican domestic sugar used in soft drinks and forcing down the price of sugar on the 
Mexican domestic market.275 The Mexican HFCS import tax effectively put an end to HFCS dumping.  
 
POPE & TALBOT v. CANADA – SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. is an Oregon-based timber company that operates three sawmills in British 
Columbia, Canada. The company exported timber from British Columbia into the United States. A 
portion of these shipments entered duty-free up to a limit set by the government of Canada under an 
overall quota determined by a U.S.-Canada Agreement on Trade in Softwood Lumber.276
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
The U.S.-Canada Agreement on Trade in Softwood Lumber was a managed trade arrangement 
that ended in March 2001 when it was not renewed by the parties, although the United States had sought 
renewal. The agreement set a maximum quota of softwood lumber imports that could enter the United 
States duty-free from the four major timber-exporting Canadian provinces. The pact was signed in 1996 
to avert a trade war over U.S. industry complaints that Canada was unfairly subsidizing logging 
companies. The crux of the on-going dispute between the nations over soft wood lumber has centered on 
the effects of the different timber policies employed by Canada and the United States on the lumber 
industries in the respective countries. The U.S. International Trade Commission has contended that the 
Canadian government subsidizes lumber production by setting the price lumber companies pay for 
harvesting rights (known as “stumpage fees”) from public land at artificially low levels.277 The 
government set prices largely determine the price of lumber in Canada because nearly all (93 percent) of 
Canadian forests are owned by the government.278 In contrast, more than half (58 percent) of the timber 
land in the United States is privately owned, and thus the U.S. government has no control over the price 
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charged for access to this wood.279 Environmentalists also have argued that Canada’s lumber policies 
promote intensive harvesting of Canada’s forests and sales of lumber at a fraction of its real value.280
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On March 25, 1999, Pope & Talbot filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state suit at UNCITRAL 
alleging that the manner in which Canada implemented the lumber agreement violated the company’s 
rights under NAFTA. Specifically, the company claimed that the quota system established in the U.S.-
Canada Agreement on Trade in Softwood Lumber violated the national treatment and minimum standard 
of treatment guarantees provided for foreign investors in NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1105 and imposed 
performance requirements on a foreign-owned company, which is forbidden under NAFTA Article 
1106.281 The company argued that its investment had been “expropriated” in violation of NAFTA Article 
1110 to the amount of $507 million, an amount later reduced to $381 million.282 The complicated 
argument boils down to an allegation that, while Pope & Talbot obtained treatment similar to other 
companies in British Columbia, it was treated less favorably than logging companies that operate in other 
parts of Canada that are not subject to the quotas of the agreement.  
 
OUTCOME 
 
On June 26, 2000, a special tribunal operating under UNCITRAL rules issued a partial ruling. 
The tribunal held that further hearings were necessary on Pope & Talbot’s claims regarding national 
treatment and minimum standards of treatment, but dismissed other claims, including claims of 
expropriation.283 On April 10, 2001, the panel issued its final ruling.284 Although the panel held that 
Canada had acted reasonably in response to most of the allegations raised by the corporation with regard 
to the country’s implementation of the agreement, the panel still found against Canada. The issue 
underlying the ruling was the behavior of Canadian government officials when the Canadian government 
sought to verify Pope & Talbot’s compliance with the requirements of the agreement. During the period 
in question, Canada knew it was being sued by the company under NAFTA, and the panel stated that 
relations between the company and the government “were more like combat than cooperative 
regulation.”285 The tribunal found that Canada acted unreasonably when it asked the company to produce 
information verifying its quota allocation in Canada versus making the information available. The 
tribunal held that these and other actions that boil down to rude treatment of a foreign investor by 
government officials were a violation of the fair and equitable treatment provisions of NAFTA.286  The 
panel eventually awarded the firm $582, 000 in damages and legal fees. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Market Access Considered an “Investment” Under NAFTA: The Pope & Talbot softwood 
lumber tribunal may be best remembered for declaring that “market access” constituted an investment 
protected by NAFTA’s rules. Even though the panel found that the effect of the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement upon the firm was not significant enough to constitute a takings, the panel concluded that “the 
Investment’s access to the U.S. market is a property interest subject to protection under Article 
1110…”287 Taken as a whole, the Softwood Lumber cases discussed here and below demonstrate how 
trade-in-goods cases (that would otherwise only be considered in traditional state-state dispute resolution) 
can be dragged into investor-state dispute resolution as well. 
 
Rudeness Falls Into the “Fair and Equitable” Catch-All: This case also highlights a major issue 
of controversy: What sort of government conduct rises to the level of violating NAFTA-provided investor 
guarantees of fair and equitable treatment? The ruling in this case suggests rudeness is a NAFTA 
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violation. It also suggests that NAFTA guarantees some specific level of conduct toward foreign 
investors, versus simply equal treatment with domestic firms. In a submission to the Canadian domestic 
court review of the Metalclad Chapter 11 case, Canada made a strong argument that the jurisprudence 
built up under bilateral investment disputes has established the precedent that for a “minimum standard” 
violation to be found, the conduct in question must be egregious and amount to “a willful neglect of duty 
or an insufficiency of governmental action that every reasonable and impartial person would recognize as 
insufficient.”288 To make its point, Canada cited numerous ICSID cases where compensation was ordered 
for violations of minimum standards of treatment only after foreign property was looted or destroyed in 
other nations by government forces while involved in armed conflict. The point was that it took extreme 
circumstances of government conduct for a government to be held liable for failing to meet the minimum 
standard of treatment.289 The Pope & Talbot panel rejected this formulation and instead considered the 
allegations of rude and overly zealous behavior by Canadian officials attempting to verify that Pope & 
Talbot’s quotas were sufficient. The panel did not find a violation of international law or even domestic 
law in the government’s conduct. Instead, by declaring that the actions of government officials in this 
case violate NAFTA’s guaranteed “minimum standard of treatment” for foreign investors, the panel 
expanded the concept of “fair and equitable treatment” to include almost any behavior a corporation 
might consider unfair. A 2001 “clarification” by the NAFTA governments attempted to deal with this 
problem by seeking to narrow the application to treatment that is required by “customary” international 
law. This is the language also used in CAFTA. Yet the notion of customary international law is 
notoriously broad, providing enormous opportunity for a continuation of the expansive interpretation by 
the tribunals.  
 
NAFTA Cases Complicate Already Intractable Trade Disputes: The U.S. Canadian Softwood 
Lumber Agreement has sparked a variety of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases on both sides of the border. After 
the Softwood Lumber Agreement ended in March 2001, the U.S. International Trade Commission, in 
response to an anti-dumping petition, issued a determination in May 2002 that the U.S. softwood lumber 
industry was threatened with injury due to the influx of Canadian softwood. As a result, the United States 
instituted countervailing duties to make up the dumping margin. Canada promptly and successfully 
challenged these U.S. tariffs in the state-state dispute resolution systems of the WTO and NAFTA. 
Meanwhile, at least four softwood lumber firms launched their own trade complaints utilizing NAFTA 
Chapter 11 and more suits may follow (see, Softwood Lumber Cases, p. 65). This throng of NAFTA 
investor-state cases further complicate a monumental trade dispute that already is being heard in a variety 
of venues at once: in previous NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 
the WTO and the NAFTA state-state dispute resolution mechanism. One of the criticisms of the investor-
state process is that it allows a narrow private interest to trump what might be a contrary public interest. 
When a government considers initiating a state-state enforcement proceeding, it must consider how the 
action could implicate other national goals or interests and balance the immediate potential commercial 
gain for U.S.-based business interests against long-term, broader interests – such as the possibility of 
creating jurisprudence that might be turned against the country in a later dispute. Not so with investor-
state proceedings. It is quite possible that NAFTA governments may issue another “clarification” to keep 
these types of cases out of investor-state dispute resolution. 
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S.D. MYERS v. CANADA – PCB TREATMENT 
 
S.D. Myers, Inc., an Ohio-based waste treatment company, claimed to have an investment in 
Canada, variously referred to as S.D. Myers Canada and Myers Canada. In the early 1990s, the company 
sought to import polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada to the United States for processing in its 
Ohio facility and pressed for permission to do so from 
U.S. and Canadian government officials. Canadian law 
at the time favored the domestic treatment and disposal 
of PCBs. However, Canada’s 1990 PCB Waste Export 
regulations allowed for exports to the United States if the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) gave prior 
approval.291 In the United States, the 1976 Toxic 
Substance Control Act prohibited imports of PCBs, with 
very narrow exceptions, such as imports from U.S. 
military bases overseas.292 In October 1995, however, the 
EPA decided to allow S.D. Myers and nine other 
companies to import PCBs into the United States for 
processing and disposal.293 In 1996, the EPA moved to 
make this informal policy a federal regulation and issued a final Import for Disposal Rule that opened the 
U.S. border to PCB imports for processing and disposal.294 In November 1995, one month after the EPA 
opened the border, Canada issued an Interim Order banning exports of PCBs.295 Canada declared that it 
sought time to study the contradictory legal situation in the United States (the law prohibiting imports and 
the regulation allowing them) and review its international obligations concerning PCB trade. Canada is a 
signatory to the Basel Convention, a multilateral environmental agreement concerning transboundary 
trade in toxic waste, which calls for the processing of hazardous waste as close as is possible to where it is 
produced, so as to minimize transport of such material.296
“Each Party shall take the appropriate 
measures to: … Ensure the availability 
of adequate disposal facilities for the 
environmentally sound management of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes that 
shall be located to the extent possible 
within it whatever the place of their 
disposal…”  
The Basel Convention290  
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
PCBs were used as coolants and lubricants in transformers, capacitors and other electrical 
equipment because they are good insulators and weatherproofers.297 PCBs were banned for production in 
the United States in 1977 because of evidence that they built up in the environment and caused health 
effects.298 Over the years, the U.S. EPA studied PCBs and determined them to be toxic to humans and 
hazardous to the environment. “PCBs enter the body through lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and skin and 
can circulate throughout the body and can be stored in fatty tissue. PCBs are absorbed and stored in the 
fatty tissue of higher organisms as they bioaccumulate up the food chain through invertebrates and 
mammals... PCBs may cause developmental toxicity, reproductive effect and oncongenicity [cancer] in 
humans.”299 PCBs are persistent contaminants – meaning they do not readily or quickly lose their 
environmental and health-threatening qualities. 
 
Because of the unique dangers posed by PCBs and other highly toxic substances, the Basel 
Convention sets rules regarding their transport and disposal.300 Canada and Mexico are parties to the 1989 
convention. The United States has signed but never ratified the agreement. The Basel Convention strongly 
encourages countries to limit exports of hazardous waste, to develop the capacity to treat hazardous waste 
domestically and to promote production processes that limits the creation of toxic wastes. When issuing 
its Interim Order that banned the export of PCBs, Canada announced that it needed to assess its 
obligations under the Basel Convention, which encourages countries: 1) not to engage in trade in toxic 
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waste with non-parties; 2) to ensure PCBs are disposed of in an environmentally sound manner; and 3) to 
develop a viable, long-term strategy to dispose of such waste at home.301  
 
In addition, in deciding to issue the order that temporarily halted PCB exports, Canada took into 
consideration that U.S. law prohibiting the importation of PCBs and correctly questioned whether the 
EPA’s “enforcement discretion” was in compliance with U.S. law.302 Following the assessment, Canada 
then moved to develop permanent regulations that would reopen the border and allow the export of 
Canadian PCB waste to the United States under certain conditions.303 The new Canadian regulations took 
effect on February 4, 1997, and S.D. Myers imported seven shipments of Canadian PCB waste into the 
United States.304 However, on July 20, 1997, the U.S. border was permanently shut for PCB trade by a 
U.S. judge after the environmental group Sierra Club successfully challenged the EPA’s new Import 
Disposal Rule in a U.S. federal court as a violation of the U.S. Toxic Substance Control Act.305
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On October 30, 1998, S.D. Myers sued Canada for $20 million in compensation to cover its lost 
profits during the 16-month period that the EPA allowed for imports of PCBs while they were blocked by 
Canada.306 The company argued that the Canadian Interim Order was a violation of NAFTA’s investment 
chapter because it damaged the company’s ability to recoup future expected profits from the company’s 
plan to import Canadian PCBs for disposal in the United States. Specifically, S.D. Meyers claimed that its 
NAFTA privileges for foreign investors were violated because the Canadian ban on PCB trade under its 
Interim Order constituted “disguised discrimination” aimed specifically at S.D. Myers in violation of 
NAFTA’s national treatment rules (Article 1102).307 The company also claimed that the Interim Order’s 
ban was designed and implemented in a “discriminatory and unfair manner which constituted a denial of 
justice and violation of good faith” contrary to NAFTA rules guaranteeing foreign investors fair and 
equitable treatment (Article 1105).308 In addition, S.D. Myers argued that the temporary export ban 
effectively required the company to dispose of PCBs in Canada, which, by conditioning the company’s 
investment on certain ways of operating, constituted an illegal performance requirement that is forbidden 
under NAFTA’s Article 1106.309 Finally, the company argued that the interim ban deprived the 
corporation of the benefits of its investment in Canada and thus constituted a measure “tantamount to an 
expropriation” as defined by NAFTA Article 1110, which requires compensation from the government.310
 
OUTCOME 
 
On November 13, 2000, a NAFTA UNCITRAL tribunal ruled in favor of S.D. Myers. Although 
the tribunal dismissed S.D. Myers’ claims regarding expropriation and performance requirements, the 
panel upheld the company’s other claims. The tribunal found that Canada had violated the national 
treatment rules of NAFTA’s investment chapter in a variety of ways.311 The tribunal noted that even 
though Canada had a “legitimate goal” in seeking to develop a domestic PCB treatment industry, the 
tribunal ruled that Canada was obliged to do so in a manner “consistent with NAFTA investment rules,” 
which the panel ruled the Interim Order and assessment was not.312 Thus, the panel suggested, to promote 
its Basel Convention commitments and policy goals, Canada should have used government contracts and 
subsidies to encourage a domestic PCB disposal system rather than issue an export ban.313  
 
In addition, the tribunal decided that S.D. Myers’ share of the Canadian PCB market constituted a 
legitimate investment under NAFTA, adding yet another form of investment to the long list already 
explicitly covered in the “definitions” section of NAFTA’s investment chapter.314 Using a similar analysis 
to that employed by the Metalclad panel, but reaching the opposite conclusion, the S.D. Myers panel also 
ruled that Canada’s violation of S.D. Myers’ national treatment rights constituted a minimum standards 
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violation and thus no further injustice under international law had to be established.315 Accordingly, 
Canada was ordered to compensate S.D. Myers for the profits it could have made had it been allowed to 
import PCBs during the 16 months in question. On October 21, 2002, the tribunal ruled that the firm was 
entitled to $4.8 million in compensation from the Canadian Treasury.  
 
Canada unsuccessfully appealed the tribunal’s decision to the trial division of the Canadian 
federal court.316 The Canadian Arbitration Act permits domestic courts to set aside arbitral awards when 
an award deals with matters “beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration” or is “in conflict with the 
public policy of Canada.”317 Canada had argued strongly throughout the case that it had long been its 
public policy under various domestic laws and international agreements to dispose of PCB waste 
domestically. On January 13, 2004, however, the federal court dismissed the Canadian government’s 
request for review in its entirety. In response to Canada’s argument that the NAFTA tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to hear the claim upon which it decided, the court held that Canada’s opportunity to file 
objections based upon jurisdiction had lapsed because all jurisdictional objections should have been 
addressed as a preliminary matter, prior to the tribunal’s hearing on the merits.318 Additionally, the court 
found that contrary to Canada’s argument, allowing the S.D. Myers award to stand was not in 
contravention to Canadian public policy.319 Lastly, the court declined Canada’s contention that it should 
exercise an expansive standard of review that would permit the court to basically review the record in its 
entirety for mistakes of law and fact instead of the ordinary standard of review for international arbitration 
awards, which is accorded a high degree of deference.320
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Market Share Considered a NAFTA-Protected “Investment”: The S.D. Myers case indelibly 
broadened the definition of “investor” and “investment.” S.D. Myers was a cross-border service provider 
with the waste treatment services provided at the company’s Ohio plant, not in Canada. As the 
government of Canada argued in its statement of defense in the case, it is not clear what S.D. Myers’ 
“investment” was in Canada.321 The U.S. company claimed to have a joint venture with Myers Canada, 
which was owned by a Myers family member. However, it is not clear if this Canadian company had 
assets damaged by the closing of the border. Clearly S.D. Myers’ long-term efforts to obtain a share of the 
Canadian PCB market are not comparable to Metalclad’s investment via the construction of a multi 
million-dollar facility in Mexico. However, the NAFTA tribunal equated these two situations, going so 
far as to suggest that S.D. Myers could be considered a NAFTA investor merely because it sought a share 
of the PCB market in Canada. This case opens the door for an investor whose business was stopped 
before it could become established to succeed in claims for lost future profits.322 This lesson may have 
been learned by the Canadian mining firm Glamis Gold who is bringing a NAFTA suit over a California 
law that allegedly blocks a planned open-pit gold mine (see below, p. 52). In addition, the logic used by 
the tribunal in the S.D. Myers case may have encouraged new cases by investors interested in using 
investor-state challenges as a strategy for attaining greater market share. The most notable of these cases 
UPS case against the Canadian postal service (see below, p.45). 
 
Investor Rights Trump International Environmental Obligations: In this case, Canada 
explicitly raised its obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement (the Basel Convention) as a 
justification for its Interim Order, temporary PCB export ban and attempts to develop domestic PCB 
treatment capacity. This case proves a concern raised by environmentalists during the debate about 
NAFTA’s approval: what would happen when NAFTA’s expansive rules required governments to act in 
violation of their obligations in the scores of environmental treaties that many countries, including the 
NAFTA nations, have signed? Sierra Club trade specialist Christine Elwell called the decision “a 
devastating blow not only for a country’s domestic ability to set its own standards, but for the Basel 
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Convention as well.”323 This case sends an alarming signal about what happens generally under NAFTA 
when investor “rights” come in to conflict with countries’ environmental policies and obligations. 
 
International Tribunals Second-Guess Governments, Limit Policy Options: It is also striking 
that the tribunal in the S.D. Myers case felt competent to decide what policy the Canadian government 
should use to carry out its environmental objectives. The tribunal, which had no expertise in 
environmental policy and apparently little expertise in NAFTA, designated Canada’s goal of fostering a 
Canadian PCB industry as legitimate and did not find that the Canadian approach to meeting its goals was 
unreasonable. Rather, the panel decided that Canada was obliged to adopt a means of obtaining its goal 
that was most consistent with open trade, or “least trade restrictive” in WTO parlance, and recommended 
that the government use its procurement policy as an alternative avenue to promote the domestic PCB 
treatment industry. Ironically, NAFTA’s procurement rules forbid giving preference to domestic service 
providers over foreign providers, so in fact the panel’s suggestion would itself violate NAFTA rules, 
demonstrating how NAFTA limits policy options.  
 
Don’t Bother Me with the Law: Finally, while acknowledging the fact that at all times S.D. Myers 
sought to ship PCBs across the border, such PCB imports were illegal under U.S. law- a fact that the 
NAFTA tribunal did not consider relevant to the case.324 In other words, even if it was illegal to bring 
PCBs over the U.S. border, the fact that Canada halted such trade was ruled to be a Canadian NAFTA 
violation. 
 
UPS v. CANADA – FEDERAL POSTAL SERVICES 
 
 The United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS) is based in Atlanta, Georgia, and is the world’s 
largest express carrier and package delivery company.326 The company was founded in 1907, employs 
330,000 people and delivers more than three billion packages and 
documents a year in the United States, Canada, Mexico and 200 
other countries.327 UPS Canada has been in operation since 1975. 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
In 1981, the Canadian postal system was transformed from 
a government department to a “Crown Corporation,” which is a 
publicly owned corporation.328 The organization, called Canada 
Post, often uses corporate terminology to describe its activities, but 
remains a public service that has been designated by the Canadian government as the universal provider 
of postal services.329 In 1993, Canada Post bought Purolator Courier, Canada’s leading overnight courier 
company.330 The joint entity employs approximately 64,000 workers, making the postal system the fifth 
largest employer in Canada.331
“When our jobs our pension 
and our public postal service 
are put on trial we should have 
the right to defend them.”  
 
Deborah Bourque, vice 
president of the 
Canadian Union of 
Postal Workers325
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On April 19, 2000, UPS filed an investor-state suit under NAFTA Chapter 11 for $160 million 
dollars. UPS claims that Canada Post’s operations violate UPS’ foreign investor rights under Chapter 11 
and also violate provisions of NAFTA Chapter 15 on competition policy, monopolies and state-run  
enterprises. NAFTA Articles 1502 (3) (a) and 1503 (2) require that government monopolies and state-run 
enterprises act in accordance with NAFTA Chapter 11 rules. Citing this provision, UPS alleges that 
Canada Post abuses its special monopoly status as Canada’s first class mail delivery status by utilizing its 
infrastructure to “cross-subsidize” its parcel and courier services. According to UPS, this NAFTA-illegal 
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cross-subsidization takes the form of postal boxes, retail postal outlets, ground and air transports, 
pensions and even letter carriers, and constitutes a violation of NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment 
rules (Article 1105) as well as NAFTA’s requirements that domestic businesses not receive favorable 
treatment (Article 1102).332 In addition, UPS claims that Canada Post gets preferential service for package 
importation, customs clearance and customs fees in violation of NAFTA’s national treatment rules 
(Article 1102).333 Finally, UPS says that NAFTA’s Article 1105 “fairness” guarantees have been violated, 
because after a governmental review found that Canada Post was behaving in an anti-competitive way, 
the government failed to take action.334 In an unusual move, the company also alleges discriminatory 
treatment under Article 1202 of NAFTA, which is the national treatment provision of the NAFTA 
Chapter dealing with cross-border service trade. The amount of damages claimed is calculated on revenue 
lost by UPS since NAFTA went into effect in 1994, plus an estimated two years for the life of the 
NAFTA dispute.335 This is the first NAFTA investor-state case against a public service, and the case 
could have significant consequences for all public services in the three NAFTA nations. 
 
OUTCOME 
 
 This case is proceeding under UNCITRAL rules. The Canadian Union of Postal Workers, whose 
members’ lives and livelihoods would be most affected by an adverse NAFTA ruling, attempted to 
intervene in the case and sought standing as parties. But their petition was denied by the NAFTA tribunal 
in 2001. The tribunal did rule, however, that it could receive amicus briefs, but it postponed the decision 
on whether or not it would accept amicus briefs to a later date. 
 
 Public Citizen filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in 2001 asking the U.S. 
government to provide its own citizens with information about the case, as per the requirements of U.S. 
domestic law. Public Citizen was notified by the Department of State that the UPS Statement of Claim 
had been classified in the interest of “national security” and was therefore exempt from FOIA. As it was 
very difficult to imagine what “national security” interests could be implicated in the corporation’s claim, 
Public Citizen challenged the denial decision in the U.S. court system. After almost two years of legal 
arguments and counter arguments and on the verge of a U.S. court decision in this case, in 2002, UPS 
finally decided to release its amended NAFTA investor-state claim voluntarily and open the hearings on 
the matter to the public. This was the first time that a NAFTA tribunal proceeding was open to public 
scrutiny. 
 
 On November 22, 2002, the tribunal rendered an initial decision regarding Canada’s challenges to 
whether an investment tribunal had jurisdiction to hear UPS’ Article 1105 claim stemming from alleged 
violations of Chapter 15, which contains limits on competition policy, monopolies and state-run 
enterprises. Some aspects of Chapter 15 are Chapter 11 enforceable and some are not. In addressing 
whether Canada’s treatment of UPS comported with customary international law, the tribunal found that 
there was no customary international law prohibiting or regulating anticompetitive behavior336 and 
dismissed the claims arising under Articles 1105, but UPS’ other claims are still being heard.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Threat to Public Services: UPS is arguing that because Canada Post provides public mail services on 
a monopoly basis, it should not be permitted to offer integrated parcel and courier services on a 
competitive basis. In an era when public and commercial service delivery is comingled in most sectors, 
few public services would be immune from similar corporate challenges. For instance, public hospitals 
obtain certain government benefits deemed necessary for them to function as universal providers to those 
unable to pay, even as they also provide fee-for-service healthcare to those with insurance or the ability to 
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pay fees otherwise. If UPS is successful with this case, it may be just a matter of time before a Canadian 
or Mexican company launches a similar suit against a U.S. public service. 
 
From Defense to Offense: Rather than claiming an expropriation due to some specific act of the 
Canadian government, UPS appears to be using NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions in a strategic offensive to 
secure a greater share of the Canadian parcel and courier delivery market. UPS is claiming that the very 
existence of Canada Post, a public sector competitor, violates its rights under NAFTA. In addition, the 
corporation backdates this claim to the day NAFTA, January 1, 1994. If UPS’s claim is successful, one 
can anticipate many more such claims against government services dating back to the moment 
corporations were granted these unprecedented new NAFTA investment protections. 
 
Corporate Rights v. Worker Rights: If UPS is successful in its claim, the government of Canada 
may be forced to restructure the manner in which it provides postal services to avoid future NAFTA suits. 
Yet the postal workers who would be most directly affected by an adverse decision have no standing in 
the NAFTA case. Even though corporations are not formal “parties” to NAFTA and have no obligations 
under the treaty as do governments, they are in effect elevated to the status of parties under Chapter 11’s 
investor-state provisions, which permit private enforcement of a public treaty. However, citizens and 
workers who would be affected by these decisions cannot be parties and must beg individual NAFTA 
tribunals for the opportunity to be heard under very limited and limiting circumstances, and can have such 
a role only at the discretion of the tribunal. 
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III. NEW NAFTA CLAIMS OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
What follows are short summaries of recent NAFTA claims where only a “Notice of Intent to 
Submit a Claim to Arbitration” has been made publicly available. A “Notice of Intent” is an official 
notification by the investor to a NAFTA government that it intends to bring a NAFTA Chapter 11 case at 
ICSID or UNCITRAL. It gives the parties a 90-day window to settle the case. After 90 days, the investor 
can then file a “Notice of Arbitration” at ICSID or UNCITRAL. No arbitration has yet commenced with 
the cases listed below, but these cases are sure to generate controversy as they move through the process. 
CANADIAN CATTLEMEN FOR FAIR TRADE v. UNITED STATES – MAD 
COW DISEASE 
 
In August 2004, a group calling itself “Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade” (CCFT) announced 
that it was bringing a NAFTA Chapter 11 suit against the United States for its May 2003 decision to close 
the U.S.-Canadian border to beef and cattle after a case of mad cow disease was discovered in a cow in 
Alberta, Canada.337 CCFT is a newly formed group of Canadian feedlot operators338 who claim that their 
industry has suffered devastating losses as a result of the border closure. Lawyers for the group are 
actively soliciting more clients to initiate Chapter 11 action in the manner of a class action suit.339 CCFT 
has filed 100 more claims totaling a reported $300 million, and the liability may rise even higher.340 As 
the status of the border closure is under active review by the U.S. government, these NAFTA claims 
constitute a timely effort to pressure the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to ignore the differing 
disease status of the two nations and open the border once again to trade in live cattle. 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST    
   
In 1986, a troubling disorder was identified in dairy cows in the United Kingdom. Called Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) by the scientists, later 
dubbed “mad cow disease” by the tabloids, the disease is 
marked by progressive degeneration of brain tissue leading to 
behavioral changes, abnormal posture, difficulty rising or 
walking, and finally death. While scientists worked steadily for 
10 years to identify the cause of the disease and control for the 
risk factors that contributed to its spread, U.K. government 
officials continued to assure the public that the meat supply was 
safe. Some scientists theorized that like a rare disorder found 
among New Guinea islanders some 50 years ago, the disease 
might be caused by cannibalistic feeding practices. In a precautionary move to prevent the potential 
spread of the disease, the United States stopped importing meat, cattle and most rendered protein products 
used in cattle feed from the U.K. in 1989.342 Although millions of cattle were destroyed in the U.K. in an 
attempt to eradicate the disease, it was later discovered to have taken hold in many European nations via 
the importation of live animals as well as contaminated animal feed. The disease would eventually be 
detected in 25 nations. However, it could be present in many others because the U.K. continued to ship 
potentially contaminated feed to some 80 nations before the practice was stopped in the mid-1990s.343
"By entering into NAFTA, the 
United States no longer has the 
right to protect its domestic cattle 
industry from contamination."  
 
Gilles Stockton, Western 
Organization of Resource 
Councils341
 
 In 1996, what had been a puzzling animal health crisis became an explosive human health issue 
when U.K. health officials announced that BSE had jumped the species barrier. Scientists revealed the 
link between BSE and a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans. Given the name “new 
variant” CJD (vCJD) by scientists, vCJD is a fatal, brain-deteriorating disease for which there is no 
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known cure. To date, some 157 people,344 mostly British, have been diagnosed with the disease and most 
have perished. Due to the long incubation period characteristic of both BSE and vCJD, the full human toll 
of the disease is not yet known.345  
 
In 1993, a single case of BSE was discovered in Canada in an animal later determined to have 
been imported from Britain.346 Thus, Canada did not suffer the severe long-term trade repercussions it 
would have if it had been an indigenous case. The first reported case of indigenous BSE in Canada was 
found in Alberta, on May 20, 2003. On May 29, 2003, the USDA, acting in accordance with U.S. animal 
disease control policy and legally required administrative law procedures, issued an emergency rule 
closing the U.S.-Canadian border to imports of Canadian beef and cattle retroactive to May 20.347 This 
action was consistent with U.S. law and trading practices. Since 1989, the United States has not accepted 
any cattle or beef from nations with even one indigenous case of the disease. Thus, previously the United 
States had closed the border to imports from Austria, Finland, Greece and Israel after the discovery of a 
single case of BSE in each nation. 
 
 In August 2003, in a controversial move contrary to the USDA’s prior practice, the USDA issued 
a press release announcing that it would partially lift the ban on boneless cuts of Canadian beef from 
cattle under 30 months of age.348 The USDA also said it would “accept applications” for certain other, 
previously banned, ruminant meat products as well.349 Following this announcement, the USDA was 
required by law to implement rulemaking to open the border to these cuts of meat. On November 4, 2003, 
the USDA issued the proposed rule that would result in the opening of the border sometime after January 
5, 2004.350  
 
Before rulemaking was completed, however, the USDA illegally began to allow in certain cuts of 
meat from Canada, including meat that was not even permitted under its proposed policy. It was estimated 
that some 33 million pounds of banned product came into the United States.351 This importation was 
brought to light and stopped by U.S. cattle producers who took the matter to court and obtained an  
injunction against the USDA, ensuring that the border was kept closed until rulemaking was complete. 
The illegal border opening has prompted an investigation by the USDA’s Inspector General, who is 
charged with making sure USDA employees follow the law.352  
 
The November 2003 proposed USDA rule indicated that the USDA planned to change its 
regulations to introduce a newly defined category of regions that would be eligible to export beef to the 
United States, regions that present a “minimal risk” of introducing BSE. Interestingly, only Canada 
qualified under this new designation. It is also notable that this categorization was contrary to the 
international categories promulgated by the Office of International Epizootics (OIE) in Paris and 
recognized as the world’s “trade-legal” standards under the WTO. Under OIE standards, Canada is 
categorized as a “moderate risk” nation, a higher category of risk than “minimal” and the second worst of 
five categories.353 The U.S., in contrast, is categorized as “BSE free.” The USDA’s plans to open the 
border and downgrade the risk from Canada suffered a setback just two months later. Rather than 
presenting a “minimal” risk to the U.S. cattle industry, to the contrary, Canada posed a significant risk as 
the first case of imported mad cow disease in the United States was found in December 2003. The BSE 
positive cow was quickly traced back to a herd in Alberta, Canada, but the damage was done as some 53 
nations quickly closed their borders to imports of U.S. beef and cattle.  
 
It is important to note that neither the United States nor Canada have done all they can to prevent 
mad cow disease. Consumer groups have been pushing both governments for years to close regulatory 
loopholes that could incubate the disease, but governments have been slow to act.354 Worse, even after the 
discover of a diseased cow in the United States, on March 8, 2004, the USDA reissued its proposed rule 
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to open the Canadian border.355 Currently the USDA is planning on opening the border on March 7, 2005. 
In the meantime, even with a limited testing system, two more diseased cows were found in Canada in 
January 2005.  
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
CCFT filed its first NAFTA Chapter 11 claim on August 12, 2004.356 The CCFT claimants allege 
violations of NAFTA Article 1102 stating that the United States is discriminating against Canadian 
feedlot operators by providing less favorable treatment to the Canadian cattlemen than it has to U.S. 
cattlemen who own Canadian cattle.357 In its filings, CCFT notes that the United States has failed to make 
any effort to round up or trace Canadian cattle that had already crossed the border before the closing. 
What the petition fails to mention is that the United States currently has no traceability system for doing 
so.358 They also allege that USDA officials, by indicating on a number of occasions that they would move 
forward to lift the border closure then “intentionally or negligently making and then failing to observe its 
commitments to eliminate its temporary ban on the importation of live cattle,”359 have breached the U.S. 
government’s obligation to provide a minimum standard of treatment under international law and NAFTA 
Article 1105 (1). They assert that this international law principle includes the obligation to pay restitution 
“for reasonable but detrimental reliance on government conduct or statements.”360
 
Canadian beef producers, whose businesses have unquestionably been devastated by the border 
closing, estimate their losses due to the closing at $2-3 billion.361 While the initial claim was for $75 million, 
more recently, up to 100 claims have been filed reportedly amounting to $300 million. NAFTA Article1125 
provides for the consolidation of claims in certain circumstances, and that may be what happens in this case. 
The United States is faced with a number of possible scenarios. It might agree to open the border to settle the 
claims. However, if dozens of cattlemen are involved in the claim, all may not agree to the terms and may 
proceed with their NAFTA cases. In that instance, the United States could be faced with the unpleasant 
possibility of having agreed to open the border − and expose U.S. consumers to increased risk − while later 
facing the possibility of being forced to pay damages to Canadian cattlemen for losses incurred during the 
period that the border was closed. 
 
OUTCOME 
 
The claim(s) have recently been filed. Arbitration has not yet commenced.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
No Foreign Investment Necessary to Bring a NAFTA Complaint?: If the Canadian cattlemen 
are permitted to move forward with their case, a bedrock principle of NAFTA’s investment chapter will 
have been discarded. NAFTA Chapter 11 will no longer even have the pretense of being a series of 
investor protections in a discriminatory and unstable investment climate. Rather, Chapter 11 will be 
unveiled as a deregulatory rendering machine best suited to shredding the laws and regulations that 
protect public health and the environment. While the U.S. government has argued that the cattlemen do 
not have a claim because they have no “investment” in the United States,362 this position is contradicted 
by language in NAFTA. The definition section of NAFTA (Article 1139) defines an investor of a Party as 
“a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is 
making or has made an investment” – period. It does not say “that seeks to make, is making or has made 
an investment in the territory of the other Party” the way that later FTAs (such as CAFTA) do – a 
potentially costly omission. NAFTA claimants do not state that they have actual businesses or property in 
the United States, but they argue that they have made “substantial investment in order to compete, and 
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profit from participation, in the North American cattle industry” and therefore qualify as investors.363 In 
addition, given that recent NAFTA panel decisions suggest that “market access” as well as “market share” 
could be considered legitimate NAFTA investments, the U.S. government has cause for concern 
regarding this unusual NAFTA case.364
 
Democratic, Administrative Procedure is Not a Trade Barrier; It’s the Law: The Canadian 
cattlemen allege that the USDA by dragging its feet is doing the bidding of protectionist U.S. cattlemen. 
Far from being “captured” by protectionist producers, it has been widely publicized that the USDA is 
thoroughly dominated by pro-free trade stalwarts from the head of the Department on down. 365 The Bush 
administration has hired numerous cattle industry lobbyists for key positions at the USDA. The National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association (which is dominated by meat packing firms that prefer cheaper Canadian 
beef) and the ardently pro-free trade USDA both wanted the border opened and the matter disposed of 
quickly. Fortunately, U.S. law does not allow USDA officials merely to follow their own inclinations. 
The USDA must follow its own binding regulations, which prohibit the importation of live ruminants and 
certain ruminant products from regions in which BSE is known to exist366 and separately require that the 
public be given notice, and a chance to comment before any nation is struck from the list of nations that 
are not allowed to import such products.367 The NAFTA claimants appear to be amazed and offended that 
the U.S. government “chose” to utilize “tedious” rulemaking, calling it “unnecessary” and a “potent and 
effective trade barrier,” 368 when in fact it is mandatory. The NAFTA claimants are also astonished that 
the United States paused for four months to reconsider its plan to open the border after the discovery of 
BSE in the United States. Rather than seeing this delay as a reasonable response to a significantly 
changed situation − with grave implications for public health and potentially catastrophic implications for 
the U.S. cattle industry − the NAFTA claimants argue that USDA “chose to continue a regulatory policy 
based upon protectionist politics rather than science.”369 They blame a lawsuit by U.S. producers for 
keeping the border closed, when in fact this producer group merely used the courts to force the USDA to 
abide by U.S. law and regulation and keep the border closed until rulemaking is finalized. It is worth 
noting that no other nation has opened its borders to trade in live cattle from Canada. Though it may be 
cold comfort to Canadian cattlemen whose businesses have been unquestionably devastated, the United 
States before opening any border it had closed due to animal disease must pursue a deliberate and open 
regulatory process per the requirements of U.S. law. The cattlemen should consider suing their own 
government for the lax rules that incubated the disease, not U.S. taxpayers.  
 
NAFTA Claim Riddled with Errors: Underlying the Canadian cattlemen’s claim is the premise that 
the United States is acting in a protectionist manner and is failing to act on “sound science.” Yet the filing 
making these claims is filled with errors and does an extremely poor job of understanding the science 
behind the BSE-related measures both governments have taken. First, the cattlemen ignore the fact that 
the United States receives only two percent of its live cattle from Canada − far from the “fully integrated 
North American cattle industry” they claim has been disrupted.370 Second, while citing OIE reports 
applauding the U.S. and Canada for their handling of the epidemiological investigations, the claimants 
completely ignore the fact that the U.S. and Canada enjoy very different BSE designations under 
international rules promulgated by OIE. The U.S. still enjoys the status of a “BSE free” nation under OIE 
rules, while Canada is a “moderate risk” nation, the second worst of five categories. It has long been the 
policy of both nations to import beef and cattle only from “BSE free” countries. 371 Third, CCFT 
repeatedly claims that the USDA’s administrative actions were “arbitrary” and punish the Canadian 
cattlemen “by mere dint of their location relative to the scientifically artificial U.S.-Canadian border.”372 
They allege that the risk of BSE infection remains small “and the border has nothing to do with it,”373 
when in fact the United States has been successful for years in preventing the importation of BSE because 
of strict border controls first applied in 1989. Fourth, CCFT alleges that the USDA had “no valid reason 
to make a distinction between processed beef and live cattle”374 when it proposed the border opening in 
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November 2003, even though it is clearly far easier for the United States to inspect incoming meat and 
limit imports to low risk cuts of meat than it is to implement a currently non-existent traceability system 
to keep track of live Canadian cattle for many years before they are slaughtered. Finally, CCFT asserts 
that the U.S. BSE-positive cow made it into the food chain and the Canadian cow did not, when the 
opposite may well be true. The U.S. government claims that even though the U.S. cow was rendered, it 
was successful in halting the distribution of all the meat and bone meal from the sick cow.375 However, 
the Canadian Broadcast Corporation recently uncovered through a Freedom of Information request that 
the Canadian cow was sent to a rendering plant and turned into poultry feed, which was later fed by 
farmers to cattle.376 In short, CCFT is demanding the U.S. to engage in a radical departure from prior food 
safety measures and change long-term trading practices based solely on a threatened damage claims that 
could amount to $300 million or more. 
 
GLAMIS GOLD v. UNITED STATES – MINING & CULTURE 
 
Glamis Gold, Ltd. (“Glamis”) is a Canadian corporation based in Vancouver and engaged in the 
exploration, development and extraction of precious metals in North and Central America.378 Under the 
1872 U.S. Mining Law, only U.S. citizens can mine on federal lands.379 Therefore, Glamis Gold, Ltd. 
established two subsidiaries, Glamis Gold, 
Inc. and Glamis Imperial, to act as 
corporate citizens on its behalf.380 With its 
U.S. entities, the Glamis firms can acquire 
claims for mining on U.S. federal lands 
free of cost and can then mine the land for 
profit without paying any royalties to the 
U.S. government or any other government 
under the 1872 Mining Law.381 In 1994, 
Glamis acquired 100 percent ownership of 
mining interests and mill sites in California in a business venture called the Imperial Project, which is 
composed of 187 mining claims and 277 mill sites and covers 1,500 acres of federal public lands382 that 
are managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM).383 Glamis 
alleges that its rights in the Imperial Project entitle it to use these lands for the purpose of prospecting, 
exploration and extraction of valuable minerals.384 As such, the Imperial Project was intended to be a 
large open-pit, cyanide heap-leach385 gold mine. The project would require that approximately 422 tons of 
rock be mined, processed or stored for each ounce of gold produced.386 Approximately 88 acres of 
woodland would be destroyed and 389 million gallons of water would be consumed annually from the 
desert groundwater aquifer.387
"Chapter 11 punishes States for doing the right thing.  
States like California that develop cutting-edge 
protections for the environment, human health or 
local communities are finding their efforts 
undermined by foreign investors challenging 
standards that are needed to prevent serious 
harm.”377  
 
David Waskow, Friends of the Earth 
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
 The Imperial Project is located in a California Desert Conservation Area388 near tribal lands, 
which included sacred and ancestral sites of the Quechan Indian Nation.389 The Quechan Indian tribe is 
the largest land-based tribe in California, consisting of 3,000 members residing on 45,000 acres of land.390 
It practices its religion in this area and sacred trails used in religious observances would have intersected 
with the Imperial Project.391
 
For the portion of the conservation area for which it was responsible, BLM was required to 
prepare and implement a comprehensive, long-range plan for the management, use, development and 
protection of the public lands. So that it could obtain approval to begin mining operations, in 1994, 
Glamis filed a “plan of operation” with the BLM and Imperial County, which it alleges included 
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backfilling and reclamation proposals to restore the land.392 After preparing environmental impact 
statements/reports in 1996 and 1997, the BLM ultimately approved the project.393 However, in 1999, the 
federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation recommended that the U.S. Interior Department deny 
approval of the project because of “serious and irreparable degradation” of an area that is sacred and 
historic to the Quechan Indian Nation Tribe.”394
 
Open-pit cyanide mining is extremely hazardous and costly. It involves digging huge earth pits or 
tearing down mountainsides to extract microscopic particles of gold. These particles of gold are then 
leached from the earth by saturating it with cyanide, a process that could contaminate the area’s scarce 
water resources. Open-pit cyanide mining is so destructive that Montana banned it in 1998 and other 
states have attempted to do so as well. In San Ignacio, Honduras, Glamis’ subsidiary, Minerales Entre 
Mares, has had an open-pit cyanide mine in operation since 1999.395 Local residents contend that 
Minerales Entre Mares’ mining activities have devastated the forests and dried up water sources. In 
October 2002, 700 San Ignacio residents protested Glamis’ open-pit mining activities and the destructive 
impact it has had upon their community.396  
 
In this context, the Solicitor of the Interior Department under the Clinton administration 
concluded in a legal opinion that if a project were to result in “undue impairment,” under BLM 
regulations the project could be denied.397 After this opinion was rendered, the BLM reversed its previous 
conclusions and recommended that the Department of the Interior deny the plan of operation for the 
Imperial Project, not only because of the impact that it would have upon the Quechan Indian Nation but 
also due to the negative environmental impact that would have resulted from the project.398 On January 
17, 2001, after six years of study, the Interior Department formally denied the project on the basis that it 
was within a Native American spiritual pathway that extended 130 miles and that the proposed mining 
activities would impair the ability of the Native Americans to travel this pathway.399
 
 In 2001, President Bush came to office and new officials took over at the Interior Department. 
After only a few months deliberation, the new Interior Solicitor rescinded the prior Solicitor’s legal 
opinion and denial of the Imperial Project.400 The Solicitor’s opinion was based on his conclusion that the 
“Secretary [of Interior] is not authorized to prevent degradation caused by mining that is necessary and 
due.”401  
 
In response to the sudden federal government reversal, in 2002, the California State Mining and 
Geology Board (CMGB) adopted an emergency regulation requiring the backfilling of all future open-pit 
mines in the state to achieve the approximate original contours of the land prior to mining.402 The 
emergency regulation also required that all mined material that is not used to backfill the pit must be 
removed so that no material would lay more than 25 feet above the original topography.403 In 2003, then-
Governor Gray Davis of California memorialized this emergency regulation into Senate Bill 22, with the 
caveat that such requirements would be limited to projects that are located within one mile of any Native 
American sacred site.404 Following the passage of the bill, CMGB adopted the emergency regulations as 
final and made them applicable to any project that had been pending as of December 12, 2002. 
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
Rather than pursuing a case against the California mining regulation in U.S. domestic courts, on 
December 9, 2003, Glamis Gold Ltd. filed a Notice of Arbitration for a NAFTA investor-state case in 
UNCITRAL raising claims using NAFTA Chapter 11 foreign investor protections to attack California’s 
mining law and the Interior Department’s earlier decision.405 Specifically, Glamis alleges that it failed to 
receive the minimum standard of treatment required by NAFTA Article 1105 because the U.S. Interior 
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Department failed to promptly approve the company’s plan of operation as required by law, and 
unreasonably and arbitrarily delayed its mining operations.406 Glamis also argues that the California 
regulation made its mining operation so costly as to be uneconomical, thereby “expropriating” the 
investment in violation of Article 1110.407 Glamis is demanding $50 million in compensation. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
First Chapter 11 Case Involving Indigenous Rights and Culture: This is the first NAFTA case 
in which a state law that was intended in part to protect indigenous peoples’ cultural interests has been 
challenged as a NAFTA violation. When signing the mining bill into law, California Governor Gray 
Davis stated that “this measure sends a message that California’s sacred sites are more precious than 
gold.”408 The governor believed that the proposed mine would irreparably harm the Quechan’s spiritual 
trail, called the “Trail of Dreams.” If Glamis succeeds in this case and California is forced to repeal or 
modify its new mining legislation, it would set a precedent that could leave cultural, religious and 
historical sites vulnerable to NAFTA Chapter 11 attacks by corporations seeking to reap a profit. Nothing 
in NAFTA provides protective exemptions for cultural, religious or historical treasures. 
 
Glamis Capitalizes on an Expansive Definition of “Investment”: Glamis alleges that if forced 
to comply with the backfilling requirement, its future open-pit gold mining operation would be 
economically unviable. Glamis does not have an established business − a  “going-concern” at the Imperial 
Project site − it just has mining rights and a plan of operation. Yet the rulings in past NAFTA investor-
state cases suggest that this may be enough for the Glamis tribunal to conclude that an investment 
protected under NAFTA exists. For instance, in the S.D. Myers case, the company successfully sought 
damages for a temporary ban on PCB imports even though it did not have an established business and 
when the legality of its intended business activities were in doubt.  
 
NAFTA Provides Greater Rights for Foreign Investors than U.S. Domestic Property Law: 
Glamis used the NAFTA investor-state system to avoid bringing this regulatory takings claim before a 
U.S. court, which would be highly skeptical of such a takings claim and would require the firm to 
demonstrate that close to 100 percent of the value of the property has been destroyed and that there is no 
other economically viable use of the property. Under NAFTA however, some tribunals have held that 
only “significant” or “substantial” impact on the value of a property may constitute a takings – providing 
foreign investors greater rights than those provided to U.S. citizens or business under the U.S. 
Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. 409 The U.S. Trade Representative has not fixed 
this problem in CAFTA or other post-Fast Track FTAs despite Congress’ instructions.  
 
Relying on the Federal Government to Defend a Policy it Opposes: In this case, both the 
claimant and respondent share the same viewpoint reflecting a disregard for cultural and environmental 
preservation. The Bush administration has clearly indicated through the actions of the Solicitor General 
that it disagrees with the previous administration’s ruling to deny the Imperial Project. Therefore, the 
Bush administration, which is exclusively authorized to defend against Glamis’ attack – allegedly 
representing the interests of U.S. citizens – agrees with Glamis’ plan to destroy the environment and 
threaten the religious grounds of the Quechan Indian Tribe. Yet, because the NAFTA investor-state 
system does not grant the public a role in the proceedings, nor guarantee representation of the state whose 
law is also being attacked, there will be no representative during this arbitration to vocalize the concerns 
of the Quechan Indian Tribe and its cultural and environmental concerns.  
 
Domestic Court Interpretation of Law Undermined: This case also demonstrates the quagmire 
presented when a NAFTA tribunal is given the power to interpret a domestic law before the domestic 
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court system itself has had an opportunity to do so. This claim regarding the Interior Department’s 
decision hinges upon whether the U.S. mining law permits the federal government to reject a project 
based upon cultural and/or environmental consequences. Instead of this question being taken through the 
U.S. court system for resolution, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state mechanism allows one 
economically interested party, Glamis, to bypass the normal process and adjudicate its complaint outside 
the domestic court system, the body best able to understand the history and intricacies of the matter at 
hand. This parallel system created by NAFTA Chapter 11 assaults a long-standing principle – that 
Congress creates the law and U.S. courts interpret the law – by permitting a private tribunal to interpret 
U.S. laws before a domestic court has had an opportunity to do so. 
 
GRAND RIVER v. UNITED STATES – U.S. TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS 
 
 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., (“Grand River”) is a Canadian company engaged in 
the licensing, manufacturing, packaging, production, importation and sale of tobacco.410 Its headquarters 
are located in Oshweken, Ontario. Grand River began production in 1996 and has more than doubled its 
production of tobacco products every year since 2001. The company estimates its assets, including plant, 
equipment, equipment on order, and cash, at $43 million.411 Although located in Canada, it exports 
approximately 80 percent of its tobacco products to the United States.412 Other claimants in this NAFTA 
suit include Canadian citizens Jerry Montour, Kenneth Hill and Arthur Montour, who have ownership 
rights in Grand River and various cigarette trading operations in the United States. They argue that their 
investment in the United States has been harmed by the tobacco settlements in the late 1990s between 
U.S. states and large U.S. tobacco firms.413
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
In 1998, 46 U.S. states entered into a settlement agreement with Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company (“tobacco 
defendants”) to resolve claims that the states had filed seeking to recoup medical expenses incurred for 
treating smoking-related illnesses of indigent smokers and to pay for smoking reduction programs.414 The 
1998 settlement agreement followed close on the heels of similar agreements reached by four individual 
states, Mississippi, Florida, Texas and Minnesota. The agreements resulted in a combined settlement of 
$240 billion through 2025.415 This money was to be used to pay state costs that were incurred in the 
treatment of indigent patients suffering from tobacco-related illnesses, to fund educational programs, and 
to restrict marketing directed at children.416
 
Also as part of the settlements, states decided to make the provisions of the settlement agreements 
applicable to all tobacco companies, including non-defendant tobacco companies, such as Grand River.417 
Non-defendant tobacco companies had 90 days to opt in or out of the tobacco settlements, and more than 
35 firms opted in. If firms opted out, they had to contribute a percentage of their sales to escrow accounts 
set up in each state by statute.418 Funds in the escrow accounts would be used to pay judgments in the 
event the states decided to sue these tobacco companies. If states took no action, the funds would revert 
back to the companies. States also began enacting complementary legislation or “contraband legislation,” 
which barred non-defendant tobacco company’s products from being sold in these states and subjected the 
companies to monetary penalties if they did not comply with the escrow statutes.419
 
NAFTA ATTACK  
 
On March 12, 2004, the Grand River petitioners filed a NAFTA investor-state claim, seeking 
$340 million in compensation for alleged violations of NAFTA Chapter 11 at UNCITRAL.420 The 
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petitioners argue in a general way that the major tobacco firms conspired to ensure that non-defendant 
firms were covered by the terms of the settlement and secured terms that are more favorable to defendant 
tobacco firms than non-defendant firms in an effort to force the smaller firms out of business and corner 
the market. Specifically, the petitioners are arguing that the requirement to make payments into state 
escrow accounts constitute an expropriation in violation of NAFTA Article 1110.421 The firm has been the 
target of multiple state lawsuits for non-payment, and the firm claims that it has already paid $1,100,000 
in escrow and penalties to states.422 The petitioners argue that their investment is being expropriated 
because their cigarettes cannot be sold in states where the firm does not comply with state escrow laws.423 
The petitioners also allege they were deprived of fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105 because 
they were not notified of the settlement negotiations, nor were they allowed to participate in negotiations, 
yet they are bound by the terms of the settlement.424 Grand River also argues that it is being discriminated 
against in violation of Article 1102 because domestic firms that participated in the settlements are 
operating in the United States without contributing to an escrow fund.425 Lastly, Grand River claims that 
the United States has violated Article 1103’s most favored nation provision because other foreign firms 
(presumably selling other products than tobacco) are not required to maintain an escrow account while 
doing business in the United States.426  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Public Health Achievements Undermined: Largely due to the tobacco settlements advertising 
restrictions, public education campaigns and related price increases in cigarettes, the percentage of teens 
who smoke is plummeting in the United States. While not all the funds from the settlements slated for 
public education has been spent as intended, there have been some impressive developments. Today, 22 
percent of U.S. high school students report being smokers, compared to 36 percent in 1997.427 Since most 
adults start smoking as teens, these statistics could translate into a big drop in the number of adult 
tobacco-related illnesses and a significant decrease in tobacco-related medical costs, which are often 
borne by U.S. taxpayers. Yet these successes and future gains that might result from further lawsuits may 
be frustrated if Grand River and other non-defendant tobacco companies are allowed to use NAFTA to 
evade responsibility for the harms caused by their products. 
 
NAFTA Threatens to Undercut State Authority: U.S. state attorneys general united and fought 
vigorously for the tobacco settlements in an effort to reduce states’ costs related to tobacco use, prevent 
smoking-related death and illness, and decrease the use of tobacco use by minors. Most attorneys general 
are popularly elected by citizens of their respective states and are charged with acting as representatives 
of the public interest. Yet state attorneys general have no standing in the NAFTA investor-state dispute 
resolution process. They must rely on the federal lawyers to defend their interests potentially behind 
closed doors in a NAFTA trade tribunal. If a NAFTA tribunal rules in favor of the Grand River 
petitioners and finds the settlement agreement violates foreign investors’ NAFTA rights, state sovereignty 
and democratic governance will be grossly undermined by a body that was not elected by state citizens, 
yet is directly impacting state law and public policy. 
 
NAFTA Tobacco Firms Evade Justice?: There are approximately 1,000 state lawsuits against 
tobacco companies such as Grand River that were not named as defendants in the tobacco settlement 
lawsuits and that have failed to contribute to state escrow funds. Non-defendant tobacco firms have 
regularly lost these cases. Grand River first fought the escrow account issue in U.S. federal court and 
failed. Now Grand River is attempting a second bite at the apple by using NAFTA Chapter 11, an option 
that is not available to U.S. firms that must abide by U.S. court decisions. A NAFTA tribunal decision in 
favor of Grand River would give Mexican and Canadian firms a back door out of the successful tobacco 
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settlements, erasing the level playing field for U.S. tobacco firms and undermining the settlements as a 
whole.  
THUNDERBIRD GAMING v. MEXICO – GAMBLING 
 
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation, (“Thunderbird”) is a Canadian company with a 
business office in San Diego involved in gaming and entertainment operations in Latin America.428 It 
claims assets worth nearly $17 million.429 In the 1990s, Thunderbird was involved in Indian gaming 
operations in California.430 The company has since shifted its focus to Latin America and now owns and 
operates gaming facilities in Panama, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.431 Between 2000 and 2001, 
Thunderbird established three gaming facilities in Mexico that are the subject of this dispute.432
 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Casinos have been illegal in Mexico since 1934,433 and in 1947, the Mexican government banned 
all forms of gambling.434 This decision was based on public policy and in recognition of the fact that 
gambling was often linked with crime. Today, opponents of attempts to allow gambling point to Mexico’s 
high poverty rate and the tendency of gambling to exacerbate the problems associated with poverty.435
 
In August 2000, Thunderbird petitioned Gobernacion (the Mexican Ministry of Government with 
authority over gaming) for permission to operate various “skill machines” in Mexico, mechanisms very 
similar to slot machines. In the request, Thunderbird referred to their machines as “games of skill and 
ability” that award prizes based on skill and “in no way as the result of chance.”436 However, the 
distinction between skill machines and slot machines is not as clear-cut as presented by Thunderbird. 
Many U.S. states define games that incorporate a skill element as gambling devices, and the Thunderbird 
games would likely be considered as such in the United States.437
 
 In response to the petition, Gobernacion issued a letter stating that it would have no authority to 
prohibit the use of such machines if they were truly skill machines.438 However, the letter indicated that 
the machines might not be allowed if the principal factor of operation was luck or gambling. 
 
 Thunderbird proceeded to establish gaming facilities in three Mexican cities, Nuevo Laredo, 
Matamoros and Reynosa.439 Shortly thereafter, there was a change in the composition of the federal 
government and a new director of gaming was appointed.440 Gobernacion, under the new leadership, 
conducted a site visit plus an administrative hearing and determined that Thunderbird’s games were not 
based on skill but that the games were − in the words of one official − “tragamonedas” (money-
swallowers).441 Gobernacion decided that the gaming facilities violated Mexican law prohibiting 
gambling and ordered the facilities to shut down. 
 
NAFTA ATTACK 
 
On August 1, 2002, Thunderbird filed a NAFTA investor-state claim at UNCITRAL, seeking 
damages in excess of $100 million for alleged violations of NAFTA Chapter 11.442 Specifically, the 
company is alleging that Mexico has allowed Thunderbird’s competitors to continue gaming operations 
while forcing Thunderbird to shut down, thus violating the national treatment and most favored nation 
treatment provisions of Chapter 11 (Articles 1102 and 1103).443 Thunderbird cites the “arbitrary and non-
transparent manner” in which it believes it was treated by the Mexican government as the basis for the 
alleged violation of Article 1105.444 Thunderbird further states that such treatment was not fair or 
equitable and that the treatment did not provide the standard of “full protection and security” as required 
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by NAFTA.445 Finally, Thunderbird is arguing that the closure of its facilities is “tantamount to 
expropriation” of its investments that, without compensation, is in violation of NAFTA Article 1110.446
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Compensation for illegal activity?: Thunderbird is claiming compensation for its failed attempts to 
engage in activities long prohibited by Mexican law. If Thunderbird is successful in obtaining payment 
for this claim, it effectively will have end run a public policy in existence for over half a century and will 
profit from prohibited gambling activity. Further, the determination about whether Thunderbird’s games 
fall under Mexican anti-gambling laws and whether these games should be banned is a decision that 
should be made by the Mexican government – not a private NAFTA tribunal. If Thunderbird is 
compensated simply because the government is unwilling to allow them to engage in an illegal activity, 
the door would be open for an array of NAFTA investor-state challenges every time a foreign corporation 
is ordered not to undertake activities deemed illegal by national law. 
 
NAFTA Promotes a Regulatory Freeze: Thunderbird’s claim is that it relied on the Mexican 
government’s tepid and qualified letter, which did not strictly prohibit skill machines, as a go-ahead for 
their business operations. The firm protests the change in policy implemented by a new regulatory official 
who made a special trip to physically examine their operation. An increasing number of NAFTA cases, 
including the California MTBE case, the Glamis mining case, the Kenex hemp food case, and others 
involve corporations demanding damages over a change of regulatory policy. Whether because of new 
factual findings, changes in values, or simply the different preferences of a newly elected government, 
policy changes are an inevitable and healthy part of any democracy. This important governmental right 
would be compromised if corporations are able to claim damages for any change in policy. Until NAFTA 
Chapter 11 provided the investor-state challenge mechanisms, such governmental policy changes were 
calculated as the cost of doing business. Now such normal activity is grounds for seeking sometimes an 
extraordinary amount of compensation, holding governments hostage to past policies and attempting to 
cement a regulatory status quo in the face of pro-consumer, pro-public interest policy changes. 
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IV. OTHER NAFTA CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATIONS 
  
What follows are short summaries of other NAFTA cases that have been adjudicated or are in 
arbitration. 
 
ADF Group v. United States – Buy America Contract: ADF Group, Inc. is a structural design and 
engineering firm based in Quebec, Canada. The company owns ADF International, which is based in 
Florida and is a wholly owned subsidiary.447 In March 1999, ADF International signed a sub-contract with 
a U.S. firm called Shirley Contracting Corporation to work on the Springfield Interchange in Northern 
Virginia, a key section of highway where a number of important arteries meet. The Springfield 
Interchange, or “Mixing Bowl” as it is referred to locally, was being revamped through a multi-year 
federally funded highway construction project designed to improve safety. ADF International was the 
subcontractor in charge of designing and fabricating the steel superstructure for nine highway 
interchanges at the Mixing Bowl.448
 
 At issue is a “Buy America” provision in the main contract between the Virginia Department of 
Transport (V-DOT) and the primary contractor, Shirley Contracting. The V-DOT Buy America provision 
was required in the contract by the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) as a prerequisite to granting 
federal funds for the Mixing Bowl Project. The FHA administers the federal Buy America policy.449 This 
law was developed in the 1980s to recycle taxpayer funds back into the U.S. economy in a sector – steel – 
that was considered vital for U.S. infrastructure and national defense. The policy requires not only that 
steel be bought from the United States, but that fabrication work on the steel be performed in the United 
States. The Buy America law contains a waiver that can be triggered in certain limited circumstances. 
ADF stated that it was willing to use 100 percent U.S. steel, but insisted that it needed to do certain 
fabrication work including cutting, welding, punching holes and milling at its plant in Canada, but was 
prohibited from doing so.450 ADF was forced to use one of its facilities in Florida to conduct some of this 
fabrication work and to sub-contract out other work, increasing the cost of the project for the firm. 
 
 On July 19, 2000, ADF brought a NAFTA investor-state challenge against the United States over 
its Buy America requirements. Specifically, ADF claimed that the federal law was designed to favor U.S. 
investments and investors and as such is discriminatory and in violation of NAFTA Article 1102.451 In 
addition, ADF alleged that the Buy America policy, and the decisions of U.S. officials implementing the 
regulation and denying the waiver, violated the company’s right to fair and equitable treatment as 
guaranteed under NAFTA Article 1105.452 Further, ADF claimed that the Buy America requirements 
constituted an illegal performance requirement under NAFTA Article 1106. Article 1106 forbids 
performance requirements “to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content” or “purchase, use 
or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory” – categories under which 
the Buy America requirements would likely fall.453 Later the company also alleged a violation of Article 
1103, guaranteeing most favored nation treatment to parties and their investors under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
The corporation claimed damages of $90 million.454
 
 In January 2003, the NAFTA tribunal rendered a decision in the ADF case. Significantly, the 
tribunal first ruled against ADF on the Article 1102 claim, finding that the imposition of domestic content 
and performance requirements by federal and sub-federal entities was not a violation of the anti-
discrimination rule. The tribunal noted ADF’s failure to submit evidence demonstrating that it was 
discriminated against by having to comply with the domestic content requirements. It explained that all 
contractors foreign and domestic were required to abide, and had abided by the domestic content 
requirements, not just non-American companies.455 Therefore, since ADF had failed to present any 
evidence of discrimination through the submission of, for example, information regarding U.S. firms 
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exempt from the requirement or a comparative cost analysis demonstrating that fabrication in United 
States vs. fabrication in Canada significantly impairs the operations of Canadian firms, the tribunal could 
not find that the U.S. actions were in violation of NAFTA Article 1102.456  
 
Then the tribunal dismissed all other claims. Most importantly, the tribunal rejected ADF’s 
argument that Chapter 11 and Article 1106 banning performance requirements applied to the federal Buy 
America law due to the fact, the plaintiff argued, that the U.S. had failed to exempt this policy under 
NAFTA Article 1108 (entitled “Reservations and Exceptions.”) Rather, the panel accepted the U.S. 
government’s argument that NAFTA’s procurement chapter, Chapter 10, was the relevant chapter. The 
United States argued that Chapter 10 applied to federal procurement undertaken by specific, listed federal 
agencies, one of which is the Department of Transportation.  
 
One NAFTA observer has charged that in coming to this decision, the panel engaged in some 
convoluted reasoning, first by deciding that a federal grant somehow constituted “procurement,” then by 
deciding that NAFTA Article 1106 (1) (c), which explicitly prohibits countries from providing 
preferences for services provided within its territory, did not apply to this case.457  
 
The debate over whether the matter was properly classified as procurement or investment also 
elicited an interesting side argument on the role of V-DOT and state procurement.458 ADF’s arguments 
did not focus on the role of the state, apparently because the company was aware that state procurement 
was not covered under either chapter of NAFTA. (While NAFTA Article 1024 provides for the addition 
of states to a specific annex of the procurement chapter, evidently these negotiations were never 
undertaken. No states are listed in the annex. Thus the tribunal found that states are not bound by 
NAFTA’s procurement chapter. Moreover, Article 1108 (1) exempts states from the anti-discrimination 
rule, most favored nation rule and performance requirement rule of NAFTA’s investment chapter. Thus, 
ADF was prohibited from making these claims against the state of Virginia.) Rather, ADF argued that the 
federal Buy America policy in effect “forced” Virginia to take the actions it did in a NAFTA-illegal 
manner. The tribunal rejected this argument as well, finding that the Commonwealth of Virginia adopted 
and applied the U.S. measures “on its own.”459
 
Azinian v. Mexico – Municipal Waste Disposal Contract: The Azinian case was the first NAFTA 
Chapter 11 ruling by a NAFTA tribunal. The investors in the case, including Robert Azinian, were U.S. 
citizens who were shareholders of a Mexican corporate entity named Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan S.A. 
(DESONA). In August 1993, DESONA won a multimillion-dollar contract with the Mexican city of 
Naucalpan to implement a solid waste collection, transportation and processing system.460 The investors 
claimed to represent a U.S. parent company called Global Waste Industries, Inc., which was alleged to 
have 40 years of experience and to have provided similar services to the residences, businesses and 
industries in the Los Angeles area.461 On March 21, 1994, the city of Naucalpan annulled the agreement 
after receiving independent legal advice that there were 27 irregularities with the contract. DESONA filed 
suit against the city for breach of contract and eventually lost in a Mexican federal court. On March 17, 
1997, DESONA filed a NAFTA investor-state suit in ICSID, claiming that the cancellation of the contract 
was a violation of their foreign investor rights guaranteed in Articles 1105 and 1110 of NAFTA. 
DESONA demanded up to $19 million in damages.462 On November 1, 1999, an ICSID panel dismissed 
the case. 
 
 The proceedings focused on certain representations by the firm, namely that Global Waste did not 
have 40 years of experience, but was founded in 1991 and went into bankruptcy 14 months later;463 that 
DESONA provided only two reconditioned vehicles and not the 70 state-of-the-art disposal trucks 
promised;464 and that a variety of other representations made by the investors, including promises to build 
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a power plant, were “so unreasonably optimistic as to be fraudulent.”465 The panel concluded that “the 
claimants entered into the Concession Contract on false pretenses, and lacked the capacity to perform 
it.”466
 
 Even though the panel did not address the NAFTA claims at length, its reasoning in the case has 
been cited in a few NAFTA cases, such as the Waste Management case, to narrow the allowable scope of 
NAFTA investor challenges. The Azinian panel ruled that a breach of contract in and of itself was not 
sufficient to establish a NAFTA claim;467 that NAFTA’s dispute settlement system should not be 
considered a court of appeal for every investor who is disappointed by an adverse ruling in domestic 
courts,468 and that any Article 1105 claim regarding failure to provide a minimum standard of treatment 
must include a clear violation of international law independent of other provisions of NAFTA.469 Finally, 
in reasoning one can only hope will be applied to future NAFTA cases, the panel held that: 
 
[A] foreign investor entitled in principle to protection under NAFTA may enter into contractual 
obligations with a public authority and may suffer a breach by that authority, and still not be in a 
position to state a claim under NAFTA. It is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be 
disappointed in their dealings with public authorities and disappointed again when national courts 
reject their complaints... NAFTA was not intended to provide foreign investors with blanket 
protection from this kind of disappointment, and nothing in its terms so provides.470
 
Crompton v. Canada – Pesticide Phase-Out: Crompton Corporation, Inc., formerly known as 
Uniroyal Chemical Company, produces a variety of specialty chemicals used in agriculture, housing and 
automotive products.471 Crompton’s World Headquarters is located in Greenwich, Connecticut. Crompton 
also owns a Canadian company, Crompton C./Cie, which is incorporated in the province of Nova Scotia. 
It has a manufacturing facility in Elmira, Ontario, which produces the chemical pesticide lindane under 
the registered trademark name of Vitavax and other products.472 In technical terms, lindane is known as 
gamma-hexachlorocyclyhexane (g-HCH). It is used for preventing fungus on seeds, as an insecticide on 
foliage of fruit and nut trees, for killing insects in wood and for the eradication of lice and scabies on 
humans and animals. 
 
Lindane is one of the few chemicals still remaining on the market in the same chemical class as 
DDT. Both are persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the organochlorine class.473 According to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), animal studies have demonstrated that lindane can cause liver 
cancer when ingested by mice.474 The EPA considers lindane a possible human carcinogen, regulates 
lindane products under six separate statutes and has restricted most uses since 1983.475 Lindane has long 
been a source of trade tensions between the United States and Canada. While Lindane was permitted as a 
seed treatment for canola in Canada, the United States allows lindane for seed treatment of 13 other crops, 
but not canola.476 American canola growers have complained that the higher cost of lindane substitutes 
puts them at a disadvantage, and Canadian canola growers were worried that Washington might block 
their imports.477
 
Beginning in 1998, the Canadian Pesticide Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA) and canola 
growers represented by the Canadian Canola Council478 organized an effort to persuade companies that 
sell products containing lindane to agree voluntarily to remove canola claims from product labels by 
December 31, 1999.479 This would mean that it would no longer be legal to produce new lindane products 
for canola seed treatment or to treat canola seeds for sale. While PMRA believed it had Crompton’s 
assent to the voluntary canola phase-out plan, Crompton claimed otherwise and alleged that it was harmed 
by various PMRA actions to implement the agreement. 
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On November 6, 2001, Crompton filed a notice with the Canadian government that it intended to 
bring an investor-state suit under NAFTA Chapter 11 based on four alleged violations of its NAFTA-
granted investor protections. Crompton claimed that it was being treated differently, in violation of 
NAFTA article 1102, than its Canadian competitors, because they produce low-cost, lindane substitutes in 
Canada and would not be as affected by the change in policy.480 Crompton further alleged that Canada 
unfairly reneged on a deal with the corporation by not undertaking a promised scientific review, in 
violation of NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment rules.481 Crompton also claimed that the government of 
Canada is instituting a NAFTA-illegal “performance requirement” in violation of NAFTA Article 1106 
that negatively impacts Crompton but helps Canadian companies that produce substitutes.482 Finally, 
Crompton charged that the Canadian government, by banning the use of lindane after July 1, 2001, has 
“expropriated” the company’s property in violation of NAFTA Article 1110.483 The company demanded 
$100 million in damages from the Canadian government to compensate for the alleged violations of its 
NAFTA investor rights.484 In 2002, the firm filed an amended Notice of Intent, adding additional facts 
and charges.485 While no arbitration seems to be underway as of yet, in January 2005, a Crompton 
spokesperson told Public Citizen that the firm was involved in a proceeding at PMRA examining the 
appropriateness of the regulatory agency’s actions, but they were still pursuing their NAFTA lawsuit.486
 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. Mexico – Bank Capitalization: Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Company, a U.S. corporation that sells personal and business insurance, is based in Novato 
California.487 According to its NAFTA complaint, Fireman’s Fund purchased $50 million (dollar-
denominated) in debentures from GF BanCrecer, for the purpose of capitalizing a subsidiary bank.488 A 
debenture is a security device (usually a bond) issued by a firm or government in return for long or 
medium term investment of funds. GF BanCrecer also sold similar debentures denominated in Mexican 
pesos and equivalent to the amount sold Fireman’s Fund to Mexican investors.489 Various financial crises 
affected the new bank, including the 1997 peso crisis, and Mexican regulators stepped in.490 Fireman’s 
Fund alleges that the authorities approved a deal that reimbursed the Mexican investors but not U.S. 
investors.491
 
On July 17, 2003, the tribunal rendered a jurisdictional decision, which dismissed Fireman Fund’s 
claims under Articles 1102, 1105 and 1405.492 Mexico filed a jurisdictional objection alleging that the 
tribunal lacked competence to hear the matter because the claim should be covered by NAFTA Chapter 
14, which covers financial services, instead of Chapter 11, which is only applicable to investments.493 The 
tribunal determined that the financial holding company that caused the alleged injury, GF BanCrecer – 
which invests in banks and insurance companies – was a financial institution within the meaning of 
Chapter 14 and that the debentures were “regulatory capital” also under the purview of Chapter 14.494 
However, the tribunal noted that since some provisions of Chapter 14 are incorporated into Chapter 11, in 
particular Article 1110, the expropriation claim survives. A final decision on the expropriation claim is 
still pending.495
 
Karpa (Feldman) v. Mexico – Cigarette Excise Taxes: A U.S. owner of the Mexican firm 
Corporacion de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. (CEMSA) filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state suit 
against Mexico in April 7, 1999, alleging that Mexico failed to rebate cigarette excise taxes to the 
corporation between 1992 and 1997 and this amounted to a “creeping expropriation” of its investment.496 
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa claimed that Mexico’s actions were specifically targeted against CEMSA 
and intended to shut down its cigarette exporting business and to give [Mexican] producers a monopoly 
on exports.497 Karpa claimed that Mexican law entitled his corporation to these rebates and that Mexico’s 
refusal to pay the tax rebates was tantamount to expropriation in violation of Articles 1105 and 1110 of 
NAFTA.498 Karpa filed his NAFTA suit at ICSID and claimed $50 million in damages.499  
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 On December 16, 2002, the tribunal found against Karpa on the Article 1110 expropriation claim, 
but found in his favor on the Article 1102 national treatment claim.500 The tribunal found that, although 
Karpa’s firm had been harmed in that it was no longer in the business of exporting cigarettes, the business 
was nonetheless still functioning and consequently no expropriation had occurred.501 However, in 
reference to Karpa’s national treatment claim, the tribunal found that in fact, Mexico had failed to accord 
Karpa the same treatment as investors in “like” circumstances.502 Additionally, the tribunal noted the lack 
of evidence presented before it by the respondent Mexico in defense of the actions alleged to be violative 
of national treatment requirements.503 The tribunal was largely swayed by Mexico’s failure to submit any 
evidence contradicting the facts presented by Karpa. Claiming it could not reveal confidential business 
information Mexico did not present evidence demonstrating that it had treated Karpa accordingly under 
the national treatment provisions, nor did it present evidence that would have explained the disparity in 
treatment.504 Therefore, the tribunal awarded Karpa $2 million in damages.505 Mexico sought a review of 
the award with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to set aside parts of the Tribunal’s award.506 The 
Mexican government has this opportunity because the case had been legally situated in Canada. On 
December 3, 2003, the judge dismissed Mexico’s application.507 Mexico appealed the decision with the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario, which also dismissed the case citing the high degree of deference given to 
arbitral decisions in Canadian law.508
 
Kenex v. United States – Drug Enforcement Policy: Kenex Limited of Ontario, Canada, is a 
producer of bulk hemp products, including hemp oil, seed and fiber.509 Kenex Canada is the owner of 
Kenex U.S., Ltd., incorporated in Delaware. Kenex products are used in a variety of hemp foods 
commonly sold in U.S. health-food stores, including energy bars, chips, pretzels, veggie burgers and salad 
oils. Hemp is harvested from cannabis sativa plant, varieties of which are used in the production of 
marijuana. Currently, hemp production is legal in 33 countries. In the United States, however, the legal 
status of hemp has a convoluted legislative and common law history. Even though some imports of hemp 
products have been allowed, legal hemp production is essentially non-existent in the United States. 
 
At issue in the Kenex NAFTA case are three new regulations issued simultaneously on October 9, 
2001, by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, which banned all hemp food products containing any 
amount of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).510 THC is the chemical substance in marijuana that gives it 
psychoactive properties. Trace amounts can be present in hemp food products even though hemp is bred 
to have less than 1 percent of THC.511 The new regulations put THC on the list of the most dangerous and 
addictive drugs such as heroin and phencyclidine (PCP). The DEA rule was effective immediately, 
instantly criminalizing the entire hemp food industry. Since the publication of the rule, no person in the 
United States has been allowed to manufacture, sell or even eat hemp products.  
 
 In its NAFTA claim, Kenex argues that the regulation was arbitrary and unfair. The firm alleges 
that it is being accorded treatment less favorable than its competitors, such as poppy seed producers or 
producers of flax oil, in violation of NAFTA Articles 1102, 1103, 1104 and 1105.512 Kenex also seeks to 
import into NAFTA U.S. obligations under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (WTO 
SPS), which governs trade in food, animal and plant life. Under NAFTA Article 1105, Kenex charges that 
the United States had an obligation under the WTO SPS to base its measure on “sound science” and to 
ensure the measure was no more trade restrictive than necessary.513 Kenex is seeking $20 million in 
damages from U.S. taxpayers for the business it has lost as a result of the U.S. action. The case was filed 
at UNCITRAL on August 2, 2002. 
 
In addition to pursuing a NAFTA claim, Kenex and other hemp companies challenged the 
regulation in the U.S. domestic court system. Simultaneous domestic court and NAFTA cases are allowed 
when the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief. On March 8, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th 
 63
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, February 2005 
Circuit granted a stay blocking enforcement of the new rule. On February 6, 2004, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 9thCircuit granted the hemp firms a victory when it ruled that the current Controlled 
Substances Act allows the sale of hemp foods and only an act of Congress can change the law.514 When 
the Bush administration declined to appeal this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, Kenex secured its 
domestic court victory. After winning their domestic court case, it is unclear if Kenex will continue to 
pursue its NAFTA case. 
 
Mondev v. United States – City Development Dispute: According to its NAFTA submission, 
Mondev International of Montreal Canada has been a major developer of commercial real estate both in 
Canada and the United States for 30 years.515 In December 1978, Mondev entered into an agreement with 
the city of Boston to build several shopping complexes and a hotel in downtown Boston. The agreement – 
called the Tripartite Agreement – was signed by the city of Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority 
(BRA) and Lafayette Place Associates (LPA), a limited partnership owned and controlled by Mondev.516 
The agreement provided for a multi-phase, multi million-dollar project to revitalize a dilapidated section 
of downtown Boston bordering on the “combat zone,” a crime-infested red light and pornography district. 
Phase I of the project consisted of a straightforward real estate development deal. Mondev built a mall, an 
underground garage and a hotel.517 Phase I was completed, named “Lafayette Place” and opened in 1986. 
However, Phase II, which involved the construction of an office building and department store, was never 
completed after the city announced that it had other plans for the parcel even though Mondev retained an 
option to buy it. The story of Phase II entails a 13-year saga including a seven-year legal battle that went 
all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court before ending up in a NAFTA tribunal. 
 
In 1992, LPA sued the BRA and the city of Boston in the Massachusetts Superior Court for 
breach of the Tripartite Agreement.518 In 1994, a jury found for LPA, awarding it and its Canadian partner 
Mondev $16 million in damages. The jury also found that the BRA had intentionally interfered with the 
contract and that LPA was entitled to recover $6.4 million for this second offense.519 However, a judge 
later held that the BRA was a public employer and therefore as a matter of law immune from suit for tort 
claims, and reduced the verdict to $9.6 million.520 Both LPA and the city of Boston appealed the $9.6 
million verdict. In May 1998, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed and annulled the $9.6 
million breach of contract judgment, holding that LPA had failed to demonstrate that it was willing and 
able to perform its own contractual obligations and agreeing that the BRA was statutorily immune under 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.521 In March 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a re-hearing of the 
case, thereby upholding the state supreme court ruling.522
 
On September 1, 1999, Mondev filed an investor-state suit under NAFTA Chapter 11 in ICSID. 
Mondev claimed that its failure to obtain damages through the U.S. judicial system amounted to 
discriminatory expropriation without compensation, and that its loss was at least $50 million in non-
realized profits.523 Specifically, Mondev claimed that the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
jury award and application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity constituted a substantive and procedural 
denial of justice in violation of the minimum standards of treatment guaranteed foreign investors under 
NAFTA Article 1105.524 Further, Mondev argued that the actions of the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
constituted expropriation without compensation, in violation of NAFTA Article 1110.525 Finally, Mondev 
alleged that comments by BRA staff and the Boston City Council demonstrated an anti-Canadian bias and 
discriminatory intent in violation of NAFTA Article 1102 national treatment guarantees.526
 
 In response to Mondev’s expropriation claim, the tribunal found that any expropriation that may 
have occurred predated NAFTA and was therefore inapplicable. Mondev had argued that in essence, the 
torts were “continuing torts” that allowed its claim to fall within the time requirements of NAFTA.527 
However, the tribunal declined to adopt such an expansive interpretation of the alleged expropriation. It 
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found that if the 1989 expiration of the option to purchase was to be considered the expropriation event 
that caused the alleged injury, then the claim was time-barred because it occurred 10 years before 
Mondev filed its Notice of Intent in 1999.528 Alternatively, if the loss of LPA and Mondev’s rights as a 
result of the foreclosure were to be deemed the date of injury, the claim also would have expired because 
it occurred in 1991.529  
 
However, the tribunal did decide to consider whether the actions of Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court could be considered the act that constituted an expropriation.530 Although the panel held 
out the possibility that a court’s application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity could in certain 
circumstances violate NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment requirements,531 ultimately, in regards to 
the court claims, the tribunal found against Mondev on both the claims of minimum standard of treatment 
and expropriation. The tribunal found that Mondev’s rights were not expropriated because the reason 
Mondev lost its rights to the property was that it failed to exercise its right of option to purchase the 
property within the requisite time period.532 The tribunal further found that the court’s decision 
recognizing the city of Boston’s sovereign immunity was well-founded in Massachusetts’ law of 
contracts.533
 
Softwood Lumber Firms v. United States − Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Since 
the U.S.-Canadian Softwood Lumber Agreement ended in March 2001 and the United States instituted 
anti-dumping cases and their countervailing duties against Canadian softwood lumber in May 2002, at 
least four Canadian lumber companies have weighed in with a new set of NAFTA investor-state cases 
based on these actions. Doman Industries is based in Duncan, British Columbia, Canada.534 It is engaged 
in the business of logging and wood processing. Doman Industries is publicly traded on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange.535 Until recent financial problems, it claims to have employed approximately 4,200 people.536 
Doman’s largest market for lumber sales is the United States.537 Canfor Corporation is headquartered in 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. It is an integrated forest products company that sells timber 
throughout North America.538 It operates 19 sawmills in Canada and also has a U.S. subsidiary – Canfor, 
U.S.A.539 Canfor earns approximately $2.95 billion annually and employs 10,300 people.540 Terminal 
Forest Products, Ltd. is incorporated in Richmond, British Columbia, Canada. It is a privately owned 
corporation that is wholly owned by Terminal Sawmills, Ltd.541 Terminal Forest Products, Ltd. produces, 
processes and sells western red cedar lumber products.542 It owns three U.S. enterprises: Terminal Lumber 
Sales, Inc., Terminal Forest Products, Inc. and South Everson Lumber Co. Inc.543 Tembec, Inc. based in 
Quebec is a Canadian forestry products firm with over 50 pulp, paper and wood product manufacturing 
units in Canada and assets of approximately $4 billion. It also has four subsidiaries in the United States.544
 
These firms are pursuing almost identical claims against the United States under NAFTA Chapter 
11 for $514 million, $250 million, $200 million and $90 million respectively.545 The companies allege 
that the U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duties measures violate their foreign investor rights under 
NAFTA Articles 1102, 1103, 1105 and 1110. The U.S. government contends that only NAFTA Chapter 
19, which provides only for state-state dispute settlement of countervailing duties cases, can be used to 
adjudicate these disputes – not Chapter 11.546  
 
The Canfor tribunal will likely have the opportunity to decide this issue, as that case has moved 
the furthest, although it has not yet produced a jurisdictional ruling. Given the complexity and domestic 
political sensitivity of anti-dumping policy and that possible new rules are now being negotiated globally 
at the WTO, the notion that one NAFTA tribunal constituted in a private enforcement action would be 
empowered to decide the question of competing jurisdictions between two very controversial chapters of 
a highly controversial agreement is an extraordinary development that could lead to another 
“clarification” by NAFTA governments. In addition, these NAFTA cases further complicate the 
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monumentally confusing softwood lumber issue that is being heard in at variety of venues at once: in 
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals and at the U.S. International Trade Commission, as well as the state-state 
dispute resolution systems of the WTO and the NAFTA. 
 
Waste Management v. Mexico – Municipal Waste Disposal Contract: Waste Management, Inc. 
the private waste disposal giant based in Houston, Texas, initially filed its NAFTA investor-state case on 
September 29, 1998.547 This case was dismissed by an ICSID panel on June 2, 2000, on the grounds that 
the company had not properly waived its right to pursue the case in the Mexican court system. Under the 
rules of NAFTA, a claimant cannot generally pursue a case in two venues at the same time, and 
ACAVERDE, S.A., Waste Management’s subsidiary in Mexico, was concurrently pursuing the same 
issues in Mexican court. When its efforts failed in the domestic court system, it pursued compensation 
over the same issues in a NAFTA tribunal. 
 
Waste Management re-filed its case at ICSID on September 18, 2000.548 The NAFTA claim 
stems from a concession agreement between Acapulco City, Mexico of the State of Guerrero and 
Acaverde, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Waste Management.549 Under the 1995 concession agreement, 
Acaverde received the exclusive right to provide waste disposal and street cleaning services to the city of 
Acapulco.550 In order to comply with the monthly payments under the concession agreement, the city of 
Acapulco received a line of credit from a Mexican Bank, partially owned by the federal government, 
Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C. (“Banobras”).551 The parties to the line of credit 
agreement were the state of Guerrero, the city of Acapulco and the bank. Acaverde alleges that throughout 
the duration of the concession contract, the City of Acapulco failed to make monthly payments, illegally 
granted other businesses and individuals overlapping rights that conflicted with Acaverde’s rights, and 
failed to secure additional funding for additional projects Acaverde deemed necessary to fulfill the 
concession agreement.552 The company argued that Mexico via the municipality, the state, Banobras and 
the failure of the court system denied Waste Management the minimum standard of treatment in violation 
of NAFTA Article 1105. Further, Waste Management argued that Mexico’s failure to compensate it 
constituted an expropriation in violation of Article 1110.  
 
 In response, Mexico filed a Memorial on Jurisdiction, contending that Waste Management was 
precluded from resubmitting the claim because Chapter 11 does not provide for re-submission of claims 
and that further, the resubmitted claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (“the issue has been 
decided”). The tribunal found that Chapter 11 does not expressly preclude the resubmission of a defective 
claim.553 In light of Chapter 11’s silence on the issue, the tribunal, relying upon international law, found 
that “if a jurisdictional flaw can be corrected, there is in principle no objection to the claimant State re-
commencing its action.”554 The tribunal then considered Mexico’s argument that the resubmitted claim 
was barred by the legal doctrine of res judicata, which means that a claimant may not make a second 
claim against the same party arising out of the same set of circumstances once the first claim has been 
decided. The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent parties from receiving “two bites at the same apple” 
once they have had the opportunity to litigate an issue and the issue has been resolved. The tribunal 
determined that in fact, res judicata, although a significant principle, did not apply in this case because 
the first panel did not decide any issues on the merits – it merely determined whether it was competent to 
exercise jurisdiction.555 Therefore, no claims arising out of the original suit had been determined yet and 
there was no bar to the resubmitted claim. 
 
A decision was rendered in the Waste Management NAFTA investor-state case on April 30, 2004. 
The tribunal found that none of the three governmental bodies acting on behalf of Mexico had failed to 
accord the claimant the minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA Article 1105.556 The tribunal found 
that Banobras did not breach its duty to provide a minimum standard of treatment to the claimant because 
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it was not a party to the concession agreement and was therefore not obligated to loan money to the 
claimant.557 Therefore, the denial of credit or the denial of an increase in credit could not be interpreted as 
unfair treatment. Similarly, the state was not in breach of Chapter 11 because it was not party to the 
agreement nor a guarantor. The tribunal focused on the conduct of the city and acknowledged that the city 
failed in a number of respects to fulfill its contractual obligations. However, the panel found that the city 
made serious efforts to comply with the contract but was disadvantaged by such factors as the residents’ 
unwillingness to pay a separate fee for waste disposal services, the Mexican peso crisis, and by 
Acaverde’s poor business plan and “heavy handed” approach to clients.558 Moreover, the tribunal noted 
that in contrast to some bilateral investment treaties, NAFTA contains no “umbrella clause” or specific 
obligation for government to live up to contractual commitments. The tribunal stated, “[I]t is sufficient to 
say that even the persistent non-payment of debts by a municipality is not to be equated with a violation 
of Article 1105, provided that it does not amount to an outright and unjustified repudiation of the 
transaction and provided that some remedy is open to the creditor to address the problem.”559 Thus, the 
panel determined that the city did not breach its obligation under Article 1105.560 Further, the tribunal 
found that the Mexican federal court system did not breach its duty under Article 1105.561 The tribunal 
found that the federal court and Mexican arbitration tribunal were justified in their decisions and that the 
claimant had been provided opportunity to appeal these decisions and did.562 Therefore, the claimant was 
not denied justice or treated unfairly. Finally, the tribunal found that the city’s failure to pay the claimant 
did not amount to a direct or indirect expropriation, the enterprise was not seized, its business was not 
blocked by the seizure of key items or property but as a result of contractual faults the operation was 
“persistently uneconomic.” The panel concluded: 
 
[I]t is not the function of the international law of expropriation as reflected in Article 1110 to 
eliminate the normal commercial risks of a foreign investor, or to place on Mexico the burden 
of compensating for the failure of a business plan which was, in the circumstances, founded on 
too narrow a client base and dependent for its success on unsustainable assumptions about 
customer uptake and contractual performance. A failing enterprises is not expropriated just 
because debts are not paid or other contractual obligations are not fulfilled.563
 
This is the second time a municipal service contract case was dismissed by a NAFTA tribunal; 
Azinian was the earlier case. One NAFTA observer noted that the facts of this case are in line with a 
number of other investment disputes that involve a public unwillingness to pay for the provision of 
formerly public services by foreign investors.564
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V. OTHER NAFTA CHAPTER 11 CLAIMS 
 
 What follows are short summaries of other NAFTA Chapter 11 claims where a Notice of Intent 
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration has been filed but no arbitration appears to have yet commenced. A full 
account of how many claims have been filed or disposition of claims will not be known until the NAFTA 
governments start to post claims on their web pages. Because many of these claims involve small 
investors, it is unlikely that they have the financial resources to adjudicate these disputes in the costly 
investor-state system. In the Methanex case, for instance, the firm claimed lawyers fees of $11 million 
while the United States claimed lawyers fees of $3 million. 
 
Adams, et. al. v. Mexico – Land Dispute: On February 16, 2001, a group of U.S. citizens sued 
Mexico using NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state system, alleging illegal expropriation of their vacation 
homes and rental properties in the State of Baja California, Mexico.565 In 1995, a Mexican Federal 
District Court ruled that the developer who sold the properties to the U.S. investors did not own the 
land.566 After much legal wrangling and negotiation between the investors and the Mexican landowners, 
on October 30 and 31, 2000, Mexican authorities allegedly physically removed the investors from the 
land without promise of compensation.567 The case was filed at UNCITRAL, and the Americans are 
claiming damages amounting to $75 million.568 This is the first “class action” style claim that has been 
filed under NAFTA Chapter 11. The case has reportedly been bogged down due to Mexico’s refusal to 
acknowledge the validity of the claim.569 This delaying tactic can work only for so long, however, as 
panels can be appointed and arbitrations move forward without the agreement of the respondent 
government, though it is unlikely that a respondent government would let a case get under way without 
their participation.  
 
Amtrade International v. Mexico – Oil Contracts: Amtrade International, Inc. filed a NAFTA 
investor-state claim against the Mexican government on April 21, 1995. Amtrade is a U.S. company 
located in San Diego. In 1994, Amtrade and Petroleos Mexicanos, a government-owned oil firm, entered 
into a settlement agreement concerning a penalty charged against an Amtrade agent who had made an 
unauthorized bid.570 Little information is available about this bid or the type of business transaction that 
gave rise to the claim. As part of the settlement agreement, Petroleos Mexicanos had to allow a subsidiary 
of Amtrade, InversaMex Capital, Ltd., to make a customized bid for unspecified “items” owned by 
Petroleos Mexicanos.571 Amtrade contends that InversaMex attempted to bid on certain lots that Petroleos 
Mexicanos had published for bidding; however, the lots were later removed from bidding.572 Nonetheless, 
InversaMex submitted its bid and Petroleos Mexicanos accepted but refused to publish an auction date for 
the items.573 Despite repeated requests by InversaMex and Amtrade, Petroleos Mexicanos would not 
publish an auction date and eventually suspended all public bids for the rest of the year.574 Amtrade 
International is seeking $20 million from Mexico arising from Petroleos Mexicanos’ alleged failure to 
satisfy the terms of the settlement agreement and for violating Articles 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105 and 
1106.575 They also allege that Petroleos Mexicanos has violated NAFTA Chapter 15 [Article 1502] 
prohibiting government monopolies and state enterprises from abusing their status.576 No arbitration is 
known to have commenced in this case. 
 
Bayview Irrigation District, et. al. v. Mexico – Water Rights: A group of 17 Texas irrigation 
districts, plus farmers, ranchers and others who hold water rights in the Rio Grand River on the border 
between the United States and Mexico, filed a “Notice to Submit a Claim to Arbitration” on August 27, 
2004, alleging that Mexico is wrongfully diverting water from the river in violation of the suing entities 
NAFTA Chapter 11 rights. 
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The claimants allege they hold “fully adjudicated” legal right to withdraw 1.2 million acre-feet of 
water annually from the lower Rio Grand (called Rio Bravo in Mexico).577 They claim that Mexico 
“captured, seized and diverted” one million acre-feet of water from the Rio Grand into a series of 
reservoirs from 1992-2002.578 This diversion benefited farmers in Mexico as indicated by rising imports 
of fruits and vegetables, and has injured farmers and others in Texas, as indicated by a reduction in 
irrigated acreage in the U.S. counties nearest the river. The claimants argue that this seizure of water is 
“tantamount” to an expropriation under Article 1110, discriminatory under Article 1102 and not in 
accordance with the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105. They estimate the value of their 
lost water to be between $265-554 million dollars and request compensation in this range.579 The 
plaintiffs also estimate that 30,000 jobs have been lost on the U.S. side of the border due to the water 
shortage.580  
 
This is a novel NAFTA Chapter 11 case, because it is unclear how a domestic water claim – even 
one based on international water allocations – constitutes a NAFTA “investment” south of the border. 
This will no doubt be one of the first issues a NAFTA tribunal will have to resolve if one is constituted in 
the case. 
  
 Even though the Rio Grand originates in the United States, it is primarily fed by a half a dozen 
rivers all originating in Mexico. The plaintiffs allege that Mexico is violating commitments it made in a 
1944 water-sharing treaty between Mexico and the United States that gave the United States rights to 1/3 
(or a minimum of 350,000 acre-feet per year) of the water in the Rio Grand.581 In return, Mexico received 
1.5 million acre-feet from the Colorado River. Officials in Mexico have dismissed the claim as 
“unfounded” noting that Mexico’s average water payments have been greater than those called for in the 
treaty.582
 
Water scarcity is an issue of major concern in the southwestern United States and through most of 
Mexico. In recent years, increased attention has been paid to an extremely serious water crisis in Juarez 
and other Mexican border towns that are growing at unsustainable rates and may run out of fresh water in 
the next five years. The water crisis has prompted numerous high-level meetings between the nations 
including meetings of the presidents. The severe shortage of water in Mexico is considered by many to be 
a national security issue. The latest NAFTA dispute is sure to exacerbate tensions on both sides of the 
border. Due to the recent filing of this claim, arbitration has not yet commenced in this case. 
 
Scott Ashton-Blair v. Mexico – Land Dispute: Scott Ashton-Blair is an attorney from Arizona who 
filed a NAFTA investor-state claim against the Mexican government on May 21, 1999.583 Mr. Blair 
claims to have purchased land in Puerto Peñasco, Mexico to build a residence and a restaurant.584 He 
claims that he was beaten and jailed by a Mexican businessman in an attempt to prevent him from 
opening what would be a competing restaurant.585 While in jail, he was denied access to a lawyer, the 
right to speak with his wife and medical attention.586 He also alleges that he has been continuously 
harassed by Mexican police officers and zoning officials.587 He is seeking the purchase back of his 
property at fair market value by the Mexican government for violating Articles 1105, 1102 and 1105(1). 
No arbitration is known to have commenced in this case. 
 
James Russel Baird v. United States – Nuclear Waste Disposal Patent: The only document 
available about this case is the Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, which is on file with 
Public Citizen. James Russell Baird is a Canadian investor who has filed a notice with the U.S. 
government stating that he intends to sue the United States using the investor-state mechanism of NAFTA 
Chapter 11 because the U.S. Congress chose to deposit nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, rather 
than in subducting tectonic plates.588 The Canadian investor claims to be an inventor and businessman 
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who holds patents in the United States and Canada for a method of disposing nuclear and toxic waste that 
involves sub-seabed disposal and subducting tectonic plates.589 While patents are arguably investments 
under NAFTA, CAFTA removed all doubt by explicitly including “intellectual property rights” in the list 
of protected investments. Baird’s theory, would allow for nuclear waste disposal in cave-like repositories 
under the ocean floor in subducting tectonic plates, such as the Pacific plate, which is slowing moving 
beneath the state of California. According to Mr. Baird’s theory the waste material would descend over 
time with the tectonic plate into the mantel of the earth. The Canadian investor claims that when the U.S. 
Department of Energy chose Yucca Mountain and issued site suitability guidelines in December 2001, the 
agency ruled out sub-seabed disposal and other options and put an end to the investor’s attempts to turn a 
profit his patent.590 He argues that the United States is in violation of NAFTA Articles 1102, 1103, 1104, 
1005, 1106 and 1110 because the U.S. action was arbitrary, discriminatory and tantamount to an 
“expropriation” of his investment and future profits and is demanding $13 billion dollars in 
compensation. Baird filed the Notice of Intent on March 15, 2002.591 No arbitration is known to have 
commenced in this case.  
 
Calmark Commercial Development v. Mexico – Land Dispute: Calmark Commercial 
Development (“Calmark”) is a California-based development company. The company claims to have 
entered into a “joint venture contract” with an American citizen named Robert Bisbee and a Mexican 
citizen named Bibiana Betina Bacon to develop 6.9 acres of land located in Cabo San Lucas, Baja 
California Sur, Mexico.592 Calmark claims to have paid Bacon $25,000 in 1989 for the right to develop a 
tourist attraction on the site.593 In addition, Calmark paid $180,000 to Bacon’s bank, which had a lien on 
the property.594 In exchange, Bacon was to have conveyed the land into a trust to Calmark. Instead, Bacon 
allegedly conveyed the land in trust to Robert Bisbee.595 Calmark promptly hired lawyers and sued in 
Mexico’s domestic court system. Calmark won its case, dissolving the trust in the Fourth Civil Court in 
Tijuana and in appellate court. What happened next, however, is an extremely complicated tale involving 
multiple lawsuits, parties named and unnamed, and allegations of fraud and forgery. In short, Calmark 
alleges that a renegade attorney from the firm representing the company in Mexico settled the case and 
assigned Calmark’s rights to pursue litigation to a third party for $400,000, leaving Calmark with no 
compensation and no land.596 This prompted more than one criminal complaint by Calmark’s true 
attorneys and a civil complaint by Calmark.597 In the end, Calmark failed in its efforts to punish the 
renegade lawyer for perpetrating an alleged fraud and receiving compensation for the funds it paid for the 
property. Now the company is using NAFTA’s investor-state process to seek compensation by charging 
that the Mexican domestic court system violated Calmark’s NAFTA foreign investor rights. Calmark 
claims that the Mexican courts have violated NAFTA Articles 1105, 1109 and 1110. (NAFTA Article 
1109 forbids the NAFTA parties from interfering with the transfer of capital, and Calmark alleges the 
Mexican judiciary failed in assisting the company in securing and transferring the money that was owed 
them in this case.)598 Calmark is asking for $400,000 in compensation.599 It is extremely hard to imagine 
how a NAFTA tribunal will be able to unravel the numerous criminal and civil cases described above and 
“rehear” these complex issues. The Calmark claim is not dated. Apparently, no arbitration has 
commenced in this case. 
 
Connolly v. Canada – Land Dispute: The only document available about this case is the Notice of 
Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, which is on file with Public Citizen. Albert Connolly is the owner 
of Brownfields Holding, Inc., an Atlanta, Georgia firm. Connelly alleges he owned property in Canada, 
which was expropriated for the purpose of building a park as part of Ontario’s Living Legacy Program.600 
Connolly alleges that the province of Ontario, through its Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, 
refused to “give credit” for a timely submitted professional report, which caused the expropriation to 
occur.601 Because the filing in this case is very brief and the investor refuses to comment, it is hard to 
discern the specifics of these allegations. No arbitration is known to have commenced in this case. 
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Robert J. Frank v. Mexico – Land Dispute: According to the Notice of Intent, an American 
investor named Robert Frank claims to have acquired rights to waterfront property in Baja California, 
Mexico, from another American in 1989.602 Frank claims to have spent more than $100,000 fixing up the 
property, and in 1992 petitioned the Mexican government to annex neighboring property.603 In 1996, the 
ownership of nearby property changed hands, and the new owner claimed to also own all of Frank’s 
property. In 1999, Frank received a notice from the Mexican government dated August 20, 1999, 
questioning his right to own the property and giving him 10 days to respond.604 Six days later, 
government officials took possession of the property, removing the investor’s guests.605 Later a sign was 
posted marking the property as owned by the government, but the investor contends the property is being 
developed for commercial use in conjunction with the new neighbor who claimed ownership of the 
land.606 Frank is charging violations of NAFTA Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110 and is asking for 
$1,500,000 in compensation. Apparently, Frank did not take this case to the Mexican judicial system 
before pursuing his NAFTA claim as there is no mention of a domestic lawsuit in his notice. Frank filed a 
Notice of Arbitration at UNCITRAL on August 5, 2002. 
 
Francis Kenneth Haas v. Mexico – Investment Partnership Dispute: The only publicly 
available document related to this case is a Notice of Intent filed December 12, 2001. Francis 
Kenneth Haas, an American citizen, alleges that he was cheated out of a business investment that 
he owned with former Mexican partners in Chihuahua, Mexico. He alleges that collectively, his 
former partners, their lawyers and public notaries used coercion and force in an effort to destroy 
evidence of his legal ownership of approximately 75 percent interest in the firm’s shares and 
then legally registered the firm in their names.607 He further contends that the state of Chihuahua, 
via its alleged incompetence and procedural irregularities608 violated his rights as an investor 
under NAFTA of receiving fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105. He seeks $17 million 
in compensation. No arbitration is known to have commenced in this case.”  
 
Lomas Santa Fe Investments v. Mexico – Land Dispute: The only publicly available document 
related to this case is a Notice of Intent filed on August 28, 2001. Lomas Santa Fe is a Mexican limited 
partnership owned by the Lomas Santa Fe Group, an American corporation located in San Diego. Lomas 
Santa Fe Group engages in real estate development including residential, recreational and commercial 
development.609 Lomas Santa Fe Investments owned a piece of property in Mexico and intended to 
develop the property for commercial purposes but was prevented from doing so by the Mexican 
government. It alleged that on November 10, 2000, the property was expropriated by the Mexican 
government in violation of NAFTA Article 1110.610 Lomas Santa Fe further claimed that it was 
discriminated against and denied national treatment under Article 1102, as other Mexican developers 
were allowed to develop property in the same zone. The company seeks either the restoration of the 
property to its previous state plus $30 million or $210 million if the property is not restored. No 
arbitration is known to have commenced in this case. 
 
Ontario Limited v. United States – RICO Investigation: The only document available about this 
case is the Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, which is on file with Public Citizen. Gordon 
Paget and Philip L. Furtney are Canadian residents and 800438 Ontario Limited is a Canadian 
corporation, specializing in real estate investment.611 Paget and Furtney are both shareholders of Ontario 
Limited. On September 9, 2002, Paget, Furtney and Ontario Limited filed a lawsuit arising out of alleged 
violations of NAFTA Chapter 11. Ontario Limited claims to have operated three subsidiaries in Florida 
that collectively sold or leased a total of 13 charity bingo halls.612 Ontario Limited alleges that between 
1994 and 1995, the state of Florida accused it of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
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Organizations Act (RICO) for allegedly allowing illegal games to be played in its bingo halls and also 
subjected Ontario Limited to a tax audit. As a result, the state of Florida seized Ontario Limited’s 
property, including financial records and shareholder information and bank accounts.613 Two forfeiture 
proceedings took place, which Ontario Limited alleges did not result in a judgment in the state’s favor.614 
Yet, it contends that the state of Florida refused to return its property.615 Ontario Limited has sought the 
return of property and compensation from the state of Florida; however, it has been told by a Florida court 
that all claims against the state caused by the actions of prosecutors are barred by the Doctrine of 
Sovereign and Prosecutorial Immunity.616 Additionally, Ontario Limited alleges that many of the Florida 
state agencies involved have either destroyed or misappropriated their financial records and property. 
Ontario Limited seeks $38 million in damages under NAFTA, alleging that the United States violated 
Article 1110 for expropriating its bingo halls, financial records, bank accounts and other business 
property. Additionally, it claims the United States violated Articles 1102, 1103, 1104 and 1105 because 
American bingo halls that operated the same types of games were not subject to the same treatment as 
Ontario Limited. Apparently, no arbitration has yet commenced in this case. 
 
Signa v. Canada – CIPRO Antibiotic Patent: On March 4, 1996, Signa, a Mexican pharmaceutical 
manufacturer based in Tolucca, Mexico, filed the first ever NAFTA investor-state claim.617 The firm was 
involved in a joint venture with Apotex, Inc. of Ontario to produce ciprofaloxacin hydrochloride, better 
known as CIPRO, a powerful multi-spectrum antibiotic. Signa attempted to challenge the Canadian patent 
law that permitted Bayer (the patent holder) to block the manufacture of a generic equivalent to CIPRO 
for three years.618 Signa charged that Bayer did not have a valid patent, yet the Canadian law allowed 
Bayer to block the generic manufacture of CIPRO without any preliminary judicial consideration of the 
contested patent.619 Signa charged that the Canadian law was a violation of Article 1105’s fair and 
equitable treatment rules as well as a measure “tantamount to an expropriation” under Article 1110. The 
firm also alleged that the patent law was not in compliance with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Signa demanded $40 million in lost profits and the long-
term loss of its Canadian market share. The issue never went to arbitration and little else is known about 
the case or whether an agreement was reached with Canada over the patent laws. Interestingly, the 
Canadian government temporarily overrode Bayer’s patent of CIPRO during the anthrax scare of 2001. 
Apotex was tapped to mass produce the drug, but a last-minute deal with Bayer prevented the patent 
override from going into effect.620  
 
Sun Belt v. Canada − Bulk Water Shipments: Sun Belt Water, Inc. is a bulk water 
importer/exporter based in Santa Barbara, California. In the late 1980s, California was in the midst of a 
drought, and the city of Santa Barbara and neighboring towns expressed an interest in acquiring bulk 
water delivered by marine tanker. In 1990, Sun Belt claims that it embarked on a “joint venture” with the 
Canadian firm Snowcap Waters Limited, which possessed a limited license to export bulk water from 
Canada.621 The companies planned to take the unprecedented step of exporting British Columbia river and 
lake water to California in oil tankers, and filed for an expanded water export license.622
 
 At a time when more of the world’s people are living in areas where fresh water is a scarce 
resource, Canada holds 20 percent of the world’s fresh water supply.623 Over the years, a number of 
investors have looked at Canada’s vast fresh water resources as a potential profit-making enterprise. In 
the early 1990s, the British Columbia government issued six export licenses for sale of a limited amount 
of bulk water and Snowcap received one of them.624 Dozens of applications for new and expanded 
licenses followed, and strong public opposition to bulk water exports quickly mounted.625 In 1991, the 
British Columbia government was forced by public protest to impose a temporary moratorium on the 
granting of new or expanded licenses for the export of fresh water.626 Many Canadians feared that if any 
province in Canada started to sell bulk water, water would become treated as a commodity under 
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NAFTA, and thus NAFTA’s investor rights and service sector market access provisions would kick in, 
making it impossible to limit the amount of water taken from the Great Lakes. This temporary ban was 
extended and made permanent in 1995, when British Columbia imposed a moratorium on water 
exports.627 In 1993, both Sun Belt and Snowcap sued the British Columbia government in domestic 
court.628 In July 1996, a settlement for $245,000 was reached with Snowcap, which already held a water 
export license it could no longer use, but no settlement was reached with Sun Belt.629
 
 On October 12, 1999, Sun Belt filed a “notice of claim and demand for arbitration” in 
UNCITRAL for damages in excess of $10.5 billion for the company’s future expected losses given its 
permanent lost business opportunity due to the water moratorium.630 In its NAFTA submissions, Sun Belt 
argued that by reaching a legal settlement with Snowcap, which held the export license, and refusing to 
settle with Sun Belt, the Canadian government violated the NAFTA investor national treatment 
provisions requiring equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors under Article 1102.631 In addition, 
the company claims that Canada violated NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment guarantee for foreign 
investors by infringing upon its due process rights (Article 1105) amounting to an expropriation under 
Article 1110.632 Finally, since Sun Belt could not argue that the 1991 water export moratorium violated 
NAFTA (which was signed in 1992 and adopted in 1994), it seems to have argued that the moratorium 
violated the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), which was rolled into NAFTA. The firm 
also expanded its claim to incorporate the 1995 permanent regulation.633 As of January 2005, the 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Web site claims that no valid claim has 
been submitted and no arbitration is proceeding. Even though the investor occasionally claims the case is 
active, apparently there has never been a panel constituted to hear this case, perhaps due to the fact that 
the key actions in the case preceded NAFTA. 
 
Trammel Crow Company v. Canada – Federal Postal Contract: The Notice of Intent in this suit 
was filed September 7, 2001, but has subsequently been withdrawn.634 Trammel Crow is a U.S. company 
based in Texas with a Canadian subsidiary “Trammel Crow Canada.”635 The company’s expertise is real 
estate management. The NAFTA case involves the company’s unsuccessful efforts to secure a contract 
with Canada Post Corporation for the management of facilities nationwide. Trammel Crow stated in its 
claim that the Canadian government issued a request for proposal (RFP) in order to solicit bids for this 
major service contract. Trammel Crow claims to have spent a great deal of time and money preparing a 
bid for the contract.636 The company charges however, that instead of engaging in a competitive bidding 
process, Canada Post instead met “in secret” with Trammel Crow’s competitors and decided to cancel the 
RFP and extend an old contract, shutting Trammel Crow out of the process.637 In its Notice of Intent, 
Trammel Crow charged violations of NAFTA Article 1102 and 1105 and demanded compensation in the 
amount of $32,000,000. This case was reportedly settled in 2002. No further details are available. 
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VI. THREATENED NAFTA CHAPTER 11 CASES 
 
In addition to NAFTA cases in arbitration and NAFTA claims that are awaiting arbitration, there 
have been a number of threatened NAFTA cases worthy of note. Of course, the full number of NAFTA 
investor-state cases being threatened privately is unknown and could be quite substantial. 
 
Chemical Company Threatens NAFTA Case Against U.S. Ozone Protection Measures: 
Atofina Chemicals, Inc. produces high-performance chemicals and polymers. Atofina is the North 
American subsidiary of the French Total Group, the world’s forth largest oil and gas company. Atophina 
is headquartered in Philadelphia and is incorporated in multiple U.S. states as well as Canada and Mexico.  
 
 Hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) 141b is a chemical used in foam insulation and has the highest 
ozone-depleting potential of all HCFCs in commercial use.638 In 2000, the EPA proposed banning HCFC-
141b use in foam blowing applications while allowing grandfathered uses until 2005, citing the 
availability of alternatives that do not deplete the ozone layer.639 The proposal was part of the Significant 
New Alternatives Policy, which allows for review and approval of alternatives to ozone-depleting 
agents.640 Atofina currently manufactures HCFC-141b in the United States and has opposed the EPA 
proposal.641 Atofina has argued against the ban on numerous grounds, including that a ban would violate 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11. Atofina claims that the domestic grandfather exemption would result in 
discriminatory treatment of investors seeking to import similar products from Mexico, thereby violating 
NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1103.642 Atofina also claims that a ban would constitute an expropriation in 
violation of NAFTA Article 1110.643
 
 It should be noted that Atofina has apparently not filed a NAFTA claim as of yet, but its 
comments on the record to the EPA hint that one could come if the EPA bans HCFC-141b. Although 
Atophina is a U.S. company with French parentage, it may attempt to use a subsidiary to advance a 
NAFTA Chapter 11 suit on the U.S. law. 
 
Tobacco Firm Delays Anti-Tobacco Legislation in Canada: A March 16, 2002, article in the 
Toronto Globe and Mail surprised Canadian health officials who were preparing to issue a new regulation 
on cigarette labeling. The newspaper reported that Philip Morris, the U.S. tobacco giant, was considering 
a Chapter 11 investor-state suit under NAFTA because of a proposed public health rule that would ban 
the words “light” and “mild” from cigarette packaging, terms that have misled smokers into believing that 
they were using a safer product.644
 
In a submission to the Canadian government, Philip Morris argued that the proposed ban of the 
descriptors “light” and “mild” would be “tantamount to an expropriation” of its tobacco trademarks 
containing those words in violation of NAFTA Article 1110, because it had invested millions “developing 
brand identity and consumer loyalty.”645 The company also asserted that the ban would be unfair and 
inequitable under NAFTA Article 1105.646 Philip Morris argues that government officials in Canada and 
the United States “actively encouraged” tobacco companies to develop and market low-yield cigarettes, 
and it is unfair of them now to chart a new course.647
 
Many nations are considering this type of legislation, not just Canada. In the United States, recent 
developments have added to pressure for the U.S. government to implement similar policies. First, on 
March 22, 2002, just one week after the company filed its NAFTA claim, the company was ordered to 
pay $150 million in punitive damages in a lawsuit brought by the family of Michele Schwarz, who died of 
lung cancer in 1999 at the age of 53.648 The verdict by a jury in Portland, Oregon, was the first in the 
nation to find that a tobacco company marketed low-tar cigarettes as a healthier alternative, even though 
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industry officials knew that they were just as dangerous as regular cigarettes.649 According to the 
Associated Press, there are similar class action lawsuits pending against Philip Morris and other tobacco 
companies in at least 11 U.S. states.650 In addition, a November 2001 monograph by the U.S. National 
Cancer Institute concluded: 1) that “light,” “mild” and “low-tar” cigarettes are just as harmful as regular 
cigarettes; and, 2) that advertising strategies used by Philip Morris and other companies have led 
consumers to perceive filtered and low-tar products as safer alternatives to regular cigarettes.651
 
While Philip Morris has told Public Citizen that it is not moving forward with the threatened 
NAFTA case, the Canadian public health legislation is not moving forward either.652 A spokesperson for 
Physicians for a Smoke Free Canada thinks that the Philip Morris threat as well as threatened domestic 
court action has played a role in stalling passage of this important public health policy.653
 
NAFTA Threats Scuttle Plans for Canadian Public Auto Insurance Program: In April 2004, 
an all-party committee of the provisional government of New Brunswick, Canada, recommended that the 
province develop its own public auto insurance program. The committee was responding to a public 
outcry over skyrocketing auto insurance premiums, an issue so controversial that it almost led to the 
unseating of the Progressive Conservative party in the 2003 elections.654 The committee recommended a 
plan that would achieve average premium reductions of approximately 20 percent over existing plans due 
to the not-for-profit mandate and other cost savings. 
 
Before the ink was dry on the proposal, the Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC), representing 
Canada’s largest insurers, warned that the proposal could trigger legal action on the part of foreign firms 
under NAFTA Chapter 11. The IBC General Counsel warned that the proposal could be considered an 
“expropriation” of the market share of NAFTA insurance providers already in the market.655 The NAFTA 
Chapter 11 tribunal in the S.D. Myers PCB case had previously stated that “market share” could 
constitute a legitimate investment under NAFTA. The IBC argument was supported by a legal opinion 
prepared for a number of Canadian provinces exploring similar schemes that warned that “to the extent 
that the replacement of private automobile insurance with a mandatory public insurance system were to 
deprive private insurance providers of the use or expected economic benefits of their investments,” it 
could be argued that the program was an expropriation under NAFTA.656
 
In June 2004, New Brunswick Premier Bernard Lord officially rejected the plan and instead 
recommended modest market reforms geared at lowering rates such as a first time driver’s credit and a 
new oversight board. The Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives charged that the government had 
backed down in the face of “aggressive threats of treaty litigation and behind the scenes lobbying by 
federal trade officials.”657 The Center’s Scott Sinclair argued that the province should go ahead and 
implement the plan. “The decision whether to create public auto insurance is still in the hands of New 
Brunswick citizens, and they should make it without interference from broadly worded NAFTA and 
[WTO] rules.”658 Canadian trade and investment expert Steven Shrybman added, “These investment 
treaty provisions are extreme and bear little or no relations to trade. They must be scaled back so that they 
do not interfere with democratic decisions about important public services.”659
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
After examining the extraordinary history of NAFTA cases and claims contained in this report, it 
is worth revisiting the underlying assumptions that gave rise to the NAFTA model of investor protections 
and the investor-state dispute resolution system. An analysis grounded in available data regarding foreign 
investment cast suggests neither the investment model nor its enforcement mechanism are justifiable or 
sound public policy.  
  
What Purpose Do These Foreign Investor Protections Really Serve?  
 
The primary justification for the investor-state system from the developed country point of view 
is that it is needed to protect investors from state seizure of property. The primary justification for the 
investor-state system from the developing country point of view is that the adoption of these investor 
protections will result in foreign direct investment. Both these arguments bear further scrutiny. 
 
Do Foreign Investor Protections Serve to Protect Firms from Expropriation? 
 
  The backers of the NAFTA investor protection model and the investor-state enforcement system 
argue that such provisions are needed to protect firms from illegal expropriations and outright 
discrimination in unstable nations with underdeveloped legal systems. Indeed, NAFTA backers invoked 
the history of Mexico’s 1938 nationalization of its oil industry to frame NAFTA’s extreme version of 
investor protections as a reasoned response to nationalizations and extrajudicial expropriations.  
 
Yet, as this report makes abundantly clear, the NAFTA Chapter 11 track record of cases is not 
one of reversing illegal expropriations or clear-cut instances of discrimination, rather it is a track record of 
a broad array of attacks on government actions and regulatory policies that include nondiscriminatory 
environmental and public health measures, a variety of land-use actions, domestic court decisions, legal 
settlements, municipal contracts, public services, tax policy, anti-gambling policy, drug policy and the 
application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. One supporter of these investor rules characterized 
NAFTA’s investment rules as “an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a 
financial or business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy or 
discriminatory treatment by the host treatment by the host government,”660 and this description is much 
closer to the mark.  
 
A review of the 42 NAFTA cases and claims in this report shows that only one case involved an 
incident that could be characterized as government expropriation – the GAMI Mexican Sweeteners case. 
The actions that gave rise to that case do not resemble the vision of unjustified government seizure of 
foreign firm that NAFTA supporters feared. The Mexican government’s 2001 takeover of a number of 
debt-ridden Mexican sugar mills resulted in troubled mills staying afloat and being restructured, so that 
the mills could once again become economically viable, and they are now being re-privatized by the 
government. It is likely that the government did not even know that a U.S. investment firm had a small 
share in a few of the plants. Governments in all three NAFTA countries are sometimes forced to address 
the problem of troubled firms in crucial industries with direct state intervention, as we saw when the Bush 
administration moved to assist the troubled U.S. steel industry in 2002.  
 
A full accounting of how often true government expropriations trigger bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) cases is not possible because the vast majority of these cases remain absolutely secret as they are 
adjudicated behind closed doors in various venues. While rare, nationalizations do occur. One need only 
think of the nationalizations performed in modern history in Libya and Iran, and more recently in 
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Zimbabwe. These infrequent occurrences, however dramatic, hardly justify the application of the extreme 
investor rights that allow investors to attack an array of host countries’ domestic policies unrelated to acts 
of expropriation in closed investor-state dispute resolution systems to all nations of the world.  
 
The golden rule regarding when international commercial agreements allow challenges of 
domestic regulatory policies should be simply: Is the regulation in question discriminatory? Does it treat 
foreign and domestic investors alike? If these questions are answered in the affirmative, there is simply no 
legitimate basis for an international commercial agreement to permit – much less encourage – investor 
challenges.  
 
Do Foreign Investor Protections Serve to Attract Foreign Direct Investment? 
 
 The investment rules contained in NAFTA, CAFTA, in BITs and many Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) have been packaged and sold to world leaders as a tool for increasing foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and also increasing trade. President Antonio Saca of El Salvador believes “CAFTA provides an 
opportunity for a new generation of companies to invest in our country, and encourage sustainable 
growth, a rise in incomes and economic diversification.”661  
 
But will CAFTA’s investment chapter deliver on such expectations created by decades of 
repetition of the claim? The evidence that it will not is beginning to accumulate.  
 
In 2003, the World Bank published a study analyzing FDI flows from 20 wealthier countries 
(members of the invitation-only Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to 31 
developing countries over the past twenty years. Noting that OECD member nations are the source of 
over 85 percent of FDI to developing countries, the study concluded that “analyzing twenty years of 
bilateral FDI flows from the OECD [nations] to developing countries finds little evidence that BITs have 
stimulated additional investment.”662
 
A recent Yale University study using similar econometric analysis with data from 176 countries 
found that “in general, BITs appear to have little impact on FDI.” Even more damning, the Yale study 
found very little relationship between the existence of a bilateral investment treaty with the United States 
and the level of U.S. FDI.663 A pending Tufts University study confirms these findings. Bilateral 
investment treaties have had zero effect in attracting FDI to Latin America, especially U.S. FDI, 
according to Tufts.664
 
These studies analyzed the actual investment flow data and conclude investor protections did not 
increase FDI. Yet, was Mexico under NAFTA an exception to these findings, given that FDI in Mexico 
increased after NAFTA? The work of Mexican economist Enrique Dussel Peters, of the National 
Autonomous University in Mexico City, demonstrated that Mexico’s shared border with the United States 
– not NAFTA’s investor protections – was the dominant factor attracting U.S. FDI.665 Yet in recent years, 
Mexico’s edge due to proximity has been eroded. After China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, U.S. 
investors started moving production from Mexico to China. Thereafter, Mexico saw almost 1/3 of its 
plants owned by U.S. investors relocate.666 It seems unlikely that the Central American nations or the 
Dominican Republic will benefit from proximity when so many U.S. firms have already made the 
calculation that China’s educated workforce, low wages and numerous government subsidies offset the 
transportation costs and inconvenience of long-distance production. Notably, the United States does not 
have a BIT with China, yet China is now the largest destination of U.S. FDI. Moreover, the flow of U.S. 
FDI is occurring despite the fact that the United States government and numerous business interests have 
long been extremely critical of China’s economic, political and legal institutions. 
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The mounting evidence that investment rules and the investor-state regime will have little impact 
on FDI is consistent with much of the literature on FDI, which cites labor costs, market size, market 
performance, access to regional and global markets, raw materials, physical infrastructure (ports, roads, 
power), cost of other inputs and other economic factors as the key determinants of FDI.667 As well, 
increasing factors include the presence of an educated workforce and large concentrations of skilled 
workers in urban areas, no doubt related to the increasing rates of offshoring of service sector jobs from 
developed to developing economies and the boom in mergers and acquisitions as foreign firms snap up 
privatized government assets. Standards of treatment for foreign investors may be one of the many factors 
businesses consider, but these factors are likely trumped by considerations regarding economic, political 
and social stability, rules regarding market access and taxation, and specific incentive packages tailored 
for specific businesses. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that there are many significant nations, major investors and major 
recipients of foreign direct investment whose transactions are not covered by BITs. Japan, which is the 
second largest source of FDI, is party to only four BITs, while Brazil, one of the biggest recipients of FDI 
in Latin America, is not party to even one BIT. 668 Conversely, many countries that have signed a large 
number of BITs have continued to receive only moderate FDI flows in return. For instance, the nations of 
Sub-Saharan Africa still have trouble attracting FDI, despite concluding a multitude of agreements 
designed to protect the interests of foreign investors in these countries. 669  
 
Moreover, the investment rules in the NAFTA, BITs and recent FTAs actually ban the primary 
public policy mechanisms used by governments to ensure that FDI contributes to local development. For 
instance, CAFTA Article 10.9, on Performance Requirements, provides that CAFTA nations may not 
impose requirements to: export a given level or percentage of goods or services; achieve a given level or 
percentage of domestic content; purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services 
provided in its territory; relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of 
exports; transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its 
territory; and act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or services it provides to a specific 
region or world market. Similar rules are contained in many BITs and FTAs. 
 
Most now-developed nations made extensive use of these types of performance requirements, 
such as local content rules, during their history of industrialization and some have maintained such 
policies until very recently. Many developed nations utilized such policies extensively in the auto sector 
to promote backward integration and localization of production and value added.670 Today, developed 
countries use other mechanisms that have different names but perform a similar function, such as trade 
‘rules of origin,’ which set the level of local content for product to qualify for trading preferences. 
Numerous theoretical, cross-country and country-specific studies have demonstrated that performance 
requirements are an important tools in development policy that generate significant benefits for host 
countries.671 Many would argue that such developmental tools should continue to be available to 
developing nations as they have been to developed nations, rather than being removed from that economic 
development toolbox.  
 
While developing countries have the most to lose, developed countries could see important local 
development policies challenged as well. For instance, the United States Community Reinvestment Act 
works by conditioning regulatory approval for the opening of new bank branches on a bank's record with 
regard to making loans and other investments in the locale it is supposed to serve. If drafters of FTAs and 
BITs make no exception for either of these types of public interest regulations, these laws could be 
challenged as forbidden performance requirements because they require a set portion of services to be 
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provided within a set domestic territory.  
 
The Real Story: Investor “Protections” Have Moved from Shield to Sword  
 
If these investor protections and investor-state enforcement are not central to the investment 
decisions of foreign investors and they do not promote foreign investment, what do they do? 
 
First, as this report demonstrates, instead of providing investors with a shield against government 
seizure of property, these investor protections are being wielded by investors as a sword to attack an array 
of regulatory policies and everyday government functions. To avoid incurring financial liability, 
increasingly countries will revoke important public interest policies, as Canada did in the Ethyl case, and 
weaken other regulatory safeguards to evade the possibility of further liability from other foreign firms. 
The variety of policies challenged is surprising, even to the governments who sign the free trade 
agreements and BITs containing investor protections. Recently, foreign firms have expanded the use of 
these rules even further to seek cash compensation for losses that occur during an economic downturn. 
The 30-plus cases against Argentina over the emergency measures Argentina took to weather its 2002 
financial crisis are still pending, but they threaten to take a substantial bite out of the Argentine recovery. 
Worse, such cases are only the beginning of the potential adverse impacts that such investor protections 
threaten.  
 
Second, recent BIT cases illustrate the astonishing extent of the financial liability that countries 
have knowingly or unknowingly undertaken when agreeing to the NAFTA model investor protections 
included in BITs and FTAs. In January 2005, the Slovak Republic was ordered to pay an astonishing 
$868 million to a Czech bank in settlement of a loan dispute.672 If Slovakia were to pay this amount, this 
would reportedly increase its public sector deficit from 3.9 percent of GDP, to 5.8 percent of GDP. 673 In 
2003, the Czech Republic was ordered to pay some $350 million to a multinational media firm (Central 
European Media or CME) following a BIT tribunal ruling that Czech media regulatory authority had 
violated the terms of a Czech-Netherlands BIT.674 The giant award almost doubled the Czech Republic’s 
budget shortfall that year. 675 In 2004, the U.S. firm Occidental Petroleum took advantage of a U.S.-
Ecuador BIT to challenge the cancellation of value-added tax rebates by Ecuador. It was awarded $71 
million plus interest by the BIT panel.676
 
Third, a government’s cost of defending against investor-state claims in various arbitration bodies 
can be quite substantial. The U.S. government has already spent $3 million in just one case − defending 
the United States against the challenge to California’s MTBE regulations.677 With 10 cases completed or 
pending against the United States, taxpayers may spend an approximate $30 million simply on legal fees. 
The Czech Republic spent $10 million in an unsuccessful effort to defend its interests in the two media 
cases mentioned above.678 Taxpayers in nations like Argentina, which has a total of 37 BIT cases pending 
against it (the vast majority by foreign utility firms challenging the emergency measures Argentina took 
to weather the 2002 financial crisis, such as a freeze on utility rates) and Mexico, with 14 pending BIT 
cases, will face very large bills for the specialized legal counsel needed to defend these cases. 
Alternatively, countries facing such prohibitive costs may find it more expedient to cave in when a 
challenge is threatened.679
 
But perhaps the clearest evidence yet that NAFTA-style investor protections have moved from a 
defensive tool against uncompensated expropriation to an offensive weapon used to attack basic 
regulatory policy is the fact that in CAFTA, new language may establish the right of a company to use its 
subsidiary in another nation, a nation that is a party to the agreement, to attack its home-state laws. This 
new clause – found in CAFTA’s Article 10.12 (Denial of Benefits) is an outrageous pre-emption of 
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congressional authority to make the law of the land. However, sadly this development is also a natural 
evolution of these unnaturally expansive investor protections. Recent BITs and NAFTA panel rulings 
have steadily eroded the ostensible foundation of these investment rules by concluding that investors need 
not be foreign to obtain compensation (Tokios Tokelės v.Ukraine) and may not even need to have an 
investment to bring investor-state claim (S.D. Myers v. Canada).  
 
The “Denial of Benefits” language in CAFTA lays bare the radical, underlying agenda of 
proponents of these rules. The expansive NAFTA-style “investor protections” are nothing short of a 
parallel court − a privatized judicial system − for investor complaints over government decisions, 
regulations and actions that impair their profitability. What certain multinational businesses could not 
achieve in the halls of Congress or Parliament or through domestic court systems, they have and will 
continue to achieve through “trade” rules unless Congress rejects the pacts containing these provisions. 
 
NAFTA Lessons for CAFTA Nations 
 
Of the 42 NAFTA investor-state cases and claims reviewed in this report, in five cases investors 
have succeeded with their demands for compensation, and in six cases, the government has successfully 
defended against investor challenges. Although this is still a small body of cases, the NAFTA rulings to 
date are sufficient to illustrate a number of alarming trends that should play a large role in the 
consideration of CAFTA, which contains similar terms. 
 
Foreign Investors Will Use the Investor-State System to Seek Compensation for Adverse 
Domestic Court Rulings: A growing number of NAFTA cases seek to challenge adverse domestic 
court rulings. In the Loewen funeral home case, the NAFTA tribunal indicated that potentially all U.S. 
domestic court decisions, including those of the U.S. Supreme Court, could be subject to NAFTA review. 
This expansive ruling led to protests from jurists and legal scholars. However, the investment terms in the 
proposed CAFTA fail to prevent complicated domestic court cases from being “reheard” in trade 
tribunals. 
 
Increasing Questions Regarding the Constitutionality of Investor-State Tribunals: Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution creates an independent judiciary. Congress cannot delegate the “essential 
attributes” of the judiciary to tribunals or other such bodies. Yet, just such a delegation appears to have 
occurred under the investor-state system. While organizations representing jurists have demanded an 
examination of the constitutionality of trade tribunals before the U.S. expands investor rules via new 
FTAs such as CAFTA, the administration has failed to provide such an analysis and instead simply 
replicated the flawed investor-state system in CAFTA.
 
Foreign Investors Can Bring “Regulatory Takings” Cases Not Allowed Under Domestic 
Law: While the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that “mere diminution” in the value of property does 
not constitute a taking, NAFTA panels have held that “incidental interference” with the use of a property 
might constitute a takings. One “fix” the USTR attempted in CAFTA was to eliminate the phrase 
government actions “tantamount to” an expropriation that appears in the NAFTA text as activity requiring 
compensation. However, that change is merely cosmetic. The new FTAs still require compensation for 
“indirect” expropriations which is the operative term.  
 
NAFTA Definition of “Investment” Does Not Conform to Compensable Property Under 
U.S. Law, CAFTA Makes Bad Situation Worse:  In NAFTA the definition of a compensable 
investment is not limited to the category of “real” property (i.e., real estate) implicated by regulatory 
takings jurisprudence. Indeed, most types of investments for which the U.S. government could be sued 
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under NAFTA generally constitute intangible “personal” property that would not be eligible to establish 
the existence of a regulatory takings claim under U.S. law. NAFTA panels have extended this textual 
definition further in deciding that domestic court decisions, “market access” and “market share” are 
compensable investments. CAFTA negotiators failed to heed the calls of Congress to provide “no greater 
substantive rights” to foreign investors than U.S. firms, and CAFTA expands the investment category by 
including: “the assumption of risk,” “expectation of gain or profit,” intellectual property rights, as well as 
“licenses, authorizations, permits” increasing U.S. liability and putting more local government actions in 
jeopardy. 
 
Potential Cost to the Taxpayers Could Reach the Billions: In the first 11 years of NAFTA, with 
only 11 cases decided or settled, fives times investors have succeeded with at least some of their claims 
and $35 million in public funds have been paid in compensation to foreign investors by governments. As 
an increasing number of cases are filed, billions in taxpayer dollars are being sought by NAFTA firms. 
Additionally the costs of defending cases are mounting. With 10 cases completed or pending against the 
United States, and just one case costing $3 million to defend, U.S. taxpayers may be billed an 
approximate $30 million in lawyers fees alone. If CAFTA were to be approved by Congress and go into 
effect, the liability and costs of the investor-state litigation will increase further.  
 
The Investor-State Mechanism Eviscerates the Sovereign Immunity Shield: NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11 and CAFTA’s proposed investor protections include no sovereign immunity shield. This 
constitutes a radical revision of longstanding U.S. sovereign immunity protections. As one legal scholar 
put it “[b]y assenting to the terms of NAFTA, the United States, Canadian and Mexican governments 
essentially have waived whatever rights of sovereign immunity they may have enjoyed prior to 
signing.”680 That foreign investors can sue the federal government when domestic citizens and firms are 
barred from bringing such suits is yet another example of how foreign investors are granted greater rights 
than U.S. businesses operating under U.S. law. 
 
State and Local Governments Are Not Safe From the Reach of Investor-State Tribunals: 
Not only have federal policies been challenged by investors in NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, but an 
increasing number of actions taken by state, provincial and municipal governments have been challenged 
as well. These include state and local land use decisions, state environmental and public health policies, 
adverse state court rulings, and state and municipal contracts. While the federal government is liable for 
any compensation awarded in investor-state tribunals, federal governments have a variety of avenues 
under domestic law to pressure state and local governments to alter their policies to reduce or avoid such 
liability. 
 
Public Disputes, Private Tribunals: When investors demand taxpayer funds as compensation in 
investor-state tribunals, the cases are heard in arbitration bodies, which were designed to arbitrate private 
cases between contractual parties in narrow commercial disputes. Now, however, these private arbitral 
bodies are dealing with significant issues of public policy. While the CAFTA text provides for such 
tribunal proceedings to be open to public observation (if interested parties can afford to fly to distant 
venues to observe), citizens still cannot be party to a suit. Even the ability to submit an amicus brief is at 
the discretion of the panel. Under NAFTA, these cases can still be closed to the public upon the demand 
of the plaintiff corporation. 
 
Threat of Investor-State Challenges Chill Public Interest Policies: Threatened cases continue 
to chill public interest policies. In 2004, a proposal by the New Brunswick, Canada, to develop its own 
public auto insurance program in response to skyrocketing rates was scuttled after it was noted that the 
idea could prompt legal action on the part of foreign firms that might consider a public auto insurance 
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plan an “expropriation” of the their market share under NAFTA. It is impossible to calculate the real toll 
of threatened investor-state cases because communication regarding such cases most often takes place 
behind closed doors. 
 
Number of Investor-State Cases Against Public Services Could Increase: The UPS case 
against the Canadian Postal Service encapsulates one of the most disturbing trends in the NAFTA cases 
taken as a whole, which is that some corporations are utilizing these rules to carve out move favorable 
market conditions for their firms. If the UPS suit is successful, few public services offered on a 
competitive basis would be safe from a NAFTA challenge of this type. CAFTA contains no language to 
safeguard nations from this type of case. 
 
Environmental Text Has Not Protected Investor-State Environmental Measures: The 
provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11 purporting to protect the environment have been given such short shrift 
by NAFTA investor-state tribunals as to render them meaningless. In the Metalclad toxic waste case, 
there was no evidence that the tribunal even considered Chapter 11’s environmental provisions before 
reaching a final decision. In the S.D. Myers PCB case, Canada’s obligations under an environmental 
treaty that regulates trade in hazardous waste, called the Basel Convention, was considered by the 
NAFTA tribunal, but in the end was completely discounted. Nothing in CAFTA remedies this problem. 
 
No Appeals in NAFTA, Appellate Proposal for CAFTA Deeply Flawed: There is no standing 
appellate body or other mechanism for appealing a NAFTA investor-state tribunal ruling. Thus, NAFTA 
signatory governments are subject to ad hoc rulings by an ever changing cast of ad hoc panelists. The 
result has been contradictory rulings on a variety of issues. The Bush administration is working on a 
proposed framework for an appellate mechanism for CAFTA. While the 2002 Fast Track statute required 
such a mechanism to establish “coherence,” the administration proposal calls for an ad hoc appellate 
mechanism drawing panelists from a roster, not a standing appellate body. The lack of permanent 
professional staff will ensure that panels will continue to strike out on their own in interpreting the 
complex investment rules, a recipe for further arbitrary, contradictory rulings, out of step with U.S. law 
and jurisprudence. Worse, the proposal eliminates the narrow, domestic court review allowed of some 
investor-state cases. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Both the NAFTA investment model and the private investor-state enforcement mechanism 
established in public treaties are bad public policy. NAFTA’s investment rules need a rewrite, and such 
provisions must not be included in future agreements. Even the most ardent business and government 
proponents of the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism do not argue that such a system is 
necessary to protect foreign investors in developed nations. The reasonable assumption underlying this 
position is that developed nations have strong domestic legal institutions to fairly adjudicate property 
rights. Indeed, very few treaties between developed nations contain such a mechanism, with NAFTA 
being a rare exception. Proponents of the NAFTA investor protection model do argue, however, that these 
investor rules should be applied to developed nations solely as a necessary quid pro quo to get foreign 
developing country governments to sign on to the rules. Thus, for developed nations, the application of 
the investor rules and the investor-state system is quietly acknowledged as completely unnecessary from a 
public policy perspective. 
 
For certain developing nations, the purported public policy concern is the readiness of the 
domestic judiciary to promptly and fairly adjudicate property rights. However, if developed nations truly 
have an interest in spreading the rule of law around the globe, some would argue that the best way to 
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achieve this would be to assist nations in the establishment of functioning political and judicial 
institutions – not by locking them into a set of specialized investor protections adjudicated by tribunals 
that do not provide basic due process protection and that serve only a very narrow set of interests. Indeed, 
the creation of such a specialized investor model may remove the incentive of developed nations to give 
aid to further the development of judicial institutions. 
 
Certainly for the United States, the costs of maintaining a parallel “court” system that exposes 
U.S. federal, state and local governments to enormous liability as well as double jeopardy on litigated 
cases and threatens basic government functions and public interest safeguards on which we all rely clearly 
outweigh whatever benefits the investor-state system might provide some specific investor operating 
overseas.  
 
CAFTA nations appear to be getting an even worse bargain. There is no evidence that greater FDI 
flows will follow the application of these extreme investor rules. Plus, the risk of a multimillion-dollar 
damage award and the cost of simply defending these suits is even more burdensome to nations with 
smaller economies. 
 
Congress instructed U.S. negotiators to fix the problems inherent in the NAFTA investor 
protection model. The Bush administration ignored Congress’ will and signed a CAFTA text in May 2004 
that included investment rules that expand and even worsen the NAFTA investment rules’ serious 
problems. Because CAFTA is signed and the Bush administration will not open it to fix these problems, 
the only way to avoid spreading the NAFTA investment protection problems is for Congress to reject 
CAFTA and send negotiators back to the table with a clear signal that Congress’ demands on the investor 
protection issues must be met so that foreign investors are not granted greater rights than provided in U.S. 
law. As regards NAFTA and other FTAs containing investment rules, from a public interest perspective, 
an “interpretation” or “clarification” of the investment rules such as those issued by the three NAFTA 
trade ministers is not sufficient to fix the significant problems with the substantive rules or the procedural 
issues. 
 
To repair the balance between the public interest and corporate interests that has gone so badly 
askew under the NAFTA model of investor protection and to avoid spreading this failed model further in 
CAFTA, Public Citizen recommends:  
 
• The investor-state mechanism should be kept out of future agreements. Commercial disputes 
arising under the terms of international agreements between nations should be dealt with by the 
governments themselves on a state-state basis. There is precedent for this approach, as an 
investor-state enforcement mechanism was not included in 2004 U.S.-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement. 
 
• NAFTA is overdue for a thorough review with an overarching question of whether it should be 
continued. In the interim, however, the radical regulatory takings provisions that give foreign 
investors greater rights than U.S. investors under U.S. law should be excised from NAFTA and 
kept out of future agreements. Other aspects of the NAFTA model of investor protection model 
require significant change to ensure that foreign investors are not granted greater substantive or 
procedural rights than U.S. firms operating under U.S. law. 
 
• Trade agreements should focus on traditional trade matters − the terms of exchange between 
countries − not countries domestic regulatory system, investment regime or other internal 
policies. All non-discriminatory environmental, health, safety and other public interest policies, 
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as well as state and local matters and domestic court decisions must explicitly be kept from the 
coverage of investor protection rules. 
 
• If pressured to accept such investor-state enforcement as part of a free trade agreement or a 
bilateral investment treaty, developing countries should work to ensure that such enforcement is a 
temporary measure only. 
 
• When Fast Track expires in 2007, this outdated procedure for trade policymaking must be 
replaced by a more open, accountable procedure giving all potentially interested parties a voice in 
the process. 
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KEY RESOURCES FOR NAFTA RESEARCHERS 
 
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch: www.tradewatch.org
 
Friends of the Earth: www.foe.org
 
International Institute for Sustainable Development Investment Newsletter: 
www.iisd.org/investment/invest-sd/
 
U.S. State Department site on NAFTA Chapter 11 cases: www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm
 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade site on NAFTA Chapter 11 cases: 
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/gov-en.asp
 
Mexican Government site on NAFTA Chapter 11 cases: 
www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sic_php/ls23al.php?s=18&p=1&l=1
 
NAFTA text: www.sice.oas.org/TRADEE.ASP#NAFTA
 
NAFTA negotiating texts (traveaux) for Chapter 11: www.naftaclaims.com/commission.htm
 
NAFTA Chapter 11 documents: www.naftaclaims.com
 
ICSID (provides list of pending cases): www.worldbank.org/icsid/
 
UNCITRAL (provides no information about pending cases or completed cases): www.uncitral.org/
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